If you’re like me, your first impression on hearing the news of Xander Bogaerts’ eleven-year, $280 million contract with the Padres might have been “what the %#&! are they doing?” An eleven-year contract for a thirty-year-old doesn’t align with the narrative in baseball over the last decade: analytically-minded teams understand that high-dollar contracts that go through players’ late 30s or 40s are a bad idea. And while the Mets’ signing of Carlos Correa this week to a twelve-year, $315 million contract was shocking in its own right after Correa had purportedly already agreed to a deal with the San Francisco Giants, the structure of the deal was not given the contracts we had already seen this offseason. For the Padres, perhaps signing Bogaerts for over a decade was a desperation play. They had just lost out on their reportedly preferred free-agent target, Trea Turner (more on him later). They are only a few months removed from emptying out a big chunk of their farm system to acquire Juan Soto and Josh Hader, who will become free agents themselves within the next two years. This is a team built to win now that has been all in the past two years, and if it took an eleven-year contract to get Bogaerts, the Padres panicked and felt they had to do it to put them over the top, even if it means they’ll be paying over $60 million to a 34-year-old and 41-year-old shortstop in 2033. But on further examination, we know it was probably the Padres who pushed for the deal to go eleven years, and subsequent reports confirm this. This is due to a wonky trend emerging in baseball economics that I will refer to as “AAV stretching.” By adding more years to contracts, some teams can actually save money and create additional payroll flexibility for themselves while paying players more. Bogaerts’, Correa’s, and Trea Turner’s contracts this offseason are prime examples of this. They show that certain teams seem committed to spending at or above the “competitive balance tax” (CBT) every year, and with that assumption, are structuring their contracts in a way that saves them money while also allowing them to make more competitive offers to free agents. To understand how the math works, we need to do a quick crash course in the CBT. A Crash Course in CBT Economics The CBT provides that if teams exceed a certain dollar threshold on their payroll in a given year, they must pay a tax on their overages. The salary of each player on a team’s 40-man-roster counts against the CBT. An individual player’s hit against the CBT is based on the average annual value (AAV) of his contract, which is calculated by simply dividing the total salary by the number of years. The CBT kicks in at $233 million in 2023 and there are four thresholds that increase the total tax penalty that a team pays. The size of the penalty also increases if teams pay the tax in consecutive years. The chart below demonstrates the possible penalties a team could incur for exceeding the CBT in 2023. Teams are only taxed on the payroll dollars above each individual threshold. So if a team exceeded the CBT for the first time in 2023 and had a payroll of $253 million, it would pay a $4 million tax penalty ($20M above the $233M, multiplied by the 20% tax rate). If that same team had decided to sign an additional player for $10 million, its CBT payment would have been $7.2 million—the initial $4 million, plus a 32% tax assessed on the $10 million above the $253 million threshold. With that context, we can see why teams like the Padres, Mets, and Phillies were happy to, and likely pushed for the three biggest contracts in this year’s free agent class to span over a decade and last into the signed players’ 40s. The Bogaerts, Correa, and Turner Deals Show AAV Stretching in Action Bogaerts’ contract has an AAV of $25.5 million. His fellow free agent shortstop, Trea Turner, signed a contract with the Phillies for $300 million over eleven years, for an AAV of $27.3 million. Turner will be 30 years old on opening day and, like Bogaerts, the contract takes him through his age 41 season. Correa’s twelve-year deal with the Mets has an AAV of $26.25 million and lasts through his age 40 season. When we compare Bogaerts’, Turner’s, and Correa’s contracts to other recent megadeals for shortstops, an odd trend emerges. Francisco Lindor reset the salary market for shortstops with his record-setting extension with the Mets in 2021. The deal kicked in for Lindor’s age 28 season and paid him $341 million over 10 years, good for a $34.1M AAV. The following offseason, Cory Seager signed a similar contract for his age 28 season—a 10-year deal for $325 million total, or a $32.5M AAV. Marcus Semien, who was three years older than each of them but had performed at similar levels, received a shorter deal for less money from the Texas Rangers—$175 million over seven years ($25M AAV). Interestingly, each of these players’ contracts expired after their age 38 season, creating a trend for the top of the free agent shortstop market. As shown in the table above, Bogaerts, Correa, and Turner fit comfortably into this market of upper-echelon shortstops. They all had better contract years than Seager according to FanGraph’s wins above replacement (WAR), and Turner and Bogaerts even outperformed Lindor. [1] In the three years leading up to the signing of the contracts, Turner and Lindor are well above the pack. Semien, Bogaerts, and Correa are bunched in the middle, and Seager again bottoms out the list. If you look at each player’s average WAR in their best three years prior to signing the contract, Lindor tops the list by a fair margin, but things are tightly bunched for each of this year’s free agents, all of whom are above Seager. Like Correa, Lindor and Seager had the benefit of becoming eligible for free agency by their age 28 seasons. Using the Lindor and Seager deals as a baseline, you probably would have expected Correa to sign a similar deal, and Bogaerts and Turner to get similar, but shorter, deals to account for the fact that the contracts were starting at their age 30 season. Based on the prevailing trend in the top-level shortstop market, these deals would be expected to take the players through their age 38 seasons—ten years for Correa, and eight years for Bogaerts and Turner. Obviously, that did not come to pass. The older players got longer contracts than Lindor and Seager, as did Correa. While some people may point to a competitive free agent market, or factors like biomechanical research that allow for better player aging to explain this odd phenomenon, it was likely the exact opposite. It was the teams—the Padres, Mets, and Phillies—that pushed for these longer deals, not the players. Other articles have