The Athletic  recently reported that two small market baseball clubs – the Athletics and the Miami Marlins – are in jeopardy of having grievances filed against them for spending insufficient money on their player payrolls. [1]   This article uses those examples to explain Major League Baseball’s Collective Bargaining Agreement’s grievance process and revenue sharing program. Grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement The Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) is an agreement between the 30 Major League Baseball clubs (the “Clubs”) and the Major League Baseball Players Association (the “MLBPA”).  The CBA establishes the rights and responsibilities of the Clubs, the players, and the MLBPA, and “certain terms and conditions of employment” of all MLB players. [2]   The current CBA came into effect on March 10, 2022, and expires on December 1, 2026. The CBA allows MLB players and, in some instances, the MLBPA on behalf of players, to file grievances against the Clubs.  The CBA defines a grievance as “a complaint which involves the existence or interpretation of, or compliance with, any agreement . . . between the [MLBPA] and the Clubs or any of them, or between a Player and a Club[.]” [3] Here are some notable examples of grievances filed under the CBA:  · In 2021, the MLBPA filed a grievance against MLB for failing to schedule more games during the COVID-shortened 2020 season. [4]   · In 2022, Trevor Bauer filed a grievance in connection with his suspension following allegations of sexual assault. [5]   · And, in 2001, the MLPBA filed a grievance against Club owners for threatening to contract two Clubs from MLB. [6] The grievance process begins when a player or the MLBPA provides notice of the grievance to a Club or the Clubs, after which the Club(s) responds to the grievance.  The parties to a grievance may resolve it on their own.  However, if a player or the MLBPA disagrees with a Club’s decision, the CBA also allows a player or the MLBPA to appeal the Club’s decision first to the Major League Baseball Labor Relations Department, and then, if necessary, to a panel of three arbitrators (the “Arbitration Panel”), headed by the panel chair.  The Arbitration Panel has jurisdiction and authority “to determine the existence of or compliance with, or to interpret or apply agreements or provisions of agreements between the [MLBPA] and the Clubs or any of them, or between individual Players and the Clubs.  The Arbitration Panel shall not have jurisdiction or authority to add to, detract from, or alter in any way the provisions of such agreements.” [7] The Arbitration Panel’s decision regarding a grievance is effectively final:  In Major League Baseball Assn. v. Garvey , the Supreme Court held that an arbitrator’s decision will only be overturned if it is the result of fraud. [8] Revenue sharing and grievances for violations of the CBA’s revenue sharing policy The CBA’s revenue sharing program is designed to improve on-field competition, and the MLBPA may file a grievance against a Club that misuses proceeds received from that program.  Clubs receive revenues from nationally broadcast games and local sources like regional broadcast contracts, sponsorships, and sales of tickets, concessions, and merchandise. [9]   Obviously, Clubs in larger markets, like New York or Los Angeles, that have more lucrative television deals and bigger stadiums collect more local revenues than Clubs in smaller markets, like Milwaukee and Tampa Bay.  To attempt to even the playing field to some degree, the CBA’s revenue sharing plan redistributes a portion of those local revenues. [10] The calculation of how much money Clubs pay or receive under the revenue sharing program is complex.  Essentially, the program pools 48% of each Club’s local revenues, and that pool is redistributed equally among all Clubs.  [11]   As a result, a large market Club that generates a lot of local revenue ends up paying into the revenue sharing program more than it receives because 48% of its local revenues is greater than 48% of a smaller market Club’s revenues.  By contrast, a smaller market Club collects more from the revenue sharing program than it contributes.  Clubs that end up paying into the program are called revenue sharing payors, and Clubs that receive money from the program are called revenue sharing payees.  The revenue sharing program was created for the limited purpose of giving smaller market Clubs additional resources to improve their on-field performance.  Without disincentives built into it, however, owners of revenue sharing payees could abuse the program by saving  the proceeds of the revenue sharing program they receive rather than spending that money in ways designed to improve on-field performance.  As such, the CBA contains certain mechanisms to prevent that from happening.  For example, in 2022, a change in the new CBA introduced a lottery to determine the MLB Rule 4 Draft order (the “Amateur Draft”).  To disincentivize teams from tanking for lottery picks in the draft, the definition of the Amateur Draft was amended to say that revenue sharing payees cannot receive a lottery pick inside the top six selections in the Amateur Draft in three consecutive years. [12]   This rule was applied recently:  The Athletics, a frequent revenue sharing payee, could not receive a top-six pick in this year’s Amateur Draft because they had been revenue sharing payees for three years in a row. [13]   Similarly, revenue sharing payors cannot receive a top-six lottery pick two years in a row, a provision that disincentivizes large market Clubs from tanking. [14] Moreover, the CBA states that acceptable uses of the proceeds received from revenue sharing include extending current players’ contracts, signing free agents, purchasing training equipment, and investing in analytics that support player development.  Conversely, the CBA provides the following examples of uses of revenue sharing proceeds that are not consistent with this objective: · Payments to service acquisition debt or any other debt that is unrelated to past or future efforts to improve performance on the field; · Payments to individuals other than on-field personnel or personnel related to player development; · Payments to entities that do not have a direct role in improving on-field performance; and · Distributions to ownership that are not intended to offset tax obligations resulting from Club operations. [15] Furthermore, the CBA allows the MLPBA to file a grievance against a Club it believes did not use its revenue sharing proceeds to improve its on-field performance.  In any such grievance, the CBA requires the Arbitration Panel to consider the following: · The Club’s expenditures on scouting, player development, and player payroll; · The Club’s long-term strategy for improving competitiveness; · The Club’s historical use of revenue sharing receipts; · Any material adverse changes in local revenue; and · The Club’s overall financial position.  In this type of grievance, the MLBPA has the burden of demonstrating that the Club’s use of revenue sharing violates the CBA.  The burden flips to the Club, however, if the Club’s total player payroll is less than 150% of its revenue sharing receipts. [16]   The MLB commissioner may impose penalties against a Club that violates this provision of the CBA, including requiring the Club to submit a plan for its financial performance and competitive effort for the next two years. [17] Recent grievances related to the revenue sharing player payroll spending requirement A Club’s payroll is determined at the end of the season for purposes of the burden-shifting provision of the CBA.  Even so, pre-season payroll numbers can signal which Clubs may find themselves receiving a grievance from the MLBPA at the end of the season. For example, on December 9, 2024, Evan Drellich and Ken Rosenthal of The Athletic wrote an article warning that, even after signing Luis Severino to a three-year, $67 million contract in the offseason, the A’s needed to add more to their payroll to avoid receiving a grievance. [18]   The article estimated that the A’s needed to reach $105 million in payroll for competitive balance tax purposes to avoid tripping the burden-shifting provision of the CBA.  Since that article was published, the A’s signed free agents, including Gio Urshela, Jose Leclerc and Luis Urias; extended Brent Rooker and Lawrence Butler; and traded for Jeffrey Springs, increasing their payroll for competitive balance tax purposes in 2025 to approximately $115 million, according to Fangraphs. [19] While the A’s appear to have addressed their payroll concerns, the Marlins have not.  The Athletic  reported on March 18, 2025 that the Marlins were operating about $20 million below the CBA’s revenue sharing player payroll spending requirement. [20]   Since the article was published, the Marlins have made no significant changes to their 2025 payroll.  What’s worse, the article suggests that the Marlins are more likely to cut  salary by the end of the season than add it.  For example, the article predicts that Sandy Alcantara, whose salary is approximately $11.2 million for 2025, will be traded by this season’s trade deadline. [21] This is not the first time similar allegations have been made against the Marlins (or the A’s).  In 2018, the MLBPA filed a grievance against the Miami Marlins, Oakland Athletics, Pittsburgh Pirates, and Tampa Bay Rays, alleging that these four Clubs violated the CBA by misusing the money they received through MLB’s revenue sharing program.  That grievance was filed pursuant to the then-operative CBA, which has since expired.  However, that CBA – like the current one – required Clubs to use the revenue sharing proceeds “in an effort to improve [their] performance on the field.”  That grievance remains pending, and the MLBPA filed another grievance against some of the same Clubs in 2019. [22] Potential consequences for the Marlins What will happen to the Marlins if they do not increase their payroll remains an open question.  As an initial matter, if the Marlins’ payroll does not exceed the 150% threshold by the end of the season, they can still show that they used their revenue sharing proceeds to improve their on-field performance.  Perhaps anticipating that their payroll would not exceed the 150% threshold, at the start of spring training, Marlins owner Bruce Sherman and president of baseball operations Peter Bendix discussed improvements the Marlins had made in the offseason, including hiring “one of the largest front-office staffs in baseball,” bulking up the Marlins weight room, renovating their spring training facility, and building a player development complex in the Dominican Republic. [23]   Notably, these are the exact types of improvements the Marlins would likely point to in a grievance hearing as evidence that they had used their revenue sharing proceeds to improve on-field performance.  Even if the grievance is successful, however, it is unclear what penalties would be levied against the Marlins.  Perhaps Commissioner Rob Manfred would require the Marlins to submit a plan for its financial performance and competitive effort for the next two years as the CBA contemplates.  It is also possible that the MLBPA will use the grievance as leverage while negotiating the next CBA, which will happen in the not-too-distant future, as the current CBA is set to expire on December 1, 2026.  Maybe even the Marlins don’t know what will happen if they don’t increase their payroll, and maybe they don’t care.  As one rival executive put it, “They’re sort of saying, ‘There’s no precedent here.  We don’t know what the punishment will be.  