What is the MLB Luxury Tax? The latest news from the MLB's off-season was the 12-year $315 million deal Carlos Correa made with the New York Mets on the same day the San Francisco Giants released they were not announcing the Correa deal because of concerns over Correa's physical examination. The deal with Carlos Correa and the Mets puts the club's payroll at $495 million. That price tag includes payroll and the luxury tax amount. Luxury tax is the commonly used phrase for the MLB's Competitive Balance Tax ("CBT"), which places a tax on every dollar a club spends during a year above a predetermined payroll threshold—for 2023, the threshold is $233 million. The Mets' expected payroll for 2023 without the luxury tax is about $384 million, thus the club will pay an additional $111 million in luxury tax. Clubs are subject to an increased tax rate for each consecutive year they exceed the payroll threshold. First-time offenders pay a 20 percent tax. Then clubs exceeding the threshold for a second consecutive year pay a 30 percent tax, and for a third or more consecutive year, clubs pay a 50 percent tax. Additionally, clubs have to pay a surcharge depending on the amount the club's payroll exceeds the threshold. The surcharge is determined using additional thresholds set at $20 million, $40 million, and $60 million above the base threshold. The surcharge increases the tax owed regarding the consecutive years a club exceeds the base threshold, so a first-time offender with a payroll exceeding the base threshold by $20-$40 million has their luxury tax increased from 20 percent to 32 percent—for a second consecutive year, it's raised to 42 percent and 62 percent for the third year. The last level of surcharge is $60 million above the threshold. This level is now dubbed the "Cohen Tax" and gets its namesake unsurprisingly from the Mets owner, Steve Cohen, because of his well-known lustrous spending even before this offseason. Under the Cohen Tax, when a club exceeds a payroll of $60 million above the base threshold, it pays 80 percent the first year, then 90 percent for the second, and 110 percent by the third year. Is the Luxury Tax Actually Holding Owners Back from Large Spending? The luxury tax's purpose is to maintain a competitive balance among the MLB clubs. Typically, sports leagues implement a salary cap—a limit to how much a team may spend on its payroll each year—to promote competitiveness and prevent large market teams from gaining too much control, however, baseball is the only major professional sport in the United States that does not have a salary cap. Thus, the question is if the MLB should establish a salary cap as opposed to a luxury tax. It is clear MLB clubs have no intention to stay below the base CBT threshold, likely because an extra $20-$50 million is pocket change for most clubs, especially if the owner has a net worth in the billions of dollars like Steve Cohen. The San Diego Padres and Philadelphia Phillies are new clubs that have jumped into the spending field these past couple off-seasons alongside common culprits like the New York Yankees and Los Angeles Dodgers. One thing this offseason has shown is clubs are more willing to pay unprecedented salaries to get the players they want. This means that if you are a billionaire who wants to own an MLB ball club, you can likely go buy whatever player you want—the luxury tax is not stopping you. This may be good or bad for baseball. At first, it might seem like a billionaire owner going out and buying whatever players they can to build a team of all-stars will make the game more exciting. Unfortunately, the likely outcome is the only team baseball fans will see competing for the World Series are those that call major cities their home. That is already the case now, as it's uncommon to tune into the MLB playoffs and not see the Atlanta Braves, Dodgers, Yankees, or Astros. The days of the Big Red Machine in Cincinnati and Randy Johnson leading the Arizona Diamondbacks to a World Series title are quickly fading away. A salary cap may stop team owners from building teams of all the best players on the market and raising the value of contracts, leaving the rest of the clubs who cannot afford those contracts out of luck and out of the competition. But, will a salary cap stop clubs if a luxury tax does not scare them? The salary cap is effective in leagues such as the NFL because it does not limit punishments for exceeding the salary cap to monetary sanctions. The NFL punishes its teams that exceed the salary cap by taking away draft picks, or canceling contracts and rejecting trades that put a team over the cap. Those punishments encourage teams to make cap space at the beginning of each year. A luxury tax is solely monetary, with an additional punishment for a club that exceeds the threshold by $40 million or more. In such a case, that club has its highest draft pick moved back 10 places, but that is not much of a punishment because the MLB draft is not like the NFL or NBA draft. It can take many years for a team to see their draft pick at the major league level, and many draft picks are used as trade pieces. What is successful in one sport may not be successful in another, so even if the MLB were to implement a system of stricter punishments for clubs exceeding the CBT threshold, the nature of the game of baseball may make those attempts futile. The Large Market Monopoly in Major League Baseball Large market clubs like the Mets are forming a monopoly that controls the player market. The willingness to spend hundreds of millions of dollars above the luxury tax, which removes all the top talent in free agency, is exclusionary conduct that may create an anti-competitive effect within baseball. Small market teams such as the Cincinnati Reds, whose owner's net worth is a mere $400 million, cannot compete with large market teams—frankly, they stand no chance and the historically poor season the Reds had in 2022 indicates that anti-competitiveness. Purchase power has led to unmatched player market domination. Howbeit, an allegation of monopoly formation falls under U.S. antitrust law, which the MLB is the only professional sports league to boast an exemption from. Origin of the MLB Antitrust Exemption In 1922, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.[1] The opinion, written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, concluded that the business of baseball was just a game and not interstate commerce, thus it was exempt from the regulations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.[2] Then, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the exemption in 1953 with the decision of Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.[3], and again in the opinion of Flood v. Kuhn in 1972.[4] The Flood opinion determined that the MLB's antitrust exemption is entitled to the benefit of stare decisis—established precedent.[5] It May Be Time to Lift the MLB Antitrust Exemption For the benefit of America's pastime, MLB clubs ought to be subject to antitrust laws. The MLB has very little intimidation when it comes to suppressing clubs that ignore what it means to have a competitive sport and instead buy their way to forming baseball's version of the Miami Heat's Big Three. The antitrust exemption does not have to be lifted for all aspects of the business of baseball, as some features of the sport benefit from the exemption, such as the minor league system. MLB Commissioner Bob Manfred sent the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee a letter outlining the negative impact subjecting the MLB to antitrust laws would have on minor league players. However, Commissioner Manfred has not been consistent with his support of the exemption. During the 2022 All-Star break, Manfred stated he could not "think of a place where the exemption is really meaningful, other than franchise relocation." Therefore, the relevancy of the MLB antitrust exemption is more case by case than broad protection. The bottom line is that the game of baseball is being threatened by big pockets. That is not to say players should deserve less, but select MLB clubs are rising above others with their spending in ways never seen before. That trend is pointing more and more toward monopolistic control that may not be stopped by simply adding a salary cap. Jared Yaggie is a 2L at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or on Twitter @JaredYaggie. Sources: [1] Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). [2] Id. at 208. [3] Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). [4] Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). [5] Id. at 269-285.