examined this issue and pointed to financial factors like high-interest rates today to explain why teams are structuring contracts like this. And that may certainly play a role, although it comes with the counterpoint that the exact same factors would be influencing player decisions to resist this trend. It’s more likely that the driving force behind these longer contracts is to reduce the AAV of the contract and lower any potential CBT payments for the teams. These contracts make sense for teams that plan to regularly spend at or above the CBT threshold. With that mindset, structuring contracts like this allows teams to both save money and offer longer contracts to players for a higher total value, thus making them more competitive players in the free-agent market. The Padres, Phillies, and Mets all paid the CBT in 2022. After they signed Bogaerts, the Padres' CBT payroll for 2023 is estimated to be $266 million, putting them in the second CBT threshold. The Phillies are estimated to be at $242 million, in the first threshold, for 2023. As repeat offenders, this would come along with a 42% CBT tax for the Padres and 30% for the Phillies (assuming Philadelphia stayed in the first threshold). The Mets, and their deep-pocketed owner Steve Cohen, blows both away. With a CBT payroll of $388 million for 2023, the Mets are nearly $100 million above the highest threshold that was instituted in the last CBA, and has been facetiously referred to as the “Cohen tax.” They will pay a 90% tax on Correa’s contract in 2023 An eight-year deal for Bogaerts at a $31 million AAV (slightly below Seager) would have paid him $248 million in total. An eight-year deal for Turner at a $33.75M AAV (slightly below Lindor) would have paid him $270 million. A ten-year deal for Correa at a $30M AAV would have paid him $300 million. By adding three years and knocking off 5—6 million in AAV to what the current shortstop market was dictating, the Padres and Phillies were able to significantly decrease the CBT payments they might make in a given year. The Mets were a little less “dramatic” by only tacking on two years and shedding $3.7M in AAV for what Correa might have otherwise gotten, but this comes with even higher savings due to the higher CBT threshold they find themselves in. The up-front savings the teams enjoy now alleviates the fear that they will be “wasting” money on the back ends of these contracts by paying 40-year-olds whose skills will likely have deteriorated at that point. And from the Bogaerts, Correa, and Turners’ perspective, they get more money overall. It's very doubtful that they would come close to earning around $25 million a year in those last couple of years (age 38-41) when they otherwise would have become free agents again. To get to the point where this structure would save the Padres and Phillies money, we need to assume that both teams are committed to maintaining a payroll over the CBT threshold every year for the life of the contracts. With that assumption, even if neither team ever went past the first CBT threshold again, the $30-$32 million in “extra” salary that came along with the eleven-year contracts pays for itself. For Bogaerts, we can estimate that the “stretching” of his contract lowered the AAV by $5.5M. In 2023, when the Padres will pay at least a 42% CBT tax, this would save them $2.31 million. If the Padres remained over the tax in 2024 but dropped back below the second threshold, the penalty jumps to 50%. The stretching would save them $2.75M that year, and every subsequent year after the end of the contract. In total, this would save the Padres $29.8 million. If you apply a formula for the time value of money assuming a 4% interest rate, that jumps to $38 million over the life of the contract, which more than cancels out the $32M in “extra” salary that came along with adding three years to the contract. Turner’s “stretching” had an even more dramatic effect, with savings amounting to about $44 million over the course of his deal under the same assumptions. For each of the teams, higher interest rates in the short term might make these savings even more dramatic Correa requires a slightly different analysis because it seems like the Mets are on a slightly different financial playing field than the rest of the league. Even if we assumed that the “Cohen tax” deterred the Mets from ever exceeding the fourth CBT threshold again over the life of the Correa deal (a doubtful proposition), they would pay a 96.5% tax annually if they stayed in the third CBT threshold. Lowering the AAV of Correa’s deal by $3.7 million saves the team $3.3 million in 2023, and $3.57 million a year from 2024-2035, for a real total of $39 million, or $49.7 million when applying the TVM formula. Perhaps just as important as the calculable dollar savings is the added payroll flexibility that AAV stretching can afford teams. Lowering the AAV on a deal by $6 million gives the Padres and Phillies that much more money to spend on players this offseason if they want to continue adding to the team but not jump into a higher CBT threshold. It can mean an established reliever, a useful utility player, or the difference between an injury-prone player with upside versus an all-star when signing a starting pitcher. If any of the Padres, Phillies, or Mets want to get below the CBT threshold at some point in the future, which can be as much of a strategic baseball decision as a financial one given that exceeding the CBT in consecutive years might lead to penalties lowering a team’s draft picks, then this flexibility can be very helpful. This strategy only makes sense for a small subset of teams that are at or near the CBT and plan to stay there for years to come. The Mets, Phillies, Padres, Dodgers, Yankees, and Red Sox were the six teams that exceeded the threshold in 2022, and all of them except the Red Sox and Dodgers already have payrolls for 2023 that are above the tax level with a few months left in free agency. It would not be surprising to see these teams continue to use this quirky trick to sign top free agents in future years as long as the CBT remains in place. If they are committed to spending above the CBT anyway, this allows them to make more competitive offers to free agents by increasing the length and total dollar amount of the contract while decreasing the actual cost to the team itself. You can say that AAV stretching is the rare win-win in the world of MLB player and team economics. [1] Lindor’s last season before signing the extension was the COVID-shortened 2020 season. For this analysis, I prorated his WAR from the 60-game season to a full season to show what it would have been having he played at the same level for 162 games.