We’ll just find out’.” [24]   So will we.  John Kane is a lawyer and a sports fan.  His Twitter handle is @JKane_Sports. Sources: [1] “Even after Severino, A’s have to spend more this winter or risk fight with players’ union,” Evan Drellich and Ken Rosenthal, The Athletic , December 9, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5982452/2024/12/09/as-spending-union-grievance-severino/ ; “Once again, the Marlins’ lack of spending risks grievance from the players union,” Ken Rosenthal, The Athletic  March 18, 2025,  https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/6211601/2025/03/18/miami-marlins-spending-payroll-luxury-tax/ . [2] CBA Article I.  [3]  CBA Article XI(A)(1)(a). [4] “MLB players union seeking $500 million in grievance against league,” Jon Sherman, New York Post , May 13, 20201, https://nypost.com/2021/05/13/mlb-players-union-seeks-500-million-in-grievance-against-league/ . [5]  “Los Angeles Dodgers pitcher Trevor Bauer’s grievance hearing against Major League Baseball to begin May 23, sources say,” Alden Gonzalez, ESPN , May 13, 2022, https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/33910887/los-angeles-dodgers-pitcher-trevor-bauer-grievance-hearing-major-league-baseball-begin-23-source-says . [6]  “Settling the dispute,” Darren Rovell, ESPN , November 14, 2001, https://www.espn.com/mlb/s/2001/1113/1277749.html . [7]  CBA Article XI(B). [8]  532 U.S. 504 (2001). [9] Revenues from nationally broadcast games are split equally among all Clubs. [10] The revenue sharing program is not to be confused with the Competitive Balance Tax (the “ CBT ”), the tiered tax on Clubs who exceed certain payroll thresholds.  The proceeds of those taxes are used towards players’ benefits, retirement plans, and a fund that rewards local clubs for growing their non-media local revenue.  See  CBA Article XXIII((H)(2)(b). [11]  CBA Article XXIV(A)(9)-(10).   [12] “Rule 4 Draft,” https://www.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/rule-4-draft (“[R]evenue sharing payees are ineligible to receive lottery selections in three consecutive years[.]”). [13] “A’s content with 11th pick, despite Draft Lottery ineligibility,” Martin Gallegos, MLB.com ,  https://www.mlb.com/news/athletics-land-11th-pick-after-being-ineligible-for-draft-lottery . [14] “Rule 4 Draft,” https://www.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/rule-4-draft (“[N]on-payees are ineligible to receive lottery selections in consecutive years.”). [15]  CBA Article XXIV(B)(5)(a). [16]  CBA Article XXIV(B)(5)(a). [17]   Id. [18] “Even after Severino, A’s have to spend more this winter or risk fight with players’ union,” The Athletic, December 9, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5982452/2024/12/09/as-spending-union-grievance-severino/ .  [19] https://www.fangraphs.com/roster-resource/payroll/athletics . [20] “Once again, the Marlins’ lack of spending risks grievance from the players union,” Ken Rosenthal, The Athletic  March 18, 2025,  https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/6211601/2025/03/18/miami-marlins-spending-payroll-luxury-tax/ .                [21] Id. [22] “Even after Severino, A’s have to spend more this winter or risk fight with players’ union,” The Athletic, December 9, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5982452/2024/12/09/as-spending-union-grievance-severino/ .  [23] “Once again, the Marlins’ lack of spending risks grievance from the players union,” Ken Rosenthal, The Athletic  March 18, 2025,  https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/6211601/2025/03/18/miami-marlins-spending-payroll-luxury-tax/ . [24] Id.

On Thursday, March 27, 2025 , former University of Tennessee head coach Jeremy Pruitt filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, claiming he was used as a “sacrificial lamb” for conduct that has a long precedent in his career at the university. Pruitt alleges that the NCAA conspired with the university in a “one-sided” investigation, unfairly placing the blame on him for a series of violations that ultimately led to the loss of his job. Pruitt is seeking a substantial $100 million in damages. A History of Violations Pruitt’s lawsuit centers on the allegation that the University of Tennessee has a long history of violations that went unnoticed upon his hire in 2017. He claims that, within one week of obtaining his job, he reported violations to the athletic director, Phillip Fulmer. Pruitt’s complaint expresses that, with the understanding that payments were being made to some players, he made the report to Fulmer, and was told that Fulmer would “handle it” and “deal with the compliance department” at the university, but no substantial actions were taken to address the issue. The NCAA’s investigation from 2020-2023 found that, during official visits, two players received direct payments from Pruitt. One received a direct payment from Pruitt to include a $7,600 down payment for a car and a monthly payment of $500 for a car payment on at least 25 occasions. The NCAA discovered that another player received $3,000 to use for medical bills and expenses. Pruitt’s wife (who once worked in NCAA rules compliance at Troy University and Florida State) also allegedly made cash payments of at least $13,000 to recruits and their families. In 2021, Pruitt and seven staff members were charged with having committed violations, all of whom were fired from their positions after an internal university investigation uncovered alleged wrongdoing. NCAA’s Response and Penalties The NCAA has yet to respond; however, they did impose penalties on Tennessee’s program. In 2023, Pruitt was given a six-year show cause order, prohibiting him from being hired by NCAA-affiliated schools unless the school shows the NCAA why they should approve the hire. Although Tennessee avoided a postseason ban due to its compliance with the investigation, the university was placed on probation, forced to vacate wins, and suffered scholarship reductions. Pruitt’s Legal Claim Pruitt’s lawsuit alleges that the NCAA allowed the University of Tennessee to choose its own lawyers for the investigation, which placed him in an unfair position due to the biased process. He claims that the NCAA also applied "an erroneous and improper standard in weighing the evidence, the net effect of which was to allow a life-altering punishment with less than the required burden of proof." Additionally, Pruitt argues that the NCAA limited the investigation by excluding “ any facts that tend to show misconduct prior to Jeremy's time as head coach and outside his chain of authority." Pruitt expresses that the university acted in bad faith in order to preserve self-interest at the expense of his career and reputation and that no reasonable jury would be able to find him guilty of the allegations. The Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) Argument The widely discussed debate surrounding NIL is a focal point in this case. Pruitt argues that the NCAA punished Pruitt for something that is no longer illegal due to the results of NCAA v. Alston . Pruitt was fired from his position just within half a year before this ruling. With this small window between stepping down from the coaching position and the allowance of college players being able to profit from their name, image, and likeness, there is hope that this will help Pruitt’s case. Pruitt expresses the unfairness of the rules that the NCAA is applying against him, which “had been essentially abolished in 2021 by the United States Supreme Court ruling.” The Future of NCAA Enforcement: Is Pruitt’s Lawsuit a Turning Point? In this new NIL era reshaping collegiate sports, critical questions stem from this lawsuit in regard to the organization’s ability to enforce infractions. This lawsuit raises broader questions about the NCAA’s power to regulate recruiting violations in a time where monetary benefits for athletes are no longer strictly prohibited. As legal challenges to NCAA authority grow, this case could serve as a critical test of how much influence the organization retains over its member institutions and whether its enforcement mechanisms need reform .   Katherine Vescio is a 1L at University of Gonzaga School of Law. She can be found on LinkedIn .

A new bill  introduced by U.S. Rep. Michael Baumgartner (R-Wash.) takes aim  at the current college athletics landscape and proposes changes that target NIL, the transfer portal, and conference realignment. The bill, called the “Restore College Sports Act,” specifically targets  areas of college athletics that the Congressman identified as in need of reform. The legislation would dissolve the NCAA and replace it with a new entity, the American College Sports Association. The ACSA would be run by a commissioner, appointed by the President and approved by Congress, who would oversee and regulate college sports. The bill also calls for a new revenue sharing model for NIL funds, which would involve pooling national NIL revenues and redistributing them equally to all student-athletes across the nation. Broadcast revenue would also be distributed equally among ASCA member institutions. Additionally, student athletes would have the ability to transfer schools without penalty or restrictions. The bill further proposes that all athletic conferences would be required to have members operating in the same time zone, in an effort to prevent cross county travel for in-conference games. Baumgarter  asserts that this requirement would reduce travel burdens and prioritize the academic and physical well-being of the student-athletes. The legislation also addresses coaching salaries by essentially creating a cap that would limit the coaches salary to ten times the full cost of attendance for students at each institution. Baumgartner stated that his bill “reflected not only good policy, but good politics. . . The NCAA is a defunct and broken institution that nobody likes. You need to make elected officials accountable for these things, because it is in the public interest.”   Baumgartner’s bill is not the only legislation introduced in an effort to change college sports. Another bill , introduced by U.S. Rep. Lisa McClain (R-Mich.) would “prevent college athletes from being employees of their schools, conferences or an athletic association.” In 2023 , U.S. Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) introduced legislation to codify NIL rights in federal law. The College Athlete Economic Freedom Act emphasizes the rights and economic interests of college athletes. The bill proposes an unrestricted federal NIL right that the NCAA, conferences and colleges could not restrain; a requirements that media rights deal include group licenses on behalf of college athletes, who must be adequately compensated for their appearances; an amendment of the Immigration and Nationality Act to allow international college athletes attending colleges on F-1 visas to capitalize on their NIL without facing immigration consequences; and a prohibition of college and NIL collective practices that discriminate on the basis of gender, race, or sport. The same year, U.S. Senators Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) and Joe Manchin (D-W. Va). introduced their own NIL bill, the Protecting Athletes, Schools, and Sports Act of 2023, which contemplates a more restrictive landscape for athletes’ NIL opportunities and a limitation on the transfer portal.   Despite interest from both parties, it's unlikely an NIL bill will pass anytime soon. Murphy “estimated the chances of Congress passing NIL-related legislation before the end of 2026 are close to zero.”   Cassandra Devaney is a graduate of the University of Connecticut School of Law.