For many attorneys and law students aspiring to utilize their legal degrees to work in the sports industry, an in-house position with a professional organization is considered the peak of an arduous climb to the top of the sports law world. Oftentimes, legal positions in some of the mainstream sports in America, namely football, basketball, and baseball, are typically those that are sought after by the sports enthusiasts in the legal world. Nevertheless, due to the exponential growth of its popularity and the constant expansion of its professional leagues, the path toward in-house positions in American soccer has never appeared more open for those aspiring to work within the beautiful game. As an incoming law student who ultimately hopes to attain an in-house counsel position within professional soccer, I wanted to learn from those who are currently in positions toward which I and several others passionate about the intersection of soccer and the law aspire. Accordingly, I decided to start a process that I wanted to document by way of Conduct Detrimental to share with all who are interested – an interview with a member of the legal counsel at every MLS club. From these interviews, I hope to be able to provide insight into the nature of legal counsel positions in professional soccer. And at the end of this process, I hope that we will all be more knowledgeable on what it requires to successfully convert our greatest passions into a dream occupation. This interview, though, is slightly different from my first interview and will be different from those that follow. Nonetheless, it will still provide invaluable information about a position within one of the most prominent organizations in professional soccer. For this interview, I had the privilege of speaking with Michaela Clicque – senior legal counsel for the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). A graduate of the University of Vienna and Instituto Superior de Derecho y Economia (ISDE) in Spain, Clicque has worked with UEFA for just under eight years. Her words were incredibly insightful, and it was a pleasure to learn from her. 1. BG: Tell us a bit about your story – what led your interest in working within soccer to develop and what were some of the career steps you took that eventually placed you in your current position? Also, for those in America unfamiliar with UEFA, could you please provide us with a brief description of the federation and its role within FIFA and global soccer as a whole? MC: Since I was a kid I was always very much interested in football and it became quickly my dream to work in this world. Therefore, once I had finished my studies of law in Vienna I found a university in Spain which offered a master in sports law. Through this master I have managed to score a great internship in one of the best law firms in Spain which specialises in sports law. Not only have I learned a lot there but it opened me a lot of doors through great networking opportunities. Once I have finished this internship, I was probably in the right place at the right time as there was just an opening in UEFA. I must say, though, that a crucial reason why I was chosen for this position was the fact that I was speaking all three official languages of UEFA (plus two other ones). Briefly about UEFA: UEFA is a Confederation, covering the European area (and a bit further), which organises its own national team and club competitions. In the pyramid structure of football, it is located below FIFA. However, there is no direct reporting line between the confederations and FIFA. FIFA is in charge of its own competitions and has jurisdiction over all its member associations in matters which are regulated by FIFA. In the same way, UEFA is in charge of its own competitions and has jurisdiction over its (55) member associations as well as clubs for matters which are under UEFA’s competence. 2. BG: What does a typical workday look like for you as legal counsel at the UEFA? Is your position more of a consultancy role, or do you primarily serve as the club’s representative in all pertinent legal matters? MC: In general, I would say we are advising all national associations and clubs as well as our colleagues internally on all statutory and regulatory related matters. This may relate to a specific question with regards to the application of a rule, or more general, to the revision of a set of regulations as well as ensuring that any kind of process launched within UEFA is in accordance with the relevant UEFA regulations. Apart from that, there are always new things landing on our tables which makes the job so interesting and diverse. 3. BG: As UEFA is a continental federation, we see employees originating from various countries, which may be influenced by the flexibility afforded to workers from member nations of the European Union (EU). Does this flexibility play a role in the international diversity within UEFA’s personnel? MC: Yes, UEFA is a great working place in this regard, as you will find colleagues from a lot of different places. This allows a great cultural exchange. However, one thing that we then all have in common is the love for the game. There is always a great atmosphere when a major football tournament is on and everyone is rooting for its own country. It is true that the majority of UEFA employees may come from EU countries but there are still quite some employees coming as well from outside of the EU. Switzerland, the country where UEFA is based and where, I believe, still the majority of UEFA employees comes from, is not part of the EU. 4. BG: Could you explain the licensing process for attorneys in Europe, at least from your experience? MC: This is a bit of a complicated one, as every country has its own system. As football related matters are mostly resolved in the Court of Arbitration for Sport, it is not necessary to be a qualified lawyer from a specific country. Lawyers from all over the world are arguing cases before the CAS. 5. BG: If you could list 3 of the most important skills necessary to work as in-house counsel for UEFA and provide a brief explanation for their importance, which skills would you choose? MC: A good knowledge of football and its politics. In order to be able to properly understand all regulations (be it competition regulations or rather more technical regulations), a good knowledge of UEFA’s competitions in general is of paramount necessity. Moreover, it is important to understand how the whole football model, with the relevant member associations, leagues and clubs is designed and interacting. Apart from that, due to the international character of the work, it is always helpful to speak more than one language. 6. BG: Do you think there exists a possibility for Americans aspiring to work in the soccer industry to obtain a position at UEFA or as counsel for a European club? In your mind, what would be some of the steps necessary to realize this aspiration? MC: Yes, and I believe there are already some Americans working in legal positions in certain clubs in Europe. We have as well some employees within the UEFA legal division which are not from Europe. It is true that the world of sports law, and, in particular football is rather small, and it always helps to know the right people in order to get into this world. But without having a good knowledge of the competitions, and the game itself, even the best contact cannot help. It is important to always stay humble and sometimes maybe accept a position which may be a bit below your expectations at first, but which would allow a step into the football world. 7. BG: What is the one critical piece of advice that you could offer from your experience to law students aspiring to work in-house not only in soccer but in sports as a whole? MC: It might be tough at first to get in, but you should never give up and be persistent. There will be this one little door which will open and then you have to give it your all and show that you deserve to be there. Special thank you to Michaela Clique for her contributions to this article. She can be found on LinkedIn at Michaela Clicque. Bryce Goodwyn is a 1L at Regent University School of Law. He currently works as a Dean’s Fellow completing research and administrative work. He also formed part of the recently established National Sports Legal and Business Society as the East Region Chair. He can be found on Twitter @BryceGoodwyn and on LinkedIn as Bryce Goodwyn.