United States Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Representative Alma Adams (D-N.C.) introduced the Fair Play for Women Act on Tuesday. Aimed at promoting fair and equitable opportunities and support for women’s programs, the bill seeks to hold institutions and conferences responsible for Title IX violations. In its current form, the bill expands the reporting requirements for colleges and K-12 schools, including the number of scholarships and amount of student aid, and makes the data available to the public. Additionally, the bill requires the institution to report (and certify) the requested data annually. According to the bill, if the Department of Education found a college or university out of compliance with Title IX, the Department of Education would be able to fine the institution or require the institution to submit a plan that would remedy the Title IX violation. Moreover, the bill adds a private right of action, allowing an individual to sue an institution for a Title IX violation. Other benefits of the new bill include annual Title IX training and the development of a database of Title IX coordinators at K-12 schools and colleges/universities. This past summer was the 50th anniversary of Title IX. Since then, opportunities for girls and women to participate in sports have grown exponentially. Despite the growth, there remains a shortfall in the opportunities available for girls and women compared to boys and men. Specifically, the bill notes that there are over 1 million fewer opportunities at the high school level and nearly 150 thousand at the collegiate level. The Fair Play for Women Act hopes to bridge the gap. Due to the current session nearing its end, the bill is unlikely to pass. However, the same sponsors will likely reintroduce the bill next year. Recently, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) hired former Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker as its next President—a move many have considered a push to get Congress involved in regulating the NCAA. Thus, expect the Fair Play for Women Act and other issues to be front and center in the new year. Landis Barber is an attorney at Safran Law Offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or via his blog offthecourtdocket.com. He can be reached on Twitter @Landisbarber.

So far this offseason, we have seen a surprising development in how MLB front offices are structuring free-agent contracts for star players. Over the past decade and change, there have been countless examples of long-term contracts that simply haven’t panned out well for teams. Whether you want to talk about Albert Pujols’ deal with the Angels, Robinson Cano’s deal with the Mariners, or Jason Heyward’s deal with the Cubs, you could go on and on about how poorly those deals ended for those respective teams. Knowing how analytical front offices are becoming these days, you’d think that the result of all these aforementioned deals would make teams wary of handing a free agent a decade-long deal, right? This offseason has proved that hasn’t been the case. Over the past two years, there has been no shortage of consternation between management and players. Whether it was the disagreement about player salaries during the COVID-shortened 2020 season or the tension-filled lockout before last season, the relationship between the MLB and the MLBPA was rocky, to say the least. But after all the CBA negotiations, labor peace was ultimately achieved, and the landscape was paved for the owners to open up their pocketbooks heading into this offseason. Despite this, many remained skeptical that we’d see teams give the extra years and the extra dollars to players on the free-agent market. Coming out of the pandemic and lockout, the large majority of long-term deals we saw were signed by younger players with years of control like Wander Franco, Fernando Tatis, Julio Rodriguez, Spencer Strider, Michael Harris, etc to buy out arbitration years. There weren’t many players around the age of 30 signing those eight, nine, or ten-year deals we grew accustomed to in the early part of the 2010s. But that has changed so far this offseason as four players have already agreed to deals of at least 10 years. Why the re-emergence of the decade-long deal? The new CBA’s competitive balance tax implications are a big reason why. Contrary to the other major professional sports in the US, Major League Baseball does not have a salary cap. However, in order to keep big market teams like the Yankees from lapping the payrolls of small market clubs, MLB instituted a measure to somewhat penalize exorbitant spending called the Competitive Balance Tax (CBT). The tax line is set at $233 million for the upcoming season, with escalating penalties based on how far (and how often) clubs spend over the threshold. MLB does not calculate tax payrolls based on year-to-year salaries (teams frequently disperse money unevenly throughout deals), but, rather, annual average values. Because of this, by spreading out the money over more years, teams can lower their newly signed player's AAV. For example, let’s look at Carlos Correa’s new deal with the Giants. Many were surprised that the Giants were willing to give him a 13-year contract that will take him into his age 41 season. Many in the industry expected something to the effect of 10 years at most with around $350 million guaranteed. If the Giants would’ve offered 10 at 350, Correa’s AAV figure would have been $35 million, a significant impact on their CBT payroll. But by adding the additional 3 years, Correa’s CBT hit dropped to $26.9 million. That $8 million in savings allows the Giants more flexibility to stay under the thresholds that could result in penalties. The same can be said about the Turner, Judge, and Bogaerts deal as well. While this initially sounds beneficial