Seven members of the medical team that treated Diego Maradona are facing homicide charges in Buenos Aires. Maradona, who died in November 2020 at the age of 60, is regarded as one of the greatest football players of all time. He captained the Argentinian national team when they won the World Cup in 1986, scoring the infamous “Hand of God” goal in the quarter-finals.  The trial, which started last month, centers on allegations that medical negligence contributed to Maradona's death. Maradona had been home recovering from brain surgery, having undergone a procedure to remove a blood clot on his brain, when he suffered a heart attack. Maradona, a national icon, had long struggled with drug addiction, obesity, and alcoholism, but prosecutors argue that his death could have been prevented with proper medical care. The accusations emerged after the prosecutor’s office gathered a group of medical experts to determine if there was evidence that Maradona’s medical team committed a crime. The prosecutor’s group of medical experts released a report in 2021 accusing Maradona’s medical team of acting in an “inappropriate, deficient, and reckless manner,” ultimately concluding that the team’s failure to properly monitor Maradona after he was released from the hospital contributed to his death.  The accused include Maradona’s brain surgeon, psychiatrist, addiction specialist, and several nurses. Among the charges is "culpable homicide," a crime similar to involuntary manslaughter. The prosecution’s case includes expert reports and over 120,000 messages and audio recordings, highlighting deficiencies in Maradona’s care. The experts also pointed out that Maradona had not received necessary heart or lab tests and had symptoms of heart failure before his death. Despite this, the majority of the medical team has denied any wrongdoing. The defendants argue that Maradona insisted on home care and that his death was unforeseeable, occurring “during sleeping hours, without offering us any time.” In response to the medical experts report, the defense also commissioned its own forensic study to support their claim that Maradona’s death “was sudden and without agony.” However, this past week, a doctor testified at trial that the late soccer star should have been admitted to a rehab center after his release from the hospital, rather than taken home following the surgery he underwent. “He should have gone to a rehabilitation clinic ... a more protected place for him,” Mario Alejandro Schiter, who treated Maradona for two decades, told the court. Schiter said he was a consultant and that he had no decision-making authority, and that the clinic's directors ultimately “came and told me they opted for home hospitalization.” According to some witnesses at the trial, the home where Maradona was taken lacked the necessary medical equipment. Schiter, who also observed the autopsy on Maradona's body, said “all the evidence suggests that there was a failure to provide modifiable care, which led to heart failure.” The trial will continue through July, with a three-judge court rendering judgment on seven of the eight medical professionals accused - the eighth, a nurse, asked to be tried separately by a jury. If they are found guilty, the defendants face up to 25 years in prison. Cassandra Devaney is a graduate of the University of Connecticut School of Law. Sources: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2eg09e14do https://apnews.com/article/maradona-homicide-trial-doctors-fa75d5af559411da0809f8ad21de2974

Like in every professional sport, the margins between winning and losing in Major League Baseball are extremely thin. A single trade, free agent acquisition, managerial decision, or injury can play a significant role in whether a team makes the postseason or misses out by a game. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that every team seeks to find even the slightest competitive edge over their opponents.   As MLB front offices have evolved over the last several years, analytics have become a focal component of how rosters are built, prospects are scouted, and competitive advantages are gained. While front offices across the league have hired analysts, data scientists, and PhDs to keep up with this trend, clubs often make agreements with analytics companies as a supplement to their internal operations.     Because these analytic companies often have deals with multiple clubs within the same league, front offices are understandably concerned they are losing a potential competitive edge. To combat this, many clubs attempt to gain some level of exclusivity with these entities.   Just in the last decade, analytically forward front offices including the Tampa Bay Rays, Chicago Cubs, New York Yankees, and Houston Astros had exclusive arrangements with college programs to access their player’s TrackMan Data. MLB eventually halted this practice due to potential NCAA violations, but it goes to show how much teams crave to get ahead of their peers. According to Evan Drellich’s Winning Fixes Everything , the Houston Astros even considered buying TrackMan outright as they built up their analytics department under former GM Jeff Luhnow.   Therefore, it’s not surprising that there is some natural tension in these agreements between MLB clubs and analytical companies. The clubs don’t want to risk losing their competitive edge and the companies don’t want to limit their services to one particular club.   We saw this tension come to fruition recently when the Philadelphia Phillies filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in Philadelphia against Zelus Analytics and its parent company Teamworks Innovations. In the suit, the team claimed Zelus attempted to sell components of the Titan Exchange platform to teams within their division, violating the agreement they had with the Phillies—and in effect, undermining its competitive advantage.  Titan Intelligence is made by Zelus and produces analytical models that help teams evaluate players and assist with roster construction, including player contracts and strategy. The Phillies paid Zelus $1.875 million from 2022-24 to use its Titan platform and those contracts included “division-exclusive” licenses that prevented Zelus from sharing data with any other National League East club.  Following the 2024 season, the agreement contained option for the parties to extend the deal through the 2025 campaign if the Phillies chose to do so. This is where the conflict emerged. Zelus stated the team stalled to exercise its $725,000 option for 2025 and that they did not have exclusive rights to individual components of the platform, which had been marketed to every team in the sport for months. The Phillies alleged that upon attempting to exercise their option, Zelus responded by attempting to amend the agreement so that they would be able to sell the platform in to more teams around the league, including to the team's division rivals.   The Phillies claimed they still possessed the “division-exclusive license,” and sought a temporary restraining order that would block any deal that would violate the team’s agreement with the firm to sell to just one team in each of Major League Baseball’s six divisions, in addition to unspecified compensatory damages for breach of contract.  The team argued that without court intervention, Zelus and Teamworks would have continued to try to get around their exclusivity agreement by selling parts of its platform to other teams, including its division foes, causing “irreparable harm” to the front office’s competitive advantage.  In response, the Zelus and Teamworks claimed that the lawsuit was merely "pretext for [the Phillies] to leverage the convenient imminency of the start of the 2025 MLB season to further its efforts to negotiate a price reduction on a renewal contract.” They contended the Phillies could not claim irreparable harm or a loss of competitive advantage because one of the club’s assistant general managers proposed a financial discount during the negotiations if the Phillies were to permit other teams to purchase components of the platform.” Finally, Zelus and Teamworks argued the Phillies’ contention of “irreparable harm” was based on speculation about competitive infringements. “[The Phillies] have failed to provide any actual proof of irreparable harm by way of concrete evidence,” Teamworks attorneys wrote. “And for good reason, because no such proof exists.” Judge James Crumlish III of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas sided with the defendants and denied the Phillies’ injunctive request, stating that the team failed to “show that its claims of injury were anything but entirely speculative.”  Moreover, Crumlish wrote that the Phillies failed to demonstrate “requisite diligence in seeking relief,” suggesting they implied this was an emergency situation when it wasn’t. Crumlish, however, will allow the Phillies' breach of contract lawsuit against Zelus to proceed.   Obviously frustrated by the lack of immediate injuctive relief, the Phillies issued a statement that read: “The Phillies are disappointed with the Court’s decision, which contains numerous errors of fact and law,” and “We look forward to prevailing on the merits of our case in front of a Philadelphia jury.”   On the other side, a Teamworks spokesman said, “We are pleased the court has denied the Philadelphia Phillies’ effort to prevent rival organizations from accessing our advanced analytics products,” and “While we cannot comment on specific details of ongoing litigation, we remain confident we have acted in full compliance with our agreements and look forward to an appropriate resolution.”   Moving forward, this case will proceed without the temporary restraining order in federal court. It will certainly be interesting to see if the parties are willing to take this dispute to trial or ultimately end up settling out of court. More broadly, given that the Phillies are only one of Zelus' MLB clients, it certainly adds another layer of intrigue to the resolution of this case.     Brendan Bell is a 2L at SMU Dedman School of Law. He can be followed on Twitter (X) @_bbell5

The sight of fans collapsing in tears of joy after their team secures the World Cup. The stories of Olympic medals catapulting once-unknown athletes into national icons. For many athletes, representing their country on the international stage is the pinnacle of their playing journey—the fruits of countless hours on the field and in the weight room, finally coming to bear. Yet, this dream can quickly turn horrific. Recent cases highlight how the interests of club and international teams compete with one another, sometimes resulting in devastating consequences for the very athletes they depend on.   Just over a week ago, Bayern Munich football star and Canadian national Alphonso Davies suffered a torn ACL during the third-place match of the CONCACAF Nations League tournament against the United States. The injury itself was crushing, but it became even more controversial when Davies’ agent, Nedal Huoseh, stated that his client was not fully healthy after Canada’s prior match against Mexico. According to Huoseh, the Canadian captain—who missed the November international window due to fatigue—first planned to come off the bench before ultimately succumbing to pressures from his coach and joining the starting lineup. While the Canadian soccer federation denied wrongdoing, the team’s decision to play their star player in a relatively meaningless game (particularly when they’ve already secured an advantageous World Cup bid as a host nation) has been questioned by fans and experts alike. Bayern’s chief executive, Jan-Christian Dreesen, has since threatened legal action against the Canadian federation, accusing the team of being grossly negligent and violating medical due diligence by sending Davies back on a twelve-hour flight to Germany without a proper medical evaluation. Ironically, Bayern themselves faced similar accusations from the South Korean national team head coach after a recent injury to another player, Kim Min-jae. Davies is now facing “several months” of recovery, potentially jeopardizing his hopes of playing in the 2026 World Cup.          