On November 17, 2022, Liberty Media Corporation (“Liberty Media”), the public corporation that owns the Atlanta Braves and certain real estate projects associated with the club, announced that its board of directors authorized management to pursue a split-off of the team and its assets and liabilities into a new tracking stock to be known as Atlanta Braves Holdings, Inc. The move is pending approval from the current Braves holding company, Braves Holdings, LLC, and Major League Baseball. Stated differently, this move will create a separate entity that will own the Braves and all associated liabilities and assets. A stock spin-off occurs when a publicly traded company separates part of its business into a second public company and distributes its shares in the new business on a pro-rata basis to existing investors. Under this spin-off, Atlanta Braves Holdings, Inc. will hold all the businesses, assets, and liabilities currently attributed to the Braves Group, including Braves Holdings, LLC, which is the direct owner and operator of the Atlanta Braves Major League Baseball Club. Additionally, Atlanta Braves Holdings, Inc. will control certain assets and liabilities associated with the Atlanta Braves’ stadium and mixed-use development project, The Battery Atlanta, and corporate cash. Historically, Liberty Media has had three divisions with their own Series A, B, & C common stock: SiriusXM, Formula One, and the Atlanta Braves. The most notable difference between the different classes of common stock is the voting rights assigned to that particular series or class of stock. For example, a shareholder of Class A common stock shares could have their vote count thrice, whereas the holder of a Class B or even Class C would count twice then once respectively. This, of course, can and likely would vary from company to company. In order to make this happen, Liberty Media will trade common stock shares in the divesting company, Atlanta Braves Holdings, Inc., in exchange for shares of its Series A, B, and C shares of the current Liberty Braves common stock. It is expected that as it relates to the intergroup interest in the Braves held by the Liberty SiriusXM and Liberty Formula One groups, these interests would be extinguished in a yet-to-be-determined fashion. What is a publicly traded company? A publicly traded company is a corporation whose shareholders have a claim to part of the company's assets and profits. Through the free trade of shares on stock-on-stock exchanges or over-the-counter (OTC) markets, ownership of a publicly traded company is distributed among general public shareholders. These corporations are registered with the Secured Exchange Commission (SEC) and sold the initial stock to the public via an Initial Public Offering (IPO). Generally speaking, a company goes public in order to raise funds from the general public as opposed to a collective such as a private equity firm or just from one person like an angel investor. The advantage is that it becomes a publicly owned entity and has potential access to albeit at a slower pace, a larger influx of cash. The downside, however, is that the public entity is subject to more scrutiny from regulating authorities such as the SEC. Are there any other publicly traded sports franchises? There are three other United States-based sports franchises listed on public stock exchanges: the Green Bay Packers, the New York Knicks, and the New York Rangers. While the Packers are not actually publicly traded, the organization is not owned by a small ownership group as is common with professional franchises, but rather by a publicly held non-profit corporation comprised of 537,000 shareholders. The New York Knicks and Rangers, on the other hand, are not individually listed but are owned by Madison Square Garden Sports Corporation which is listed. Madison Square Garden Sports Corporation had a split that led to the creation of Madison Square Garden Entertainment. This split-off branch created a publicly traded company for its entertainment ventures including the venues Madison Square Garden and Radio City Music Hall. While it is unclear why Madison Square Garden Sports Corporation and Madison Square Garden entertainment had a spin-off, one could rationally assume that it was to consolidate the assets of each branch and also to offset any potential losses. While the spin-off has been talked about going as far back as 2015, it is interesting that this happened in April 2020, during the “Covid Era.” Given that live performances and the sorts were not happening for the foreseeable future, but sports could resume in due time, and the sports teams drew in large sums of money from media rights, separating the assets and liabilities of the sports and entertainment entities seems like a rather logical move. However, worth noting, this is not the actual reason but merely a theory as to why it finally happened five years after the initial talks of it. As it stands now, it appears that this new Braves organization will take a form similar to that used by Madison Square Garden Sports Corp and its ownership of the Knicks and Rangers. Namely, by separating the different “classes” of assets and liabilities. Formula One is proving to be quite lucrative, as is The Braves organization and its related ventures, especially coming off its World Series title in 2021. SiriusXM, on the other hand, has seen its subscribers decline over the years, with its peak being in 2019 after its acquisition of Pandora Radio. Again, this is also just a theory, this in no way means SiriusXM is going under or even really facing financial difficulties as it is hard to discern what goes on in the boardrooms. However, this theory does at least seem rational. Either way, the team is venturing into a Brave New World by becoming now the second publicly listed and traded sports organization in the United States, and it will be very interesting to see how the stock performs in the years to come.