for the teams, you might still be asking how these contracts will look in 2032 for teams when the age regression likely takes place. The honest answer is they probably won’t look great. However, I believe teams feel like they are getting “surplus value” over the first few years of these deals from an AAV perspective. While Farhan Zaidi, Brian Cashman, Dave Dombrowski, and AJ Preller probably won’t admit it publicly, they likely view any value they get in the last few years from their newly signed players as a bonus. In Correa’s case, Giants probably view it more as a 10-year commitment at the $350 million figure. If he flames out in 2033 like Albert Pujols, Jason Heyward, and Robinson Cano did, they’ll likely release him. While they’ll hypothetically still take the $26.9 million AAV hit in ’33, ’34, and ’35, they’ll hopefully already have gotten their return on investment in the first 10 years of the deal. Whether or not we see this trend continue in the future is yet to be seen. Will we see more teams manipulate the CBT penalties by offering 10, 11, 12, and 13 deals to players in free agency? Will MLB intervene and put a limit on the length of deals to prevent such action? It’s yet to be seen. But until anything is done about it, teams will likely continue to find loopholes to construct World Series-caliber rosters as efficiently as possible. On the player's side, I don’t think the MLBPA has a big issue with it. For them, it’s all about maximizing their earning potential. Unlike the NFL, MLB contracts are fully guaranteed. Getting released after suffering a career-ending injury won’t change the amount of money these newly signed players will receive in their deals. Carlos Correa was getting $350 million regardless of if he signed a 10-year deal or a 13-year deal. In addition, he gets some level of certainty as to where he’ll be for the foreseeable future and doesn’t have to worry about an injury derailing his value if he were to go on the free agent market any time soon. As with anything, change is inevitable in the modern landscape of sports. But this trend we’ve seen this offseason could have a monumental impact on the length of free agent deals in Major League Baseball for years to come. Brendan can be found on Twitter @_bbell5

The panel convened in the Independent Accountability Resolution Process (IARP) issued its Public Infractions Decision in the University of Arizona case. Former University of Arizona men’s basketball coach and current Xavier University head coach, Sean Miller, avoided sanctions, but the University of Arizona will serve three years of probation, which will end in 2025. A portion of Arizona’s case revolves around former assistant men’s basketball coach Emanuel “Book” Richardson. An FBI investigation revealed that Richardson accepted $20,000 in bribes from an agent, which Richardson used to direct players to the agent’s services. Richardson served 90 days in a federal correctional institute after pleading guilty to one count of bribery. Another former assistant coach, Mark Phelps, is also a part of the panel’s decision after loaning $500 to a prospective student-athlete, then attempting to cover up the violation. The panel’s decision encompassed both the men’s basketball program and the swimming and diving program, finding that an assistant coach for the swimming and diving program “conducted impermissible tryouts and provided preferential treatment to prospective student-athletes.” Violations As a result of each assistant coach’s conduct, the panel found that Richardson committed multiple Level I violations, and Phelps committed a Level II violation and multiple Level III violations. At the same time, the assistant swimming and diving coach committed multiple Level II and III violations. Each assistant coach received a show-cause penalty. If the coach is still an NCAA coach, the show-cause penalty requires the coach’s employer to appear before a committee every six months and detail how the coach has complied with the NCAA rulebook. For Richardson, the show-cause penalty is ten years. For Phelps, it is two years, and for the assistant swimming and diving coach, it is one year. Both head coaches of the programs avoided sanctions due to the panel finding that the head coaches “promoted an atmosphere of compliance,” including overseeing the assistant coaches. However, the institution received a Level II violation due to the lack of education regarding NCAA rules amongst its athletic staff. Penalties The panel accepted most of the self-imposed penalties against the men’s basketball program, including the 2021 postseason ban, but also added a seven-week recruiting communication ban for the current year. Additional penalties include vacating wins from seasons when the conduct occurred. The swimming and diving program received several penalties, including one-weeks suspensions for off-campus recruiting and communications and a reduction in the number of official visits for the current academic year. The institution will be on probation for three years, beginning on Wednesday, which will include seminars on NCAA rules and providing prospective student-athletes with information about the probation and violations. As one of the last Independent Accountability Resolution Process is nearing its end, the Division I Board of Directors decided to eliminate the IARP. A big reason why the Division I Board of Directors voted to eliminate the IARP is the length of time it takes to reach a decision. Arizona’s case is a prime example. Much of the conduct occurred in 2017, and none of the individuals remain with the university. Thus, a more efficient process will be coming soon. Landis Barber is an attorney at Safran Law Offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or via his blog offthecourtdocket.com. He can be reached on Twitter @Landisbarber.