These issues are not unique to football, either. In the NHL’s midseason ‘4 Nations Face-Off,’ which featured a tournament-style competition between four national hockey teams, Boston Bruins star defenseman and U.S. national team member Charlie McAvoy suffered a shoulder injury in a preliminary match against Sweden. He was given treatment and cleared by the Team USA medical staff—comprised of members of the Minnesota Wild’s medical team—playing in the following game against Team Canada. However, McAvoy developed increasing pain, and upon returning to the Bruins for further evaluation by the club’s medical staff (as opposed to that of Team USA), it was discovered that McAvoy had a shoulder infection and significant injury to his AC joint that required hospitalization. The Bruins were publicly displeased with how McAvoy’s injury was handled, reigniting tensions between Boston and Minnesota’s medical teams (who had previously disagreed over player health). This history highlights a fundamental issue for international athletes: national teams and club teams often have separate medical staffs, each operating with entirely different priorities. While Team USA’s doctors were focused on short-term tournament success, the Bruins—who have McAvoy under contract through 2029–30—were concerned about the long-term health of their franchise cornerstone. While Team USA has faced no ramifications, the Bruins have been without a key player since February 8, a significant blow to a team whose only “fault” was allowing one of their players to compete internationally.   Club teams may not be completely without recourse when one of their players suffers an international injury. Bodies like FIFA provide insurance policies covering injuries sustained while on national team duty, awarding up to $7.5 million per case. However, such protections are far from universal. While the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) insured players for the 2018 Winter Olympics, they did extend the same coverage for the 4 Nations tournament. The NHL has since informed the IIHF they will not be moving forward with their partnership for the 2028 World Cup of Hockey, leaving club teams to bear the financial and competitive burden of losing players to international injury. This lack of insurance means that while clubs in some sports may receive compensation for injured players, many others are left with no course of action.   Despite mounting concerns of player burnout from players and fans alike, governing bodies continue to push for expanded schedules. FIFA is adding matches to an already congested calendar, including the upcoming 2025 Club World Cup. Meanwhile, the NBA and NFL are exploring ways to integrate international competitions into their seasons. Although leagues have resisted the idea that additional rest may reduce injury—most notably the NBA’s recent changes to their rest policies—the effects of overuse are becoming undeniable. Stars across sports have seen their rate of injury increase following a 2024 Olympics that saw many players take on an increased workload necessitated by added international games. Adding further matches and travel to an already busy schedule would seemingly only cause the rate of injury to spike further, prompting concern for the long-term health and safety of players in this current climate.   Solutions do exist for teams and players alike who want to insulate their bodies against the rigors of being both a modern international and club-level athlete, though implementation remains a challenge. The WNBA’s recent “prioritization” rules (designed to limit athletes’ offseason and international play) have faced pushback from players. Greater club discretion is needed to prevent teams from losing star talent to serious international injury without compensation, as the Bruins now face with McAvoy. Even when teams can pursue insurance claims and litigation (as in the Davies case), those measures do nothing to reduce growing player workloads or prevent the injuries in the first place—leading to athletes losing valuable years of their careers. Allegations by Davies’ agent that he was pressured into playing also underscore a need for player autonomy and discretion in deciding whether they feel healthy enough to take the field. More immediate solutions could include an adjustment of the standard player contract (SPC) that is available in many professional leagues (and typically sanctions certain events that are deemed as high-risk to players) to explicitly preclude participation in international matches if the player is deemed medically unfit (or introducing robust return-to-play protocols). Implementing such safeguards would appear to be a necessary first step to soothing growing overuse injury concerns athletes face as they balance demanding schedules for club and country.   As sports organizations worldwide chase record viewership numbers by increasing player workloads and scheduling added matches, the divide between national sports federations and club teams has never been wider. Conflicting medical assessments, limited player autonomy, and relentless scheduling demands are pushing athletes beyond their limits, often with insufficient protection for players and clubs. The question remains: will teams and leagues learn from these contemporary lessons and adopt proactive legislative shifts to safeguard their players, or will it take a career-ending injury to a global superstar to finally force change?   Oliver Canning is a 2L at the University of Miami School of Law. He can be followed on Twitter (X) @OCanning and found on LinkedIn .

When the NCAA made the groundbreaking decision to allow student-athletes to profit from their Name, Image, and Likeness (“NIL”), it introduced an entirely new dimension to collegiate athletics. In doing so, the NCAA also opened the door to an unpredictable and constantly evolving marketplace. Since the rule change, athletes around the country have signed NIL deals worth significant sums of money in exchange for their commitment to programs, a new layer to recruiting that has been likened to the “Wild West.” However, the recent March Madness appearance by the McNeese State Cowboys, and their subsequent exit at the hands of the Purdue Boilermakers, introduced a novel and unexpected twist to the NIL landscape. Amir “Aura” Khan, the Cowboys’ student manager, led the team onto the court in a custom yellow Under Armour tracksuit emblazoned with his nickname “Aura” across the back. He was also seen carrying his signature pregame boombox, now adorned with two prominent Buffalo Wild Wings logos. [i]  Khan’s rise to fame may appear perplexing at first glance. He is not a player. He doesn’t score points, block shots, or make any in-game contributions on the stat sheet. Instead, Khan spends his basketball seasons on the sidelines, ensuring players remain hydrated and energized throughout games. Khan’s relative anonymity changed on February 24th, when a video of him rapping the lyrics to “In & Out” by Lud Foe went viral, unexpectedly launching him into the national spotlight. [ii] While the total number of NIL deals signed and the compensation Khan received remain undisclosed, reports indicate that his month of visibility led to at least 12 agreements with major companies, including Buffalo Wild Wings, Insomnia Cookies, TickPick, and TurboTax. [iii] Some estimates place the total value of these deals in the six-figure range. Khan, a senior at McNeese, is expected to graduate this spring, with speculation swirling as to where he will go next.  This is a level of career intrigue yet to be seen for a student manager at any program. Under current NCAA NIL rules, student-athletes are permitted to engage in endorsement opportunities and other revenue-generating activities. [iv]  However, these rules do not directly address non-athletes, leaving individuals similarly placed to Khan in an ambiguous position. To be clear, Khan does not fall under the NCAA’s definition of a student-athlete. Under Bylaw § 12.02.14, a student qualifies as a student-athlete only if they are recruited with the intent to participate in intercollegiate athletics under a particular institutions athletic department. [v]  As a student manager, Khan does not engage in on-court competition or practice and therefore falls outside this definition. However, his role raises important questions about the current NIL framework. He is publicly associated with the team, featured on the program’s official website alongside other student workers, and, as of late, has played a visible part in the team’s culture and identity. [vi] While he does not step onto the court, Khan has clearly become a face of the McNeese State Cowboys basketball program prompting a discussion about whether the NIL policy should evolve to reflect the influence of non-athlete contributors in collegiate athletics. This issue is not unique to student managers. A similar situation arose earlier this month when “Cy,” the mascot of Iowa State University, signed what was termed an “UN-NIL” deal with the brand Duke Cannon. [vii] Mascots are traditionally anonymous during their collegiate tenure, with many only revealing their identities upon graduation. The details of the agreement with Duke Cannon remain unclear, though it presumably included promotional products, and while the individual behind the costume is permitted to benefit from their own personal NIL, most fans would not even know who they are. Despite that lack of visibility, the mascots these students portray play an integral role in school spirit and athletics culture. For example, in 2017, Brigham Young University’s “Cosmo the Cougar” captivated national audiences with a dance performance during a timeout against Boise State. [viii] The video, posted to Cosmo’s personal YouTube channel, has since garnered over 13 million views. Like Khan, Cosmo is an example of how roles peripheral to the on-screen competition can still drive significant fan engagement and exposure. At present, institutions such as the University of Wisconsin advise that students seeking NIL deals outside of official athletic department affiliation should obtain legal counsel. However, UW and similar schools explicitly prohibit the use of university trademarks or campus imagery in promoting commercial products. [ix] This guidance reflects a growing tension: while universities aim to protect their intellectual property and maintain compliance with NCAA regulations, they may simultaneously be curbing the visibility and entrepreneurial potential of students who help elevate their programs in non-traditional ways. As the lines between athlete, entertainer, and influencer continue to blur, particularly among younger and more online generations, it is increasingly likely that schools and governing bodies will need to reevaluate their NIL policies. Whether it’s a student manager with viral charisma, a mascot with millions of YouTube views, or another previously overlooked contributor to college sports culture, a new era of marketability is taking shape. With the transfer portal now open, NIL deal speculation is once again beginning to ramp up. While Khan will soon graduate and pursue new opportunities, his story presents a compelling question: what’s to stop the next viral student manager, cheerleader, or other school representative from entering the transfer portal in search of their own NIL payday? The genie is well out of the bottle — and college sports may never look the same. Andrew Majka-Sunde is a graduate of Western New England Law School ’21 and most recently served as Corporate Counsel for the Moses-Weitzman Health System in Middletown, CT.  He can be reached at LinkedIn here . Sources: [i]    @John_Fanta, X (March 22, 2025, 12:05pm), https://x.com/John_Fanta/status/1903478171707556339 [ii]   @Phill-UpOnMe, X (February 24, 2025, 11:12am) https://x.com/Phil_UpOnMe/status/1894057776357236862 [iii]  @reed_vial3, X (March 15, 2025, 8:04pm), https://x.com/reed_vial3/status/1901062054145823114 [iv]    Division I 2024-2025 Manual, § 22.01.1, at 413 (2024). [v]    Division I 2024-2025 Manual, § 12.02.14, at 35 (2024). [vi]   2024-25 Men's Basketball Roster, https://mcneesesports.com/sports/mens-basketball/roster , (Last Visited Mar. 25, 25). [vii]  Andrea Surnit, Duke Cannon Breaks Tradition With UN-NIL Deal With Iowa State Mascot , DesignRush, https://www.designrush.com/news/duke-cannon-breaks-tradition-un-nil-deal-iowa-state-mascot (last visited Mar. 24, 2025). [viii] BYU Cougarettes, Cosmo the Cougar and Cougarettes | Dance Performance | BYU vs. Boise State , YouTube (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KUoD-gPDahw (last visited Mar. 25, 2025). [ix]  University of Wisconsin–Madison, Name, Image, and Likeness – Non-Student Athletes , Office of Strategic Partnerships and Licensing, https://licensing.wisc.edu/name-image-likeness-non-student-athletes/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2025).