In November 2022, the United Soccer League (USL) and United Soccer League Players Association (USLPA) announced that they have achieved the first Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for USL League One. Under the hierarchical pyramid of the USL, USL League One is the second-highest league, preceded by the USL Championship and followed by the semi-professional USL League Two. Remaining below the MLS, then, USL League One is effectively American soccer’s third division, which makes this CBA the first of its kind for such a division in both the United States and the Americas as a whole. The establishment of this CBA follows the establishment of the USL Championship’s CBA in 2021, meaning that every professional league in the USL now possesses a CBA between the league and its players. USL President Jake Edwards celebrated the establishment of this CBA, using its ratification to emphasize the “deep commitment of [the USL’s] Board of Governors to the player experience.” Proponents of the CBA have noted that the terms of the agreement significantly advance player protection, compensation, and working conditions for all League One players. Upon evaluating the terms of the agreement for myself, one of the more notable provisions was Article 14(J), which concerns the reimbursement of relocation expenses incurred by a player who signs with a new club. Upon signing a new player to a standard player agreement, a club must reimburse the player for up to seven hundred fifty dollars of reasonable and necessary relocation expenses, provided such expenses are documented. Generally, many USL contracts only span a duration of one year, meaning that players under these contracts must find a new team during the off-season and, if they are successful, relocate themselves and their families to a new city. Such a venture is often costly for League One players, so the reimbursement of relocation expenses helps ease the perpetual transition for players having to move from city to city to continue playing professionally. Additionally, Article 14(A)(1) of the Agreement protects the financial interests of players who are either traded, loaned, or transferred to another USL League One Club without having provided their consent to the deal. According to this provision, deals completed by clubs without the consent of the players in controversy must afford the player (1) the same salary and (2) benefits materially similar to those provided in their previous contract (i.e., health insurance or stipends toward the purchase of the same that would result in reasonably similar out of pocket costs as compared to the previous benefits received). Article 14(A)(2) provides that, in the event of a player being loaned, traded, or transferred between USL clubs without their consent, the player will be reimbursed for all reasonable, necessary, and documented relocation expenses in relocating to the new club or back to the old club upon being recalled from a particular loan spell. Most significantly, Article 14(A)(2)(c) provides that such players shall be reimbursed for reasonable, necessary, and documented expenses associated with “the termination or settlement of [their] lease obligations” on residences in the cities where they originally lived, for a total that cannot exceed the lesser of four months’ rent or $4,500. With these guarantees, it appears that players who are involuntarily uprooted from their homes via the business of their former clubs will not be forced to navigate through the logistics of relocation without assistance. While these provisions seem to indicate that the newly-ratified CBA is a complete victory for the players, there also exist nuances with the CBA that suggest certain concessions that must be given by players as well. In a brilliant article on the subject, Chris Deubert, Senior Counsel at Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete LLP, highlights that Article 24(F) of the CBA requires a player to split the costs of arbitration resulting from a dispute between themselves and their club. This provision seemingly contradicts both the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS), which both require employers to pay arbitration costs unless the employee can afford them. This exception is potentially inapplicable to the majority of USL1 players on their current salaries, so it will be interesting to observe whether any problems arise from the enforcement of this arbitration provision. Regardless of these concessions, however, it is certainly true that the ratification of a collective bargaining agreement for the third division of American professional soccer is a tremendous step in the right direction for the support of the players in this country. USL1 is a league close to my heart, as some of my former collegiate teammates and coaches are currently part of the league’s Greenville Triumph. I’ve seen firsthand the work they and countless others have done to establish a sustainable infrastructure within that level of American soccer, and they deserve to be supported. With the ratification of the CBA, that support has now been codified, and as 2026 looms at the forefront of American minds, it will be for the betterment of the sport in this country. Bryce Goodwyn is a 1L at Regent University School of Law. He currently works as a Dean’s Fellow completing research and administrative work. He also formed part of the recently established National Sports Legal and Business Society as the East Region Chair. He can be found on Twitter @BryceGoodwyn and on LinkedIn as Bryce Goodwyn.

If you’re like me, your first impression on hearing the news of Xander Bogaerts’ eleven-year, $280 million contract with the Padres might have been “what the %#&! are they doing?” An eleven-year contract for a thirty-year-old doesn’t align with the narrative in baseball over the last decade: analytically-minded teams understand that high-dollar contracts that go through players’ late 30s or 40s are a bad idea. And while the Mets’ signing of Carlos Correa this week to a twelve-year, $315 million contract was shocking in its own right after Correa had purportedly already agreed to a deal with the San Francisco Giants, the structure of the deal was not given the contracts we had already seen this offseason. For the Padres, perhaps signing Bogaerts for over a decade was a desperation play. They had just lost out on their reportedly preferred free-agent target, Trea Turner (more on him later). They are only a few months removed from emptying out a big chunk of their farm system to acquire Juan Soto and Josh Hader, who will become free agents themselves within the next two years. This is a team built to win now that has been all in the past two years, and if it took an eleven-year contract to get Bogaerts, the Padres panicked and felt they had to do it to put them over the top, even if it means they’ll be paying over $60 million to a 34-year-old and 41-year-old shortstop in 2033. But on further examination, we know it was probably the Padres who pushed for the deal to go eleven years, and subsequent reports confirm this. This is due to a wonky trend emerging in baseball economics that I will refer to as “AAV stretching.” By adding more years to contracts, some teams can actually save money and create additional payroll flexibility for themselves while paying players more. Bogaerts’, Correa’s, and Trea Turner’s contracts this offseason are prime examples of this. They show that certain teams seem committed to spending at or above the “competitive balance tax” (CBT) every year, and with that assumption, are structuring their contracts in a way that saves them money while also allowing them to make more competitive offers to free agents. To understand how the math works, we need to do a quick crash course in the CBT. A Crash Course in CBT Economics The CBT provides that if teams exceed a certain dollar threshold on their payroll in a given year, they must pay a tax on their overages. The salary of each player on a team’s 40-man-roster counts against the CBT. An individual player’s hit against the CBT is based on the average annual value (AAV) of his contract, which is calculated by simply dividing the total salary by the