York County, South Carolina has approved a settlement agreement with GT Real Estate Holdings, LLC (GTRE) over the failed Carolina Panthers Headquarters project in Rock Hill, South Carolina. The agreement will settle the lawsuit filed by York County in June in South Carolina state court. Lawsuit Filed mere days after GTRE filed for bankruptcy, York County’s brought the lawsuit against the City of Rock Hill, David Tepper, and entities connected to David Tepper. It centers around the county-designated $21 million of Penny Tax Funds to expand Mt. Gallant Road. According to York County, after York County wired the funds, GTRE did not use the funds for the Mt. Gallant Road project. The basis for the claims against the Tepper entities, including negligence and negligent misrepresentation, is that the entities did not perform the work pursuant to the land development agreement for the project. The claim against Rock Hill is for breach of contract due to Rock Hill failing to issue bonds for the project, which ultimately led to GTRE terminating the project. Settlement As a part of the settlement agreement, a GTRE affiliate will reimburse York County the full $21,165,000.00 in Penny Tax Funds. In turn, York County will withdraw any complaints and allegations of wrongdoing. Last week, the York County Sheriff’s Office announced an inquiry into GTRE’s handling of the Penny Tax Funds. York County announced that the settlement resolves the county’s disputes and “the County considers all matters related to the County Payment closed and believes that no action of any kind with respect to the County Payment is warranted.” The settlement must be approved by the Bankruptcy Court before the matter is fully resolved. David Tepper and GTRE are chipping away at the issues on the York County project. One outstanding item in the Bankruptcy Court is settling with contractors that performed work on the project. Notwithstanding the remaining items, reaching an agreement with York County puts another issue behind them. Landis Barber is an attorney at Safran Law Offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or via his blog offthecourtdocket.com. He can be reached on Twitter @Landisbarber.

First reported by Pete Thamel of ESPN, the College Football Playoff (CFP) has agreed to expand the playoffs to 12 teams beginning in 2024, moving the date up from 2026. Unless the committee made changes, the 12-team field includes champions from each Power 5 conference, the Group of 5 champion, and six at-large teams. On September 2, the CFP announced an expansion of the playoffs from 4 teams to 12 teams beginning in 2026, citing a need for more participation in college football’s national championship tournament. Importantly, the CFP received nearly $470 million per year in television rights for the four-team format. Since the announcement, the CFP has been working to move up the expansion to the 2024 season. However, each playoff bowl game and ESPN, the television rights holder, needed to agree to the 2024 start date. Until Thursday, the Rose Bowl was the lone holdout, seeking better terms and primetime slots during non-playoff years. By Thursday evening, the CFP had resolved the issues, paving the way for the CFP to begin in 2024. Additionally, the CFP announced that the 2024 playoff begins the week ending on Saturday, December 21, with the higher-seeded team hosting. The top 4 teams will receive a bye. Semifinal winners will play the 2024 National Championship game in Atlanta on January 20, 2025, and the CFP will hold the 2025 championship game in Miami on January 19, 2026. The CFP did not announce anything regarding playoffs beyond 2025. ESPN’s television rights agreement expires in 2025. The NCAA is seeking a new deal that could include multiple broadcasts and fetch up to $2 billion annually—far exceeding the current $470 million. Most teams will welcome expanded opportunities to compete for a national championship. For the College Football Playoff, more playoff games mean more revenue, and a big payday will be coming soon. Landis Barber is an attorney at Safran Law Offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or via his blog offthecourtdocket.com. He can be reached on Twitter @Landisbarber.

On Wednesday, the University of California Board of Regents approved the University of California, Los Angeles’ (UCLA) move to the Big Ten Conference. With the approval, UCLA will leave the Pac-12 Conference and join the Big Ten in 2024. In June, UCLA and the University of Southern California (USC) announced they would move from the Pac-12 to the Big Ten in 2024. Since it is a private university, USC did not need approval from the Board of Regents. Since the announcement, the Board of Regents has been reviewing UCLA’s move, including holding multiple meetings. Despite UCLA having the authority to contract with the Big Ten, the Board of Regents may affirm or overturn UCLA’s decision. During its review, many of the Board of Regents’ concerns revolved around the student-athlete experience. Specifically, the Board of Regents raised concerns surrounding nutrition, mental health, and travel time. Needing only majority approval, the Board of Regents approved the move 11 to 5. To combat the concerns, the Board of Regents approved the move with conditions, including increasing support for the 2023-2024 fiscal year. The support includes at least $1.5 million in academic support, $4.3 million in nutritional support, and $562,800 in mental health services. Other conditions include establishing a $2.5 million reserve fund to supplement the aforementioned support and a contribution to the University of California, Berkeley after the Pac-12 finalizes its media agreement. The University of California, Berkeley will remain in the Pac-12. With conference realignment expected to continue in the future, the Board of Regents’ decision is insight into decision-making that may occur in other systems. For example, the University of North Carolina (UNC) and North Carolina State University (NCSU) are in the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) and part of the University of North Carolina System. Similar to the University of California System, University of North Carolina System institutions may enter into contracts and agreements, but the Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina System may rescind the authority at any time (see N.C.G.S. 116-11(13)). Thus, if either UNC or NCSU were to leave the ACC without the other school, we could see the Board of Governors review the departing university’s decision or even rescind the decision. The increased support from the Board of Regents’ decision is a victory for student-athletes attending UCLA. For UCLA, the support and contribution to Berkeley are minor payouts compared to the giant 7-year, $7 billion media rights deal the Big Ten recently inked. With the approval, UCLA will be heading to the Big Ten. Landis Barber is an attorney at Safran Law Offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or via his blog offthecourtdocket.com. He can be reached on Twitter @Landisbarber.