Earlier this week, Baltimore Ravens star quarterback Lamar Jackson filed a formal opposition to Dale Earnhardt Jr.’s attempt to federally register a stylized version of the number 8 with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). [i] The Notice of Opposition, which was filed on April 2, 2025, brings about commonplace trademark issues: brand identity and likelihood of confusion. The USPTO’s key goal regarding trademarks is to protect consumers and businesses by ensuring trademarks clearly identify the source of goods or services. It promotes fair competition by registering distinctive marks and preventing confusion in the marketplace. Can a number be trademarked? In short, yes. To successfully register a numeral as a trademark, the applicant must establish that the number in question possesses the requisite distinctiveness and is capable of functioning as an identifier of the source of goods or services. Numerals, by nature, are merely abstract symbols that denote quantity or value, and thus are not considered to be inherently distinctive under trademark law. Therefore, for a numeral to qualify for the USPTO’s protection, the applicant must show that the numeral has acquired distinctiveness. This level of distinctiveness must be demonstrated via evidence that the public has come to associate the numeral with the applicant requesting protection. Additionally, the distinctiveness of a numerical mark often depends on the complexity of the number itself.  Generally, marks comprising multiple digits are considered stronger than single-digit numerals, as they are less likely to be viewed as merely descriptive or functional. However, that presents a challenge in this case as Jackson attempts to claim sole protection over his claim on the number “8.” Jackson’s Basis for Opposition At the heart of Jackson’s position are three marks which include registration for "2018 ERA 8 BY LAMAR JACKSON 2018" along with two of his pending marks, “ERA 8” and “ERA 8 BY LAMAR JACKSON.” [ii] , [iii] , [iv]  The main goods and services these marks are affiliated with are clothing, headwear, athletic bags and active wear. Jackson's argument is that Earnhardt Jr.’s pending application seeks registration for similar goods, specifically clothing, and raises concerns that if the mark becomes registered, there is a significant likelihood for marketplace confusion. Jackson’s Notice of Opposition argues that he has achieved substantial consumer recognition linking him directly to the number 8 due to his years of collegiate and NFL play along with the sale of his branded merchandise. With a pair of MVP awards at the professional level as well as a Heisman thanks to his on-field success while at the University of Louisville, Jackson certainly can make the argument that he has become a household name around the country. Jackson’s concern is that if the USPTO is to grant Earnhardt Jr.’s application for protection of his mark, consumers may conclude that the two athletes are commercially affiliated, thereby infringing on Jackson’s trademark rights and damaging the distinctiveness of his brand. Likelihood of Consumer Confusion This case falls squarely within Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, which addresses the likelihood of confusion between Jackson’s marks and Earnhardt Jr.’s proposed registration. [v]  While both parties have established themselves as recognizable figures in their respective sports, the question is whether the stylized design of the numeral "8", coupled with overlapping goods those marks are intended to cover, is enough to cause confusion in the marketplace.   Both Jackson and Earnhardt Jr. are prominent public figures with strong commercial followings in professional sports. However, the analysis is not limited to fame or celebrity status.  We must apply the DuPont factors, a balancing test, with a focus on: (1) the similarity of the marks in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; (2) the relatedness of the goods or services; (3) the trade channels through which the goods are marketed; and (4) the conditions under which the goods are purchased, including the degree of consumer care. [vi]   Here, there is a strong argument that the stylized "8" used by Earnhardt Jr., even if visually different, has a similar commercial impression as Jackson’s "ERA 8" brand, especially as both parties seek protection in overlapping classes of goods, specifically clothing and athletic wear. These are products typically sold through consumer channels that often involve levels of consumer care, which increases the likelihood of confusion.   Additionally, Jackson’s use of the number “8” in connection with his personal brand predates Earnhardt Jr.’s application and has arguably acquired secondary meaning through long-term use in commerce, public recognition, and associated merchandise. Further, Jackson has also demonstrated consistent efforts to enforce his rights, reinforcing the position that the number “8” has come to be associated with him in the eyes of the relevant consumer base.   Given these facts, the balance of these factors appears to favor Jackson. If Earnhardt Jr. is permitted to register a stylized numeral “8” for similar goods, there is a significant likelihood that it would not only confuse consumers but also dilute the distinctiveness and commercial strength of Jackson’s mark. As such, this matter presents a strong case for refusing registration of Earnhardt Jr.’s mark on the grounds of likely confusion. Proceedings at the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board The opposition will proceed before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), a neutral adjudicative body within the USPTO that functions similarly to a court for trademark registration matters. [vii]  The TTAB’s trademark judges determine a party’s right to register a federal trademark registration. In this case, their role is strictly limited to assessing whether Earnhardt Jr.’s application may proceed to registration following the opposition by Jackson which claims a likelihood of confusion and false suggestion of a connection with his brand. A History of Opposition It is worth noting that Jackson is no stranger to defending his marks. In July of 2024, he filed a similar opposition against former Dallas Cowboys quarterback Troy Aikman, who sought to trademark the term “EIGHT.” Jackson again claims that he "“has expended considerable time, effort, and expense in promoting, advertising, and popularizing the number “8” in connection with his personality and fame”. [viii]   This matter has yet to be resolved but it is clear that Jackson is willing to go to great lengths to ensure that his brand is protected in the marketplace. Conclusion This dispute highlights the evolving role of trademarks in athlete branding and the legal challenges associated with claiming exclusive rights to commonly used symbols. While Lamar Jackson’s enforcement effort demonstrates the value athletes place on personal brand protection, securing exclusive rights to a standalone numeral remains a high bar under current trademark law. Nonetheless, the TTAB’s decision could shape how future trademark applications involving athletes, and especially their numbers, are evaluated and enforced.     Andrew Majka-Sunde is a graduate of Western New England Law School ’21 and most recently served as Corporate Counsel for the Moses-Weitzman Health System in Middletown, CT.  He can be reached at LinkedIn here . Sources: [i]  Lamar Jackson v. DEJ Holdings, LLC, Notice of Opposition, Opp. No. 91294532 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2025), https: //tsdr.uspto.gov/caseviewer/pdf?caseId=98513061&docIndex=1&searchprefix=sn#docIndex=1 (last visited Apr. 3, 2025). [ii]  2018 ERA 8 BY LAMAR JACKSON 2018, U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 7,279,545 (registered Jan. 16, 2024), https://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=88412674&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=statusSearch (last visited Apr. 4, 2025). [iii]  ERA 8, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 97/357,201 (filed Apr. 11, 2022), https://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=97357201&caseSearchType=US_APPLICATION&caseType=DEFAULT&searchType=statusSearch (last visited Apr. 4, 2025). [iv]  ERA 8 BY LAMAR JACKSON, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88/835,266 (filed Mar. 16, 2020), https://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=88835266&caseSearchType=US_APPLICATION&caseType=DEFAULT&searchType=statusSearch (last visited Apr. 4, 2025). [v]  Lanham Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2020) [vi]  In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) [vii]  Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/trademark-trial-and-appeal-board/about-ttab (last visited Apr. 4, 2025). [viii] Mike Masnick, Lamar Jackson & Troy Aikman Fight Over ‘Eight’ Trademark, Showing the Absurdity of Modern Trademark , Techdirt (July 25, 2024), https://www.techdirt.com/2024/07/25/lamar-jackson-troy-aikman-fight-over-eight-trademark-showing-the-absurdity-of-modern-trademark/ .