number of years. The CBT kicks in at $233 million in 2023 and there are four thresholds that increase the total tax penalty that a team pays. The size of the penalty also increases if teams pay the tax in consecutive years. The chart below demonstrates the possible penalties a team could incur for exceeding the CBT in 2023. Teams are only taxed on the payroll dollars above each individual threshold. So if a team exceeded the CBT for the first time in 2023 and had a payroll of $253 million, it would pay a $4 million tax penalty ($20M above the $233M, multiplied by the 20% tax rate). If that same team had decided to sign an additional player for $10 million, its CBT payment would have been $7.2 million—the initial $4 million, plus a 32% tax assessed on the $10 million above the $253 million threshold. With that context, we can see why teams like the Padres, Mets, and Phillies were happy to, and likely pushed for the three biggest contracts in this year’s free agent class to span over a decade and last into the signed players’ 40s. The Bogaerts, Correa, and Turner Deals Show AAV Stretching in Action Bogaerts’ contract has an AAV of $25.5 million. His fellow free agent shortstop, Trea Turner, signed a contract with the Phillies for $300 million over eleven years, for an AAV of $27.3 million. Turner will be 30 years old on opening day and, like Bogaerts, the contract takes him through his age 41 season. Correa’s twelve-year deal with the Mets has an AAV of $26.25 million and lasts through his age 40 season. When we compare Bogaerts’, Turner’s, and Correa’s contracts to other recent megadeals for shortstops, an odd trend emerges. Francisco Lindor reset the salary market for shortstops with his record-setting extension with the Mets in 2021. The deal kicked in for Lindor’s age 28 season and paid him $341 million over 10 years, good for a $34.1M AAV. The following offseason, Cory Seager signed a similar contract for his age 28 season—a 10-year deal for $325 million total, or a $32.5M AAV. Marcus Semien, who was three years older than each of them but had performed at similar levels, received a shorter deal for less money from the Texas Rangers—$175 million over seven years ($25M AAV). Interestingly, each of these players’ contracts expired after their age 38 season, creating a trend for the top of the free agent shortstop market. As shown in the table above, Bogaerts, Correa, and Turner fit comfortably into this market of upper-echelon shortstops. They all had better contract years than Seager according to FanGraph’s wins above replacement (WAR), and Turner and Bogaerts even outperformed Lindor. [1] In the three years leading up to the signing of the contracts, Turner and Lindor are well above the pack. Semien, Bogaerts, and Correa are bunched in the middle, and Seager again bottoms out the list. If you look at each player’s average WAR in their best three years prior to signing the contract, Lindor tops the list by a fair margin, but things are tightly bunched for each of this year’s free agents, all of whom are above Seager. Like Correa, Lindor and Seager had the benefit of becoming eligible for free agency by their age 28 seasons. Using the Lindor and Seager deals as a baseline, you probably would have expected Correa to sign a similar deal, and Bogaerts and Turner to get similar, but shorter, deals to account for the fact that the contracts were starting at their age 30 season. Based on the prevailing trend in the top-level shortstop market, these deals would be expected to take the players through their age 38 seasons—ten years for Correa, and eight years for Bogaerts and Turner. Obviously, that did not come to pass. The older players got longer contracts than Lindor and Seager, as did Correa. While some people may point to a competitive free agent market, or factors like biomechanical research that allow for better player aging to explain this odd phenomenon, it was likely the exact opposite. It was the teams—the Padres, Mets, and Phillies—that pushed for these longer deals, not the players. Other articles have examined this issue and pointed to financial factors like high-interest rates today to explain why teams are structuring contracts like this. And that may certainly play a role, although it comes with the counterpoint that the exact same factors would be influencing player decisions to resist this trend. It’s more likely that the driving force behind these longer contracts is to reduce the AAV of the contract and lower any potential CBT payments for the teams. These contracts make sense for teams that plan to regularly spend at or above the CBT threshold. With that mindset, structuring contracts like this allows teams to both save money and offer longer contracts to players for a higher total value, thus making them more competitive players in the free-agent market. The Padres, Phillies, and Mets all paid the CBT in 2022. After they signed Bogaerts, the Padres' CBT payroll for 2023 is estimated to be $266 million, putting them in the second CBT threshold. The Phillies are estimated to be at $242 million, in the first threshold, for 2023. As repeat offenders, this would come along with a 42% CBT tax for the Padres and 30% for the Phillies (assuming Philadelphia stayed in the first threshold). The Mets, and their deep-pocketed owner Steve Cohen, blows both away. With a CBT payroll of $388 million for 2023, the Mets are nearly $100 million above the highest threshold that was instituted in the last CBA, and has been facetiously referred to as the “Cohen tax.” They will pay a 90% tax on Correa’s contract in 2023 An eight-year deal for Bogaerts at a $31 million AAV (slightly below Seager) would have paid him $248 million in total. An eight-year deal for Turner at a $33.75M AAV (slightly below Lindor) would have paid him $270 million. A ten-year deal for Correa at a $30M AAV would have paid him $300 million. By adding three years and knocking off 5—6 million in AAV to what the current shortstop market was dictating, the Padres and Phillies were able to significantly decrease the CBT payments they might make in a given year. The Mets were a little less “dramatic” by only tacking on two years and shedding $3.7M in AAV for what Correa might have otherwise gotten, but this comes with even higher savings due to the higher CBT threshold they find themselves in. The up-front savings the teams enjoy now alleviates the fear that they will be “wasting” money on the back ends of these contracts by paying 40-year-olds whose skills will likely have deteriorated at that point. And from the Bogaerts, Correa, and Turners’ perspective, they get more money overall. It's very doubtful that they would come close to earning around $25 million a year in those last couple of years (age 38-41) when they otherwise would have become free agents again. To get to the point where this structure would save the Padres and Phillies money, we need to assume that both teams are committed to maintaining a payroll over the CBT threshold every year for the life of the contracts. With that assumption, even if neither team ever went past the first CBT threshold again, the $30-$32 million in “extra” salary that came along with the eleven-year contracts pays for itself. For Bogaerts, we can estimate that the “stretching” of his contract lowered the AAV by $5.5M. In 2023, when the Padres will pay at least a 42% CBT tax, this would save them $2.31 million. If the Padres remained over the tax in 2024 but dropped back below the second threshold, the penalty jumps to 50%. The stretching would save them $2.75M that year, and every subsequent year after the end of the contract. In total, this would save the Padres $29.8 million. If you apply a formula for the time value of money assuming a 4% interest rate, that jumps to $38 million over the life of the contract, which more than cancels out the $32M in “extra” salary that came along with adding three years to the contract. Turner’s “stretching” had an even more dramatic effect, with savings amounting to about $44 million over the course of his deal under the same assumptions. For each of the teams, higher interest rates in the short term might make these savings even more dramatic Correa requires a