First reported by Greg Madia of The Daily Progress, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) will grant an additional year of eligibility to University of Virginia football players that do not have any eligibility remaining. The University of Virginia submitted the request to the NCAA, and the NCAA granted the request after the university’s season was halted after ten games. The University of Virginia canceled its remaining games against Coastal Carolina and Virginia Tech after the devastating deaths of 3 football players, Lavel Davis Jr., Devin Chandler, and D’Sean Perry. During the weeks of the canceled games, Virginia football players took part in each of the funerals for their teammates and a memorial service on campus. Typically, Division I athletes, including football players at Virginia, have five years to play four seasons of competition, beginning at the time of enrollment. In 2020, the NCAA granted an extra year of eligibility to winter and spring sports, which extends the clock for 2020/2021-enrolled athletes to six years. If an extraordinary circumstance prevents an athlete(s) from meeting the eligibility rules, a school can file a waiver on the athlete(s) behalf. Here, due to outgoing athletes being unable to complete their careers, the University of Virginia sought a waiver of the eligibility timeline. Now, those athletes will be able to play an additional year. Importantly, the waiver is limited to those athletes that have exhausted their eligibility under the rule. Either way, the NCAA did the right thing, granting another year after devastating losses to the program. Landis Barber is an attorney at Safran Law Offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or via his blog offthecourtdocket.com. He can be reached on Twitter @Landisbarber.

Name, image, and likeness (NIL) is now permitted for high school athletes in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (PIAA) Board of Directors on Wednesday, December 7, 2022, approved on its third and final reading a new policy to allow high school athletes to profit off their NIL while maintaining their high school athletics eligibility. The NIL policy was originally passed on the first reading with the PIAA Board of Directors in July and then passed a second reading in October. The NIL policy is effective immediately. Under the PIAA's new NIL policy, Pennsylvania high school athletes are eligible to profit from their NIL from a number of options, including commercial endorsements, promotional activities, and a social media presence. The NIL policy, however, has some restrictions that mirror NIL policies adopted by other high school state athletic associations. The policy prohibits any person employed or affiliated with the school, including boosters and alumni, from soliciting, arranging, negotiating, or paying for the use of a student’s NIL. In addition, students cannot wear school uniforms or “school-identifying apparel” or make reference to the PIAA or their school or team name when engaging in NIL activities. Students also cannot endorse or promote any third-party entities, goods, or services during team or school activities. The students also cannot wear apparel or display a logo or insignia of an NIL partner during team activities, unless that logo or insignia is part of the team uniform. Furthermore, the policy outlined prohibitions on NIL activities in certain vice industries, including: Adult entertainment; Alcohol; Casinos and gambling; Tobacco and electronic smoking; Opioids; Controlled dangerous substances; and Weapons, firearms, and ammunition. The policy introduced a requirement that each NIL deal be based on the value a given athlete’s endorsement brings for providing a specific service/activity. Specifically, the policy states that “NIL contracts/agreements need to come from analysis of the value an athlete brings for providing a specific service/activity, not as an incentive for enrollment decisions or membership on a team.” The guidance, however, does not provide any objective criteria for determining the “value” an athlete’s endorsement would bring for providing a specific service/activity. Therefore, businesses entering into NIL deals with PIAA athletes will need to justify the “value” a given athlete brings to the deal using objective factors or metrics (e.g., potential engagement rate). The policy also includes a disclosure requirement that requires an athlete to disclose to their principal or athletic director any NIL agreement within 72 hours after entering into the agreement. With the PIAA’s new NIL policy, there are now 22 high school state athletic associations that allow student-athletes to monetize their NIL while maintaining their high school athletics eligibility. Ryan Whelpley is an Associate at Morse in Waltham, Massachusetts, where he is a member of the firm’s Corporate Practice Group. He is a graduate of Albany Law School and Union College. At Union, Ryan was a member and three-year captain of the Men’s Basketball Team. You can connect with him via Twitter (@Whelpley_Law) and LinkedIn.