In the great sitcom Blackadder Goes Forth , our eponymous “hero” finds himself facing a court martial, having unwittingly killed and eaten the beloved pet pigeon of his commanding officer, General Melchitt. Not to worry, as he says, “ any reasonably impartial judge is bound to let me off. ” Enter, as his judge, Colonel Melchitt himself, who immediately refers to Blackadder as “the Flanders pigeon murderer” and sentences him to death by firing squad. This week, NFL coach Brian Flores argued to the Second Circuit that he finds himself in a similar (if, granted, less life-threatening) situation. Broadly, Flores filed a lawsuit alleging that various NFL teams, and the NFL itself, engaged in discriminatory employment practices designed to keep him, and other minority coaches, from positions of power and authority in the NFL. One of the methods Flores alleges is that teams would bring him (and other plaintiffs, like Steve Wilks) for an interview purely to comply with the "Rooney Rule" ( i.e.  NFL teams must interview minority candidates for head coaching positions), but without any actual intent to hire. As readers may recall, Flores was alerted in part to this alleged chicanery because Bill Belichick accidentally sent a congratulatory text message to the wrong “Brian,” a timely reminder: (1) that Bill Belichick may be the only person watching the news this week and thinking “ well, that could happen to anyone ”; and (2) of the sheer, extraordinary number of NFL head coaches named Brian. Including Flores (who alleges if not for the NFL’s discriminatory practices, he would still be an NFL head coach), along with current head coach Brians Daboll, Callahan, and Schottenheimer, that would make an incredible 12.5% of NFL head coaches named “Brian,” a truly remarkable result for America’s 345th most popular boy’s name. Anyway, the NFL (and the NFL team defendants) are arguing that Flores’ case should be arbitrated – rather than litigated in the Southern District - because the various contracts Flores had with these teams contain arbitration clauses. This week, Flores argued to the Second Circuit that the NFL’s arbitration clauses are unenforceable because (a) they mandate that the NFL can choose the arbitrator; and (b) the NFL can choose NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell as the arbitrator (during argument Judge Lynch neatly summed up the position as “you have a dispute with  me, that will be arbitrated by  me”). Per Flores, this makes the clauses “unconscionable.” This case has huge implications not only for the NFL, but far beyond. It is estimated that more than 60 million American workers are bound by arbitration agreements, and more than 80% of America’s largest companies use arbitration agreements to determine employment disputes. Most serious arbitrating bodies (AAA, JAMS and so forth) will underscore that securing the right arbitrator is one of the most important parts of the process. Flores suggests that Goodell may possibly not be the most neutral arbitrator, what with his being “ professionally and financially beholden to the NFL and its teams, ” “ personally represented by the same attorneys representing ” the NFL, being paid “ tens of millions of dollars ” a year to protect the NFL’s interests, and having very publicly issued a statement the day that Flores’ case was filed calling it “ without merit. ” As Flores’s attorney stated during argument: “ without hyperbole, Mr. Goodell may be the most biased arbitrator of this case on the planet .” As argued in an amicus brief filed by various esteemed arbitration practitioners, the Second Circuit has the power with its decision to create a monumental shift, not only giving employers the power to unilaterally choose the arbitrator, but to pick one with a significant vested interest in the employer securing a favorable outcome. If the Second Circuit rules that the arbitration provision is enforceable, it opens the door for other employers to utilize similar clauses. When not offering a scathing assessment of the fortunately unidentified attorney who drafted the Pittsburgh Steelers’ arbitration clause (“a mess”), Judge Lynch seemed to pose the exact question raised by the amicus brief: what stops any employer in the United States doing this? Why wouldn’t every employer insist that the arbitrator of any complaint be the company CEO? If the Second Circuit rules in favor of the Defendants (if, indeed, the Second Circuit rules on the issue at all – the Defendants argue that while the clauses are not unconscionable, that question should be remanded to the District Court), the answer may well be “nothing.”               Charles Bergin is an attorney at Kaufman Dolowich LLP. His practice focuses on labor and employment law, business litigation, immigration law and general liability defense. He has a background in entertainment law, sports law, and insurance litigation. He was named a New York Metro “Rising Star” in the field of “Business Litigation” each year from 2020-2024, as a “Top Attorney In Westchester” by Westchester Magazine,  and in 2024 was recognized by Super Lawyers Magazine as one of the “Top Attorneys In America."

Like other lawsuits filed by former college athletes, Greg Brooks Jr. alleges LSU improperly used his name, image, and likeness. But the institution’s improper use has nothing to do with breached contracts or false promises. The former starting safety and Team Captain alleges LSU’s negligent conduct delayed a brain tumor diagnosis, resulting in a rushed brain surgery by an ill-qualified surgeon. Brooks suffered multiple strokes during the surgery, which rendered him severely disabled. The lawsuit provides a detailed description of how LSU ignored clear signs of neurological trauma, subjected Brooks to a major surgery without considering other treatment options, then, without permission, used Brooks’s NIL to garner positive publicity in the months following the disastrous surgery . [1]     Asserting liability for failure to diagnose is a novel concept in collegiate sports law. Typically, the alleged injury directly relates to the sport itself: the plaintiff in the landmark worker’s compensation case Waldrep v. Texas Emplrs. Ins. Assoc .  suffered severe injury to his spinal cord during a TCU football game; Jordan McNair collapsed during football conditioning at Maryland and ultimately died from heatstroke. [2]  Brooks’s harm resulted from delayed diagnosis of a medulloblastoma tumor causing adult-onset hydrocephalus: a rare condition in which a tumor on the brainstem blocks cerebral spinal fluid from properly flowing throughout his brain, causing neurological symptoms like migraine, dizziness, nausea, balance issues, etc. [3] Serious issues such as concussions and CTE are well-known risks for football players. Yet, LSU ignored clear warning signs of neurological issues and threatened to remove Brooks from its roster before seeking proper tests and treatment. [4] Thus, unlike precedent, Brooks’s harm directly ties to LSU’s failure to recognize and treat an ongoing medical issue, instead of the sport itself.     LSU instructed its players to defer to LSU coaches and/or athletic trainers on issues with their health or physical condition. [5]   Reliance on their advice proved detrimental for Brooks: LSU coaches and athletic trainers cleared Brooks for practice and games, even though he complained of dizziness, nausea, and headaches daily. [6]  LSU Athletic Trainer Owen Stanley responded to Brooks’s continued complaints of textbook neurological symptoms by evaluating him with C3 Logix: an iPad app LSU athletic trainers regularly used to evaluate athletes with suspected head injuries. [7]  Stanley cleared Brooks for practice once the app ruled out a concussion. [8]  The next week, Stanley responded to Brooks’s persistent complaints by saying he needed a Vertigo test. [9] LSU’s team doctor, Dr. Vincent Shaw, approved Stanley’s diagnoses without examining Brooks himself. [10]     Although given the “option” to sit out practice and/or a game, coaching staff warned Brooks if he chose to do so, someone else would take his place, thus risking forfeiting his starting position. [11]  So, Brooks continued practicing – and even starting in the first two games of the 2023 season – before LSU ordered an MRI 39 days after his initial complaint. It revealed Brooks’s symptoms were caused by hydrocephalus due to a malignant brain tumor. LSU arranged for emergent brain surgery the very next day  at an LSU affiliated hospital. [12]  LSU selected Dr. Brandon Gaynor to remove the cancerous tumor sitting on his brain stem, a delicate part of the brain that controls everything from balance to speech to mood. LSU’s rash decisions not only prevented the Brooks family from exploring other treatment options, but also directly contributed to the multiple, disabling seizures Brooks suffered during the surgery.   This is a tragic example of causation: but for LSU’s acts/omissions, Brooks, despite the severity of his diagnosis, likely would have lived a normal life, free of disability. In an interview with Good Morning America on February 3, 2025, Brooks’ father noted, “the disease is not the issue. He did wonderful with his radiation, with his chemo. This is the aftermath of injury from surgery." [13] Seizures and/or brain damage are not a guaranteed consequence of hydrocephalus – if that were true, I would not have graduated college, let alone law school. My benign brain tumor developed during elementary school. I suffered undiagnosed hydrocephalus symptoms most of my life, including issues with speech, memory, balance, direction, and processing information, as well as increasingly intense headaches, nausea, and dizziness. The pressure eventually reached my optic nerves, affecting my vision to the point of periodic 100% blindness by the time I was diagnosed as a college sophomore. Although doctors said I needed surgery immediately, my parents thoroughly researched my condition and options before we decided on treatment and the neurosurgeon to perform it. This informed decision has allowed me to live a relatively normal, healthy life in the five years since my surgery, culminating in my law school graduation this May. LSU robbed Brooks of such opportunity: not only to determine the objectively optimal treatment, but also to experience life as a normal, healthy man in his twenties. Today, Brooks remains wheelchair bond, struggling to speak and perform basic physical movements. [14] This easily could have been prevented.    