slightly different analysis because it seems like the Mets are on a slightly different financial playing field than the rest of the league. Even if we assumed that the “Cohen tax” deterred the Mets from ever exceeding the fourth CBT threshold again over the life of the Correa deal (a doubtful proposition), they would pay a 96.5% tax annually if they stayed in the third CBT threshold. Lowering the AAV of Correa’s deal by $3.7 million saves the team $3.3 million in 2023, and $3.57 million a year from 2024-2035, for a real total of $39 million, or $49.7 million when applying the TVM formula. Perhaps just as important as the calculable dollar savings is the added payroll flexibility that AAV stretching can afford teams. Lowering the AAV on a deal by $6 million gives the Padres and Phillies that much more money to spend on players this offseason if they want to continue adding to the team but not jump into a higher CBT threshold. It can mean an established reliever, a useful utility player, or the difference between an injury-prone player with upside versus an all-star when signing a starting pitcher. If any of the Padres, Phillies, or Mets want to get below the CBT threshold at some point in the future, which can be as much of a strategic baseball decision as a financial one given that exceeding the CBT in consecutive years might lead to penalties lowering a team’s draft picks, then this flexibility can be very helpful. This strategy only makes sense for a small subset of teams that are at or near the CBT and plan to stay there for years to come. The Mets, Phillies, Padres, Dodgers, Yankees, and Red Sox were the six teams that exceeded the threshold in 2022, and all of them except the Red Sox and Dodgers already have payrolls for 2023 that are above the tax level with a few months left in free agency. It would not be surprising to see these teams continue to use this quirky trick to sign top free agents in future years as long as the CBT remains in place. If they are committed to spending above the CBT anyway, this allows them to make more competitive offers to free agents by increasing the length and total dollar amount of the contract while decreasing the actual cost to the team itself. You can say that AAV stretching is the rare win-win in the world of MLB player and team economics. [1] Lindor’s last season before signing the extension was the COVID-shortened 2020 season. For this analysis, I prorated his WAR from the 60-game season to a full season to show what it would have been having he played at the same level for 162 games.

United States Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Representative Alma Adams (D-N.C.) introduced the Fair Play for Women Act on Tuesday. Aimed at promoting fair and equitable opportunities and support for women’s programs, the bill seeks to hold institutions and conferences responsible for Title IX violations. In its current form, the bill expands the reporting requirements for colleges and K-12 schools, including the number of scholarships and amount of student aid, and makes the data available to the public. Additionally, the bill requires the institution to report (and certify) the requested data annually. According to the bill, if the Department of Education found a college or university out of compliance with Title IX, the Department of Education would be able to fine the institution or require the institution to submit a plan that would remedy the Title IX violation. Moreover, the bill adds a private right of action, allowing an individual to sue an institution for a Title IX violation. Other benefits of the new bill include annual Title IX training and the development of a database of Title IX coordinators at K-12 schools and colleges/universities. This past summer was the 50th anniversary of Title IX. Since then, opportunities for girls and women to participate in sports have grown exponentially. Despite the growth, there remains a shortfall in the opportunities available for girls and women compared to boys and men. Specifically, the bill notes that there are over 1 million fewer opportunities at the high school level and nearly 150 thousand at the collegiate level. The Fair Play for Women Act hopes to bridge the gap. Due to the current session nearing its end, the bill is unlikely to pass. However, the same sponsors will likely reintroduce the bill next year. Recently, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) hired former Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker as its next President—a move many have considered a push to get Congress involved in regulating the NCAA. Thus, expect the Fair Play for Women Act and other issues to be front and center in the new year. Landis Barber is an attorney at Safran Law Offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or via his blog offthecourtdocket.com. He can be reached on Twitter @Landisbarber.

So far this offseason, we have seen a surprising development in how MLB front offices are structuring free-agent contracts for star players. Over the past decade and change, there have been countless examples of long-term contracts that simply haven’t panned out well for teams. Whether you want to talk about Albert Pujols’ deal with the Angels, Robinson Cano’s deal with the Mariners, or Jason Heyward’s deal with the Cubs, you could go on and on about how poorly those deals ended for those respective teams. Knowing how analytical front offices are becoming these days, you’d think that the result of all these aforementioned deals would make teams wary of handing a free agent a decade-long deal, right? This offseason has proved that hasn’t been the case. Over the past two years, there has been no shortage of consternation between management and players. Whether it was the disagreement about player salaries during the COVID-shortened 2020 season or the tension-filled lockout before last season, the relationship between the MLB and the MLBPA was rocky, to say the least. But after all the CBA negotiations, labor peace was ultimately achieved, and the landscape was paved for the owners to open up their pocketbooks heading into this offseason. Despite this, many remained skeptical that we’d see teams give the extra years and the extra dollars to players on the free-agent market. Coming out of the pandemic and lockout, the large majority of long-term deals we saw were signed by younger players with years of control like Wander Franco, Fernando Tatis, Julio Rodriguez, Spencer Strider, Michael Harris, etc to buy out arbitration years. There weren’t many players around the age of 30 signing those eight, nine, or ten-year deals we grew accustomed to in the early part of the 2010s. But that has changed so far this offseason as four players have already agreed to deals of at least 10 years. Why the re-emergence of the decade-long deal? The new CBA’s competitive balance tax implications are a big reason why. Contrary to the other major professional sports in the US, Major League Baseball does not have a salary cap. However, in order to keep big market teams like the Yankees from lapping the payrolls of small market clubs, MLB instituted a measure to somewhat penalize exorbitant spending called the Competitive Balance Tax (CBT). The tax line is set at $233 million for the upcoming season, with escalating penalties based on how far (and how often) clubs spend over the threshold. MLB does not calculate tax payrolls based on year-to-year salaries (teams frequently disperse money unevenly throughout deals), but, rather, annual average values. Because of this, by spreading out the money over more years, teams can lower their newly signed player's AAV. For example, let’s look at Carlos Correa’s new deal with the Giants. Many were surprised that the Giants were willing to give him a 13-year contract that will take him into his age 41 season. Many in the industry expected something to the effect of 10 years at most with around $350 million guaranteed. If the Giants would’ve offered 10 at 350, Correa’s AAV figure would have been $35 million, a significant impact on their CBT payroll. But by adding the additional 3 years, Correa’s CBT hit dropped to $26.9 million. That $8 million in savings allows the Giants more