For the last half-century, the NFL has separated itself from the rest of the major professional leagues as the most dominant sport in our country. Due to its immense popularity, the interest in the league extends far beyond the games on Sundays. While the NFL season only lasts for about half the year, the league stays in the mainstream conversation on the major sports television networks and talk radio shows throughout the year due to the draft, free agency, and coaching carousel. Now imagine if all those events were crammed into one month. That’s the current reality of December in college football. While I typically don’t like to compare the NFL to its college counterpart, I do think that the powers that be in college football should take a hard look at how well the professional game utilizes the calendar to keep fans interested throughout the year. Yes, there are some limitations that the college game must work with that the NFL doesn’t, but there are some issues that college coaches, administrators, players, and recruits are dealing with right now that can be addressed. Let’s dive into what can and can’t be changed. As we sit here in mid-December, several programs that experienced coaching changes have just hired their new man to lead their programs. The early signing period for recruiting opens next week. The Transfer Portal opened last week and nearly 1,000 players across all levels have entered it. And oh, by the way, teams are preparing for bowl games (including the College Football Playoff). In short, if you are a college football coach right now, there simply aren’t enough hours in the day to focus on all these very important pressing issues. The advent of the one-time transfer rule by itself would’ve had a significant impact on college athletics. But its arrival along with NIL rights has created no shortage of chaos. Lots of players across the country are entering the portal this time of year to test the open market to see if they can secure a NIL deal from their current school to keep them on campus or be lured by a big offer from another program. You might be asking why these players are entering the portal now, before their bowl games? It’s because the newly enacted 45-day transfer window just opened last week. The next question you might ask then, is why did the window open now? Well, because we are talking about college football, it’s imperative to remember that players looking to transfer need to begin classes when the spring semester starts in January. Because of this reality, I don’t see how the transfer portal chaos can be contained in the month of December. There’s no way around delaying it to the new year because of the need to get players on their new campuses and ready for spring ball. It’s worth mentioning that there is another 15-day transfer window after most programs finish their spring practices, but most of the volume of portal entries occurs in this window. So, if the transfer portal chaos (in its current form) cannot be changed, what can? The early signing period. For most of college football’s history, there was only one signing period each February where recruits could ink their names on their national letter of intent to play for their future school. However, in 2017, the NCAA Division I Council and the Collegiate Commissioners Association approved an additional period in December where players could officially sign with their new schools. Initially, many thought that only a handful of players would utilize the early signing period and the majority would still sign during the February period. That has proven not to be the case as nearly 80% of high school prospects have signed early. In theory, having an early period is a great idea. It allows recruits who are firm in their commitments to go ahead and sign their letters of intent and potentially enroll early at their new schools in time for spring practices. But one area in which it has been a failure is how it meshes with the timing of coaching changes. Back when the February signing period was the only signing time, almost all coaching changes had been completed. Few head coaches or coordinators are fired or changed after February, and coaching staff hired in early December had nearly two months to figure out how they want to manage their roster. That is no longer the case now as new hires are forced to hit the ground running from day one to not only salvage their high school recruiting class. As a result, schools have reacted by firing head coaches long before their season concludes. Increasingly, if you wait too long before the early signing date to make a coaching, roster, or program move, you're way too late. In 2021, 13 schools fired head coaches during the season. This year, an additional 8 did the same. "The December [signing] date changes everything," TCU AD Jeremiah Donati said last year when he decided to fire TCU legend, Gary Patterson. "[With] the old signing day, it was different. You could get through bowl season and kind of let this play out a little bit, but now the December deadline accelerates the process. So, what can be done about the early signing period? Some will argue that it should be eliminated, and college football should return to only having one period in February. While that likely would be preferable to what we have now, I do believe some form of an early signing period is beneficial to allow players who are deadest on their schools to not only sign but potentially enroll early in the spring semester. Therefore, I believe moving the early signing period to before the season would be the best solution. In doing so, you allow the high school recruits that want to sign early the opportunity to cap off their recruitments before the beginning of their senior seasons. In addition, you allow college coaches to have some level of certainty on how their classes are shaping up before they enter the grueling nature of their fall seasons. The mad rush of hosting recruits on campus, in-home visits, and high school visits that coaches do this time of year can be shifted to the summer when they don’t have to worry about the transfer portal, staff changes, and bowl games simultaneously. Is this a perfect solution? No, but in today’s era of college athletics, I don’t think there is a failproof way to do it. Recruits who sign early will need to have the opportunity to get out of their commitments if their school makes a coaching change. There still will be chaos in the transfer portal this time of year. Coaching changes will still happen before the conclusion of the season. But by moving the early signing date earlier, you take one thing off coaches’ plates. Many will point to the salaries head coaches make these days and refuse to “feel bad” for the number of hours they work (justifiably so). However, adding zeroes to a person’s paycheck doesn’t add the number of hours in their days and it’s worth noting that many of the assistants, graduate assistants, and support staff don’t make a tremendous amount of money. Most importantly, the student-athlete experience has been negatively affected by the December signing period. Here’s to hoping things can change for the better so players, coaches, and fans can keep their attention on the excitement of what’s happening on the field instead of worrying too much about what’s going on off of it. Just as NFL doesn’t have its postseason, draft, free agency, and coaching carousel all in one month, college football could shift at least one of its major events to a different date. Brendan can be found on Twitter @_bbell5