Events following the disastrous surgery demonstrate a cold disposition. LSU advised Brooks after the surgery that St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, an institution with ample experience in removing brain tumors, was ready, able, and willing to accept him as a patient. [15] The family later learned Brooks’ surgery is routinely performed by fellowship-trained pediatric neurosurgeons – and that Dr. Gaynor specializes in adult spinal surgery. [16] Further, LSU used Brooks’s NIL to protect its public image without accomplishing the good will it claimed. It created a fundraising page to raise money for Brooks’s treatment, yet the Brooks family has received none of it. [17] It repeatedly publicly disclosed confidential information about Brooks’s condition without consent. [18] LSU honored Dr. Gaynor with a “Geaux Tigers Hero” award for “heroic” efforts in treating Brooks. [19] Not only did LSU fail to consult the Brooks family before bestowing the award, but, according to Mr. Brooks, no one from LSU has contacted the family since the surgery. [20]     While the injustice of the situation is evident, liability for failure to diagnose is a novel cause of action in collegiate sports law. Prior cases like Waldrep  predict a grim likelihood of success: the concept of a “student-athlete” provided a nearly impenetrable liability shield for the NCAA and its member schools. [21] However, the recent, albeit unpredictable, direction of sports law litigation provides a glimmer of hope. Alston   and Johnson   hamstring the amateurism defense, opening the door for unprecedented rights afforded to student-athletes: Alston   demonstrated never-before-seen antitrust accountability against the NCAA; Johnson  fashioned a test that will likely grant student-athletes employment status – an idea once considered taboo. Brooks   may very well be the case that allows student-athletes to successfully assert liability for instances of gross misconduct by NCAA member schools. LSU’s actions before, during, and after Brooks’s disastrous surgery demonstrate the nightmarish consequences of a university not held accountable.         Keeton Cross is a 3L at Cumberland School of Law with majors in Marketing and English from the University of Alabama. You can find her on X (@keeton_cross) and on LinkedIn. Sources: [1]   See   Brooks v. Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Medical College, available at https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/theadvocate.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/a/1b/a1baadaf-da46-5a6c-833b-701fa2635866/6709796a3d52a.pdf.pdf   [2]  See Waldrep v. Tex. Emplrs. Ins. Ass'n , 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000); https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/17/sports/football/Jordan-McNair-death-settlement-Maryland.html   [3]  “Geaux Hero: LSU Football Star Greg Brooks Jr. Gets Expert Care for Rare Brain Cancer from Our Lady of the Lake,” available at https://health.fmolhs.org/about-us/team-member-spotlights/geaux-hero-greg-brooks-care-team/   [4]   See Brooks , Complaint at ¶ 14. [5]   See id , at ¶ 8. [6]   See id.  at ¶ 14. [7]   See id.  at ¶ 12. [8]   Id.   [9]   See id,  at ¶ 13. [10]   See id.  at ¶ 12. [11] See id.  at ¶ 14. [12]   See   id . at ¶ 18. [13]   See  “Greg Brooks Jr. speaks out about lawsuit against LSU, recovery from brain surgery,” available at  https://www.goodmorningamerica.com/news/story/greg-brooks-jr-speaks-lawsuit-lsu-recovery-brain-118372917   [14]  Id.   [15]   See Brooks , Complaint at ¶ 22. [16]   See Brooks , Complaint at ¶ 21; https://www.theneuromedicalcenter.com/physicians/brandon-gaynor-md/ ; [17]   See Brooks , Complaint at ¶ 27. [18]   See Brooks , Complaint at ¶ 26. [19]   See Brooks , Complaint at ¶¶ 24-25. [20]   See Brooks , Complaint at ¶¶ 23-24; Good Morning America Interview [21]   See   Waldrep , 21 S.W.3d at 700 (heavily relying on the NCAA’s “fundamental policy” of amateurism, the court reasoned Waldrep’s scholarship from TCU could not be considered “pay” or “income” sufficient to constitute any contract for hire because the NCAA manual at this time had a strict anti-pay-for-play policy, but considered scholarships or educational grants-in-aid as permissive payments for players (i.e. not payment for play)).

On March 19, 2025, The United Soccer League (USL) club owners voted to implement a promotion and relegation system (pro/rel), marking the first time this European-style system will be implemented in the United States.  Representing a seismic shift in American soccer, the USL confirmed plans to launch a Division One men’s professional league in 2027 to rival Major League Soccer (MLS) within the sanctioning standards of the U.S. Soccer Federation (USSF).  Like all other professional leagues in the United States, MLS operates as a closed-league model.  The move by USL aligns with global soccer norms by introducing a three-tiered structure culminating in a Division 1 league but raises complex antitrust questions and market uncertainties.  The legal ramifications of this system – particularly considering the recent North American Soccer League, LLC v. United States Soccer Federation, Inc. ( NASL v. USSF ) anti-trust verdict – and its potential to reshape soccer’s competitive and viewership landscape demand rigorous scrutiny. In February 2025, a federal jury ruled in favor of the USSF and MLS in a seven-year antitrust lawsuit by the defunct North American Soccer League (NASL).  The NASL alleged that USSF and MLS conspired to manipulate the Professional League Standards (PLS) – including stadium requirements, owner wealth thresholds, and market size criteria – to suppress competition.  The jury rejected these claims, citing the NASL’s mismanagement and failure to retain clubs as primary sources of its collapse.  From a legal standpoint, the case sets an important precedent as the USL charts its course.  It demonstrated how difficult it is for a rival league to win an antitrust suit in sports.  “Antitrust claims are notoriously hard to prove, particularly in the sports context,” observes sports attorney Chris Deubert.  Such cases require complex economic evidence and a clear showing that the alleged monopolists unreasonably restrained trade.  NASL could not meet that burden.  USSF argued NASL simply did not meet the PLS benchmarks and even pointed to NASL’s internal troubles (one NASL investor had been implemented in a FIFA corruption probe) as reasons for its demise. While the USL’s system promotes meritocratic competition, it faces antitrust scrutiny under the Sherman Act’s Section 1 (collusive restraint) and Section 2 (monopolization).  Key concerns include barriers to entry & vertical integration, market definition & monopoly power, and collusion & conflicts of interest.  The USSF’s PLS for Division 1 could create exclusionary hurdles.  The league is to be composed of a minimum of 12 clubs at launch, expanding to 14 by the third year of operation.  Stadiums must be enclosed and have a minimum seating capacity of 15,000.  At the time of writing, only four USL Championship clubs (Birmingham Legion FC, Oakland Roots SC, Louisville City FC, Miami FC) meet the stadium standards.  USSF also states that 75% of clubs must be in metropolitan areas with a population exceeding 1 million.  A club’s principal owner must have at least a 35% stake in his/her respective club, while his/her net worth must be at least $70 million.  Smaller markets like Northwest Arkansas (Future Ozark United FC) or New Mexico may struggle to finance upgrades, risking allegations that the PLS disproportionately favor wealthy owners, echoing NASL’s claims.  In addition, if the USL’s Division 1 gains sanctioning, it would compete with MLS for players, sponsors, and broadcasters.  Courts often narrowly define “relevant markets” in sports antitrust cases.  In the NASL  case, the jury rejected the league’s argument that Division 1 and 2 leagues constitute distinct markets.  The USL must demonstrate its system enhances consumer choice without coercively displacing MLS, which may prove difficult given MLS’s entrenched position.  Furthermore, the USSF’s dual role as regulator and commercial partner to MLS remains contentious.  While the NASL  case cleared USSF of conspiring with MLS, the USL’s rise could reignite scrutiny.  If USSF grants the USL Division 1 while maintaining MLS’s privileges, rival leagues might allege biased governance.  There is no explicit rule forbidding multiple Division 1 leagues, but it is unprecedented.  One legal question is whether USSF will apply the standards uniformly, as any whiff of favoritism could revive antitrust concerns.  Questions would arise if USSF were to raise the requirements suddenly to handicap the USL, as NASL alleged happened to them.  In a post-verdict statement, USSF said the decision of NASL  “validates U.S. Soccer’s commitment to fostering a broad and healthy ecosystem of professional soccer leagues across all divisions.”  For the federation, allowing an ambitious USL pyramid to coexist with MLS would be the ultimate proof of that “broad ecosystem” commitment – and a shield against future lawsuits. Not long ago, the USL and MLS were partners rather than rivals.  In 2013, MLS and what was then called USL Pro announced an affiliation agreement to collaborate on player development.  For much of the 2010s, the USL effectively served as MLS’s minor league.  The alliance started to fray as MLS grew and sought more control over its developmental pipeline.  By 2022, MLS launched MLS Next Pro as a separate third-division league.  MLS pulled virtually all its affiliated clubs out of the USL to play in MLS Next Pro.  By the start of 2023, the USL was fully independent from MLS’s influence.  The split freed USL to pursue “disruption and innovation” – such as an open league structure – because it no longer had to align with MLS’s closed model.  USL has been standing on its own impressively – expanding to new markets, attracting investment, and solidifying multiple leagues at a time when NASL collapsed.  That said, USL is not positioning itself as an immediate MLS substitute.  Its leadership acknowledges that MLS is wealthier and more established.  While USL alone “doesn’t have the clout” to truly rival MLS financially, it can “differentiate their product” and seize the mantle of innovation. Sponsorship and media partners might see USL’s growth potential.  If USL’s Division 1 launches successfully and pro/rel is in effect by 2028, the league’s broadcast deals (which expire around 2026-27) could be renegotiated at higher values with the promise of a “major league” product.  In contrast, MLS’s locked-in Apple TV deal, which began in 2023, runs through 2032, potentially giving USL a window to gain ground in TV exposure.  While the $2.5 billion deal injected cash into MLS, it also moved most matches behind a paywall.  The USL, on the other hand, has been pursuing a more traditional and accessible media strategy, which could pay dividends as it introduces pro/rel.  