flexibility to stay under the thresholds that could result in penalties. The same can be said about the Turner, Judge, and Bogaerts deal as well. While this initially sounds beneficial for the teams, you might still be asking how these contracts will look in 2032 for teams when the age regression likely takes place. The honest answer is they probably won’t look great. However, I believe teams feel like they are getting “surplus value” over the first few years of these deals from an AAV perspective. While Farhan Zaidi, Brian Cashman, Dave Dombrowski, and AJ Preller probably won’t admit it publicly, they likely view any value they get in the last few years from their newly signed players as a bonus. In Correa’s case, Giants probably view it more as a 10-year commitment at the $350 million figure. If he flames out in 2033 like Albert Pujols, Jason Heyward, and Robinson Cano did, they’ll likely release him. While they’ll hypothetically still take the $26.9 million AAV hit in ’33, ’34, and ’35, they’ll hopefully already have gotten their return on investment in the first 10 years of the deal. Whether or not we see this trend continue in the future is yet to be seen. Will we see more teams manipulate the CBT penalties by offering 10, 11, 12, and 13 deals to players in free agency? Will MLB intervene and put a limit on the length of deals to prevent such action? It’s yet to be seen. But until anything is done about it, teams will likely continue to find loopholes to construct World Series-caliber rosters as efficiently as possible. On the player's side, I don’t think the MLBPA has a big issue with it. For them, it’s all about maximizing their earning potential. Unlike the NFL, MLB contracts are fully guaranteed. Getting released after suffering a career-ending injury won’t change the amount of money these newly signed players will receive in their deals. Carlos Correa was getting $350 million regardless of if he signed a 10-year deal or a 13-year deal. In addition, he gets some level of certainty as to where he’ll be for the foreseeable future and doesn’t have to worry about an injury derailing his value if he were to go on the free agent market any time soon. As with anything, change is inevitable in the modern landscape of sports. But this trend we’ve seen this offseason could have a monumental impact on the length of free agent deals in Major League Baseball for years to come. Brendan can be found on Twitter @_bbell5

The panel convened in the Independent Accountability Resolution Process (IARP) issued its Public Infractions Decision in the University of Arizona case. Former University of Arizona men’s basketball coach and current Xavier University head coach, Sean Miller, avoided sanctions, but the University of Arizona will serve three years of probation, which will end in 2025. A portion of Arizona’s case revolves around former assistant men’s basketball coach Emanuel “Book” Richardson. An FBI investigation revealed that Richardson accepted $20,000 in bribes from an agent, which Richardson used to direct players to the agent’s services. Richardson served 90 days in a federal correctional institute after pleading guilty to one count of bribery. Another former assistant coach, Mark Phelps, is also a part of the panel’s decision after loaning $500 to a prospective student-athlete, then attempting to cover up the violation. The panel’s decision encompassed both the men’s basketball program and the swimming and diving program, finding that an assistant coach for the swimming and diving program “conducted impermissible tryouts and provided preferential treatment to prospective student-athletes.” Violations As a result of each assistant coach’s conduct, the panel found that Richardson committed multiple Level I violations, and Phelps committed a Level II violation and multiple Level III violations. At the same time, the assistant swimming and diving coach committed multiple Level II and III violations. Each assistant coach received a show-cause penalty. If the coach is still an NCAA coach, the show-cause penalty requires the coach’s employer to appear before a committee every six months and detail how the coach has complied with the NCAA rulebook. For Richardson, the show-cause penalty is ten years. For Phelps, it is two years, and for the assistant swimming and diving coach, it is one year. Both head coaches of the programs avoided sanctions due to the panel finding that the head coaches “promoted an atmosphere of compliance,” including overseeing the assistant coaches. However, the institution received a Level II violation due to the lack of education regarding NCAA rules amongst its athletic staff. Penalties The panel accepted most of the self-imposed penalties against the men’s basketball program, including the 2021 postseason ban, but also added a seven-week recruiting communication ban for the current year. Additional penalties include vacating wins from seasons when the conduct occurred. The swimming and diving program received several penalties, including one-weeks suspensions for off-campus recruiting and communications and a reduction in the number of official visits for the current academic year. The institution will be on probation for three years, beginning on Wednesday, which will include seminars on NCAA rules and providing prospective student-athletes with information about the probation and violations. As one of the last Independent Accountability Resolution Process is nearing its end, the Division I Board of Directors decided to eliminate the IARP. A big reason why the Division I Board of Directors voted to eliminate the IARP is the length of time it takes to reach a decision. Arizona’s case is a prime example. Much of the conduct occurred in 2017, and none of the individuals remain with the university. Thus, a more efficient process will be coming soon. Landis Barber is an attorney at Safran Law Offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or via his blog offthecourtdocket.com. He can be reached on Twitter @Landisbarber.

York County, South Carolina has approved a settlement agreement with GT Real Estate Holdings, LLC (GTRE) over the failed Carolina Panthers Headquarters project in Rock Hill, South Carolina. The agreement will settle the lawsuit filed by York County in June in South Carolina state court. Lawsuit Filed mere days after GTRE filed for bankruptcy, York County’s brought the lawsuit against the City of Rock Hill, David Tepper, and entities connected to David Tepper. It centers around the county-designated $21 million of Penny Tax Funds to expand Mt. Gallant Road. According to York County, after York County wired the funds, GTRE did not use the funds for the Mt. Gallant Road project. The basis for the claims against the Tepper entities, including negligence and negligent misrepresentation, is that the entities did not perform the work pursuant to the land development agreement for the project. The claim against Rock Hill is for breach of contract due to Rock Hill failing to issue bonds for the project, which ultimately led to GTRE terminating the project. Settlement As a part of the settlement agreement, a GTRE affiliate will reimburse York County the full $21,165,000.00 in Penny Tax Funds. In turn, York County will withdraw any complaints and allegations of wrongdoing. Last week, the York County Sheriff’s Office announced an inquiry into GTRE’s handling of the Penny Tax Funds. York County announced that the settlement resolves the county’s disputes and “the County considers all matters related to the County Payment closed and believes that no action of any kind with respect to the County Payment is warranted.” The settlement must be approved by the Bankruptcy Court before the matter is fully resolved. David Tepper and GTRE are chipping away at the issues on the York County project. One outstanding item in the Bankruptcy Court is settling with contractors that performed work on the project. Notwithstanding the remaining items, reaching an agreement with York County puts another issue behind them. Landis Barber is an attorney at Safran Law Offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or via his blog offthecourtdocket.com. He can be reached on Twitter @Landisbarber.