Around this time of year in college athletics, there is no shortage of football coaches making moves to different schools across the country. Whether its coaches getting hired, fired, promoted, or demoted, the informally titled “coaching carousel” spins out of control. Sticking to that theme, another group of coaches decided it was time for them to make a major move for their careers. However, these aren’t football coaches looking for the next big-time job for their careers. They’re volunteer baseball coaches seeking much-needed respect when it comes to their pay. While major college football programs employ ten on-field coaches and an unlimited number of “analysts” in off-field roles, the NCAA imposes a limit on how many on-field coaches a baseball program can have. Currently, college baseball programs are only allowed to pay three coaches: the head coach and two assistants (usually a pitching coach and a hitting coach). Because of the demands of developing players, preparing scouting reports, recruiting, and other organizational responsibilities, many programs employ a fourth coach to help handle the load. However, because of the NCAA rule, these coaches are prohibited from receiving payment and are often referred to as “volunteer assistants.” While these volunteer assistant roles can often serve as a springboard for younger coaches to develop their skills and hopefully land full-time roles in the future, the compensation of $0 in no way reflects the responsibilities and time demands of the position. While volunteer coaches are prohibited from recruiting away from campus, many of them perform essential functions that help a college baseball program run at maximum efficiency. When you flip on the College World Series every summer and watch programs like Vanderbilt or Ole Miss win national championships, the volunteer coaches likely played a major role. However, they don’t see a dime from their respective schools. Hopefully, the unfortunate reality could change in the near future. This week, Division I volunteer baseball coaches filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of California alleging the NCAA illegally limits the number of paid baseball coaches a team can hire and also illegally price fixes a volunteer coach’s salary (at $0). Long before this lawsuit was issued, there has been a push by many involved in college baseball to add a fourth paid coach. But each time the issue has gone to vote at the Division I Council, it has been shot down. If power conferences that invest heavily into baseball had their druthers, the cap on paid coaches would’ve been lifted long ago. But because many athletic administrators at schools where baseball isn’t as big of a deal to have shot it down, it hasn’t received a majority vote. This lawsuit though can and hopefully will put an end to this mess. The plaintiffs for Smart et al. v. NCAA, which is seeking class certification, include Arkansas coach Taylor Smart and UC Davis coach Michael Hacker. Our own Dan Lust told Front Office Sports’ Amanda Christovich that the NCAA’s rule “could potentially be seen as an unlawful restraint and baseball provides a potentially appealing case for two reasons. A successful class action needs to have a “narrow” group, which is aided by limiting the lawsuit to one sport. And given that baseball coaching salaries are higher than many other sports, the potential damages for limiting compensation are higher. Lust also added that NCAA v. Alston likely paved the way for the complaint to be filed now because it ruled that the NCAA is subject to antitrust scrutiny. I’ve written about this issue in the past for our site before there was even a lawsuit involved. The expectation back then was that the three-paid coaches cap would likely be increased soon. Lawsuits like these make that speculation even more valid. It will be interesting to follow this case as it develops. Brendan can be found on Twitter @_bbell5

David Falk’s FAME sports agency (Falk Associates Management Enterprises) sued former NBA player Evan Turner for $2 million for breach of contract. The lawsuit was filed yesterday, December 1, 2022, in the Superior Court of Delaware. Falk is best known for representing Michael Jordan for the entirety of Jordan’s career. The defendants are EMTURN LLC (“EmTurn”) and Evan Turner. According to FAME’s complaint, EmTurn is a loan-out company made for Turner’s endorsement and marketing services. Plaintiff pleads alter-ego liability against Turner to avoid the LLC’s shield of personal liability. Specifically, it is alleged that “Turner regularly failed to observe corporate formalities with respect to EmTurn” as board meetings weren't held and Turner controlled all company bank accounts for personal use. Back in 2010, Turner agreed to hire David Falk as his exclusive agent in connection with contract negotiation and marketing and endorsement deals. Later in that year, the Philadelphia 76ers drafted Turner 2nd overall and Falk negotiated his entry-level deal. This lawsuit centers upon the marketing and endorsement aspect of the parties’ fiduciary agreement. With respect to marketing services, Turner allegedly agreed to pay Plaintiff a fee in the amount of 15% of all compensation received and 20% of such compensation in the event that Turner made more than $2 million in any given year. According to the complaint, on May 6, 2010, Falk entered into talks with a Chinese sports and apparel brand, Li-Ning Sports. This was identified as a potential marketing and endorsement opportunity for Turner. As a result, the parties agreed on a 6-year endorsement agreement which provided Turner and his company with a guaranteed minimum compensation of $15 million plus one million shares of Lin-Ning Sports that vested between 2011-2016. The breakdown of the alleged minimum guaranteed compensation ($15M) and vesting schedule are depicted below: Plaintiff claims that Turner then defrauded EmTurn by diverting the stock from EmTurn to himself. In September of 2021, Turner allegedly sold a portion of the Li-Ning stock and individually received the sum of $10 million. This action is what, Plaintiff claims, triggered the agency’s entitlement to $2 million, or 20% of the capital gains. FAME sent an invoice to Turner on July 15, 2022 for $2 million, and Turner has refused to pay it. The causes of action are breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit, with the latter two pleaded in the alternative. Evan Turner was an Ohio State standout, and player for various NBA teams between 2010-2020. Falk and Turner parted ways as fiduciaries in 2016, when Turner left to join BDA Sports. Jason Morrin is a law clerk (pending admission to the NY Bar) at Zumpano, Patricios & Popok LLP in New York, a firm dedicated to litigation and business counseling including in the areas of sports, gaming and entertainment. He graduated cum laude from Hofstra Law School where he was president of the Sports and Entertainment Law Society. His writing for Conduct Detrimental has been cited by ESPN, The New York Post, USA Today, and more.