In 2024, USL struck a deal with CBS Sports to broadcast a select number of matches on national television, while continuing to stream others on ESPN + and YouTube internationally.  Crucially, the USL also encouraged all its clubs to sign local free-to-air TV deals.  In fact, this season “for the first time, all USL Championship clubs secured local television deals” to air matches in their markets over local stations.  The focus is on maximizing accessibility – making it easy for casual fans to stumble upon a USL match without an extra subscription.  The results have been promising: USL reports that these local and national broadcasts contributed to a 20% rise in average match audiences in 2024, with total viewership climbing 18% over the previous year.  Many clubs saw significant upticks in their home market TV viewership (25% increase) thanks to going on local channels. The 2024 USL Championship Final (Colorado Springs Switchbacks vs. Rhode Island FC), which was aired on the main CBS network on a Saturday afternoon, drew 431,000 live viewers.  Conversely, the 2024 MLS Cup Final (LA Galaxy vs. NY Red Bulls), which did air on Fox, drew only 468,000 viewers (English and Spanish combined), down nearly 50% from 890,000 on those channels the year prior.  On the streaming side, one reporter used Nielson data to estimate that merely around 65,000 viewers watched the match via Apple’s MLS Season Pass in real time.  Even if that estimate is low (Apple’s total global viewership might be a bit higher), the fact remains the league’s premiere event likely had around 500-533K total viewers.  For context, as recently as 2022 (pre-Apple deal), the MLS Cup Final on network TV drew over 2.1 million viewers.  This all serves as a reminder that fans will watch soccer when it is easy to find – and that compelling stories (like promotion fights or underdog runs) can capture eyeballs.  Competition for viewers in soccer may intensify with USL’s rise.  MLS, for its part, is confident in its long-term plan and global stars, but it may need to ensure it does not lose the narrative.  MLS commissioner, Don Garber, recently hinted that the league might seek more linear TV exposure even during the Apple deal, a sign that they recognize the need for visibility.  If so, one could argue that USL’s presence is already pushing MLS to adjust its approach. Right now, MLS remains the market leader in U.S. soccer by far – it has more resources, marquee players, and established fanbases in large markets.  The USL will not outdraw MLS overall in the near term.  However, USL’s open system could carve out a niche of authenticity and higher stakes that appeal to hardcore soccer purists and new fans in underserved markets.  It may also attract international interest; global fans used to the pro/rel system could find the experiment intriguing, whereas MLS’s closed model has sometimes been a turn-off for that segment.  While MLS’s national TV reach may be limited by streaming, it continues to pack large stadiums and generate local buzz (especially with the Messi effect at Inter Miami CF).  USL will aim to grow its attendance too, but one advantage of pro/rel is that it gives every club something to fight for, possibly boosting attendance even for mid-table clubs (since avoiding relegation or chasing promotion keeps fans invested).  USL’s community-based approach – with many clubs having deep local roots and now local broadcasts – might foster strong regional followings.  This grass-roots growth is something MLS had to forego when it centralized media rights.  Time will tell if USL can translate that into significant national viewership, but early returns suggest a growing appetite for what USL is serving. The USL’s implementation of pro/rel is a watershed moment in American sports, one with significant legal and market implications.  It tests the premise that an open system can thrive in a country that is so accustomed to closed leagues.  In terms of market impact, the USL’s gamble could inject fresh energy into U.S. club soccer.  Fans will soon have a choice between MLS’s franchise model – still expanding, star-driven, but somewhat predictable – and USL’s merit-based hierarchy, where every season could see new clubs rising and others falling.  MLS’s dominant position is not under threat yet, but it may no longer be able to ignore the clamor for some of the excitement that an open system brings.  As the 2026 World Cup approaches and soccer gains unprecedented attention in the United States, the timing of USL’s move could not be more intriguing.  Though MLS remains king for now, there may be a battle on the horizon for American soccer supremacy. Calvin Holle is a 2L at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law.  He can be found on LinkedIn . Sources: https://www.espn.com/soccer/story/_/id/44315033/usl-votes-adopt-pro-rel-2027-division-one-launches https://www.insideworldfootball.com/2025/02/04/ussf-mls-dodge-375m-bullet-court-rules-nasl-anti-trust-case/   https://www.espn.com/soccer/story/_/id/43680111/jury-sides-mls-ussf-nasl-suit   https://www.sports.legal/2020/03/victory-for-opponents-of-the-pro-rel-model-the-court-of-arbitration-for-sport-determines-there-is-no-obligation-to-implement-pro-rel-in-the-united-states/ https://www.si.com/soccer/2020/02/07/promotion-relegation-lawsuit-cas-riccardo-silva-us-soccer-mls   https://terrybrennanlawyer.com/2020/03/24/pro-rel-goes-to-court-an-analysis-of-miami-fc-and-kingston-stockade-v-fifa/   https://www.usltactics.com/p/usl-division-one-mls-pro-rel https://www.transfermarkt.us/united-soccer-league-set-to-create-new-first-division-what-happens-next-/view/news/450217   https://www.constangy.com/pressroom-1120#:~:text=Finally%2C%20Chris%20emphasized%20the%20difficulty,faces%20in%20making%20its%20case   https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/us-soccer-defeats-failed-leagues-antitrust-lawsuit-2025-02-03/#:~:text=At%20trial%2C%20U,soccer%27s%20global%20governing%20body%20FIFA https://www.mlssoccer.com/news/2013-mls-reserve-league-schedule-announced#:~:text=MLSSoccer,Richmond%20Kickers%2C%20Sporting%20Kansas https://www.thestriker.com/2021/07/21/mls-usl-championship-league-one   https://www.uslchampionship.com/news_article/show/1325531#:~:text=For%20the%20first%20time%2C%20all,and%20commercial%20opportunities%20for%20clubs   https://www.goal.com/en-us/lists/promotion-and-relegation-is-a-move-usl-had-to-make-will-it-change-america-s-soccer-club-landscape/blt90219e7a7ecccc87   https://www.theguardian.com/football/2024/dec/18/mls-cup-tv-ratings-apple-broadcast#:~:text=In%20an%20era%20when%20ballooning,about%2065%2C000%20on%20Apple%20TV   https://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/Daily/Issues/2022/10/21/Media/MLS-Viewership/#:~:text=In%20its%20last%20season%20before,across%20the%20Univision%20networks%20averaged   https://amp.theguardian.com/football/2025/feb/19/usl-mls-soccer-united-states#:~:text=US%20club%20soccer%20can%20struggle,%E2%80%98major%20league%E2%80%99%20play%20in%202027   https://worldsoccertalk.com/tv/apple-tvs-mls-gamble-backfires-record-low-final-viewership/

In October of last year, Judge Claudia Wilken of the Northern District of California granted preliminary approval of a settlement in House v. N.C.A.A .  While much has been covered about the sum of the settlement (roughly $2.8 billion) and how revenue sharing will work between the N.C.A.A. and college athletes, there are still ongoing discussions about the details of the settlement. One detail in particular will be the challenges presented to international athletes.   The Settlement   A quick refresher on the major points of the preliminary settlement:   · The settlement would establish $2.78 billion in retroactive payments for former college- athletes going back to 2016. These payments will not come from the school’s directly, but as part of the settlement process. · Collegiate athletic departments can opt into revenue sharing directly with past and present athletes beginning at over $20 million per school. · The N.C.A.A. and power conferences will be allowed to form a “designated enforcement agency” focused on eliminating booster led NIL collectives “pay-for-play” payments.   International Athletes   As noted by Amanda Christovich in Front Office Sports, if college-athletes on student visas accept House v. N.C.A.A. payments, they could be in violation of U.S. immigration laws.   In 2018, there were about 25,000  student-athletes from outside of the United States, with that number likely having grown since . Most students on visas are considered “F class.” They can be paid for work, but there are restrictions. For example, the work must be limited to a certain number of hours, be somehow connected to their study, and income must be considered passive income .   The House settlement would have schools hand out payments to the entire athletic department, making it difficult for international athletes  to avoid or reject them. These payments could then violate the worker regulations attached to student visas, risking the student-athletes visa entirely.   Schools involved may also become unintended victims to consequences caused by the settlement agreement. It is illegal to pay workers who are unauthorized to work in the United States under U.S. Immigration and Customs laws. Any payment by a school to an international athlete could violate these laws and hypothetically create a confrontation between I.C.E. and the school.     Possible Routes   While a clear-cut answer has yet to come to light, there are a few options for this sticky situation:   ·   International student-athletes on visas could attempt to refuse payments. · They can attempt work-arounds similar to former Kentucky Basketball player Oscar Tshiebwe, who participated in NIL payments while in the Bahamas and off U.S. soil . ·  They can try to attain a different type of visa, with less strict regulations around payments. · The school can establish a trust that doles out payments at an amount more in accord with visa regulations.   Schools and international athletes will also likely be awaiting guidance from the Department of Homeland Security or Congress, who can release guidelines on payments relating to student visas or create a law addressing the issue, respectively. Of course, a final approved settlement can also address this issue.   Still, without intervention or guidance on the issue, the House  settlement may ironically be setting up more legal challenges if international athletes begin losing their visa status because of these payments.   Michael Moore is a graduate of New York Law School and former member of the school’s Sports Law Society. When he’s not working at the New York Law Department he’s thinking about the intersection of sports and law and when the Knicks or Rangers will finally win a championship.