First reported by Pete Thamel of ESPN, the College Football Playoff (CFP) has agreed to expand the playoffs to 12 teams beginning in 2024, moving the date up from 2026. Unless the committee made changes, the 12-team field includes champions from each Power 5 conference, the Group of 5 champion, and six at-large teams. On September 2, the CFP announced an expansion of the playoffs from 4 teams to 12 teams beginning in 2026, citing a need for more participation in college football’s national championship tournament. Importantly, the CFP received nearly $470 million per year in television rights for the four-team format. Since the announcement, the CFP has been working to move up the expansion to the 2024 season. However, each playoff bowl game and ESPN, the television rights holder, needed to agree to the 2024 start date. Until Thursday, the Rose Bowl was the lone holdout, seeking better terms and primetime slots during non-playoff years. By Thursday evening, the CFP had resolved the issues, paving the way for the CFP to begin in 2024. Additionally, the CFP announced that the 2024 playoff begins the week ending on Saturday, December 21, with the higher-seeded team hosting. The top 4 teams will receive a bye. Semifinal winners will play the 2024 National Championship game in Atlanta on January 20, 2025, and the CFP will hold the 2025 championship game in Miami on January 19, 2026. The CFP did not announce anything regarding playoffs beyond 2025. ESPN’s television rights agreement expires in 2025. The NCAA is seeking a new deal that could include multiple broadcasts and fetch up to $2 billion annually—far exceeding the current $470 million. Most teams will welcome expanded opportunities to compete for a national championship. For the College Football Playoff, more playoff games mean more revenue, and a big payday will be coming soon. Landis Barber is an attorney at Safran Law Offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or via his blog offthecourtdocket.com. He can be reached on Twitter @Landisbarber.

On Wednesday, the University of California Board of Regents approved the University of California, Los Angeles’ (UCLA) move to the Big Ten Conference. With the approval, UCLA will leave the Pac-12 Conference and join the Big Ten in 2024. In June, UCLA and the University of Southern California (USC) announced they would move from the Pac-12 to the Big Ten in 2024. Since it is a private university, USC did not need approval from the Board of Regents. Since the announcement, the Board of Regents has been reviewing UCLA’s move, including holding multiple meetings. Despite UCLA having the authority to contract with the Big Ten, the Board of Regents may affirm or overturn UCLA’s decision. During its review, many of the Board of Regents’ concerns revolved around the student-athlete experience. Specifically, the Board of Regents raised concerns surrounding nutrition, mental health, and travel time. Needing only majority approval, the Board of Regents approved the move 11 to 5. To combat the concerns, the Board of Regents approved the move with conditions, including increasing support for the 2023-2024 fiscal year. The support includes at least $1.5 million in academic support, $4.3 million in nutritional support, and $562,800 in mental health services. Other conditions include establishing a $2.5 million reserve fund to supplement the aforementioned support and a contribution to the University of California, Berkeley after the Pac-12 finalizes its media agreement. The University of California, Berkeley will remain in the Pac-12. With conference realignment expected to continue in the future, the Board of Regents’ decision is insight into decision-making that may occur in other systems. For example, the University of North Carolina (UNC) and North Carolina State University (NCSU) are in the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) and part of the University of North Carolina System. Similar to the University of California System, University of North Carolina System institutions may enter into contracts and agreements, but the Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina System may rescind the authority at any time (see N.C.G.S. 116-11(13)). Thus, if either UNC or NCSU were to leave the ACC without the other school, we could see the Board of Governors review the departing university’s decision or even rescind the decision. The increased support from the Board of Regents’ decision is a victory for student-athletes attending UCLA. For UCLA, the support and contribution to Berkeley are minor payouts compared to the giant 7-year, $7 billion media rights deal the Big Ten recently inked. With the approval, UCLA will be heading to the Big Ten. Landis Barber is an attorney at Safran Law Offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or via his blog offthecourtdocket.com. He can be reached on Twitter @Landisbarber.

First reported by Greg Madia of The Daily Progress, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) will grant an additional year of eligibility to University of Virginia football players that do not have any eligibility remaining. The University of Virginia submitted the request to the NCAA, and the NCAA granted the request after the university’s season was halted after ten games. The University of Virginia canceled its remaining games against Coastal Carolina and Virginia Tech after the devastating deaths of 3 football players, Lavel Davis Jr., Devin Chandler, and D’Sean Perry. During the weeks of the canceled games, Virginia football players took part in each of the funerals for their teammates and a memorial service on campus. Typically, Division I athletes, including football players at Virginia, have five years to play four seasons of competition, beginning at the time of enrollment. In 2020, the NCAA granted an extra year of eligibility to winter and spring sports, which extends the clock for 2020/2021-enrolled athletes to six years. If an extraordinary circumstance prevents an athlete(s) from meeting the eligibility rules, a school can file a waiver on the athlete(s) behalf. Here, due to outgoing athletes being unable to complete their careers, the University of Virginia sought a waiver of the eligibility timeline. Now, those athletes will be able to play an additional year. Importantly, the waiver is limited to those athletes that have exhausted their eligibility under the rule. Either way, the NCAA did the right thing, granting another year after devastating losses to the program. Landis Barber is an attorney at Safran Law Offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. You can connect with him via LinkedIn or via his blog offthecourtdocket.com. He can be reached on Twitter @Landisbarber.