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There’s a difference between innovation and optics. Right now, Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment risks confusing the two. In fact, it appears that they have already confused the two. The recent reports that MLSE President, Keith Pelley, had trade returns generated by AI and large language models should be concerning to the fans. To that point, promotion of AI-generated trade concepts as lands differently than it might elsewhere. It’s a signal problem to fans. And paired with Pelley’s “Toronto Maple Leafs State of the Union” press conference, which he described himself as “an observer” in the trade room on NHL Trade Deadline Day, becomes something more serious: a credibility issue. And right now, MLSE and the Toronto Maple Leafs do not need a credibility issue, but it’s too late for that! Trades are not content. They are the most consequential decisions a hockey organization makes outside of the draft. They shape cap structure, competitive windows, player development timelines, and the stability of the locker room. Treating them as algorithmically generated hypotheticals—even under the banner of fan engagement—reduces one of the sport’s most serious responsibilities to something that looks suspiciously like marketing theater. Fans notice when the tone shifts. And tone matters. Because at the same time the organization was leaning into AI-generated trade scenarios, its president was explaining that he was “just observing” inside the trade room on deadline day. That statement may have been intended to clarify operational roles. Instead, it raised a harder question: if leadership isn’t driving hockey decisions at the most critical moment of the season, who is—and why should supporters feel confident about the direction of the club? You can’t present simulated roster construction as innovation while presenting executive presence in real roster construction as optional. Those messages contradict each other. Markets like Toronto don’t respond well to ambiguity at the leadership level. They respond to clarity, ownership, and accountability. When messaging suggests distance from decision-making on one hand and experimentation with automated trade speculation on the other, it creates the impression that strategy is being replaced with optics. There is a place for advanced technology in modern hockey operations. Analytics departments matter. Tracking systems matter. Decision-support tools matter. But those tools exist to strengthen hockey judgment—not replace it publicly, and certainly not to stand in for leadership voice at the trade deadline. Professional sports organizations earn trust by showing who is responsible for decisions—not by positioning executives as observers while algorithms generate hypothetical ones. If MLSE wants to lead on innovation, there are stronger options available: explain cap strategy. Show the development pipeline. Clarify the competitive window. Give supporters insight into how decisions are actually made. Fans don’t need simulated trades. Fans don’t want a lack of transparency. Fans want results, and the reports coming out of MLSE and from Pelley himself, are not benefiting the team, nor the fans. Maybe Rogers should reevaluate Pelley’s oversight of MLSE. And maybe Pelley should step back, hire a President of Hockey Operations, and a GM that can work together using analytics, and old school hockey insight. The fans and players need confidence that they are being led decisively by a management team that is trustworthy and willing to do what it takes to make the team better, and not just solely by AI suggestions, or a non-hockey minded “observer.” Shaun Davis is an attorney focused on the legal and business infrastructure of sports, including intellectual property and transactional matters.

LIV Golf is on the verge of collapse. Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF) — the sovereign wealth vehicle that has bankrolled the league since its 2022 launch — is reportedly reconsidering its financial commitment, sending shockwaves through the sport and to its own employees. The league has never turned a profit, having lost an estimated $1 billion since inception, and its inability to secure meaningful media rights deals has left it structurally outmatched by the PGA Tour, which commands an estimated $7 billion in total media rights value. The financial pressure reached a breaking point earlier this month when Andrew Beaton of the Wall Street Journal reported that LIV missed a contractual payment to its players — a development that may carry consequences far beyond a single missed check. If LIV Golf ceases to exist, players and vendors may have a strong legal claim of anticipatory repudiation against the league and its trillion-dollar backers overseas. When LIV Golf launched in 2022, its ambitions were sweeping — disrupt a sport long dominated by the PGA Tour, reimagine how professional golf is played, and cultivate a global audience hungry for something new. The league made an immediate statement, luring Phil Mickelson, a six-time major champion, Jon Rahm, and Dustin Johnson away from the PGA Tour with nine-figure guaranteed contracts. But a roster full of elite talent and virtually unlimited sovereign backing could not paper over what was building beneath the surface. LIV never secured a meaningful domestic media rights deal, leaving it without the revenue infrastructure that sustains competing leagues. Greg Norman, the Hall of Fame golfer who served as LIV's CEO from its inception until 2025, described his tenure as "very draining" and acknowledged the toll it took on his personal life. The internal dysfunction and revenue failures that followed are not incidental — they are signs of a league that never found stable footing. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 253 states: (1) Where an obligor repudiates a duty before he has committed a breach by non-performance and before he has received all of the agreed exchange for it, his repudiation alone gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach. (2) Where performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises, one party's repudiation of a duty to render performance discharges the other party's remaining duties to render performance. The question here is whether LIV's players and vendors have a developing anticipatory repudiation claim against LIV Golf and the Public Investment Fund. The answer is a compelling yes, and the facts are building. PIF Governor and LIV Golf Chairman Yasir Al-Rumayyan told the Financial Times that the fund is resetting its priorities after a decade of heavy investment and pivoting toward a new domestic strategy. While those statements did not directly address LIV Golf, the dual role Al-Rumayyan occupies, sitting atop both the sovereign fund and the league simultaneously, makes it virtually impossible to treat his remarks as unrelated to LIV's contractual obligations. Players and vendors who have structured their careers and businesses around the league's financial promises can reasonably treat that signal as a material threat to future performance, and a court would not dismiss that interpretation lightly. That alone may not satisfy the threshold for anticipatory repudiation but paired with a recently missed contractual payment to players and vendors, the claim becomes substantially more viable. LIV's failure to compensate its players and vendors within a reasonable timeframe, against the backdrop of the PIF's public repositioning and CEO Scott O'Neil's walk-back on the league's funding timeline, presents a pattern of conduct that goes beyond mere uncertainty. Under § 253, if LIV fails to honor its contractual obligations, its players are legally discharged from their own remaining duties to perform, meaning they would have legal grounds to walk away from their contracts entirely. For many, that exit would lead back toward the PGA Tour. But as Brooks Koepka demonstrated, reinstatement carries a steep price, including hefty financial penalties and forfeiture of tour equity, a reality that illustrates the true cost of reliance on a league that may not survive in the near future. LIV Golf was built on a promise — guaranteed money, elite competition, and a new vision for professional golf. For the players who walked away from the PGA Tour, surrendered their world rankings, and bet their careers on that promise, the stakes could not be higher. The missed payment, the PIF's strategic repositioning, and the public walk-back from league leadership are not isolated events. They are a pattern, and under established contract law, that pattern has legal consequences. Should LIV Golf cease to exist before its contractual obligations are met, players and vendors will have a strong foundation to pursue anticipatory repudiation claims against a league that signaled its inability to perform before performance was ever due. But the LIV situation exposes something broader than one league's financial mismanagement. It raises a fundamental question about the legal protections available to professional athletes who enter into agreements with non-traditional, sovereign-backed sports ventures. The PGA Tour has reinstatement procedures, established governance, and institutional permanence. LIV had a trillion-dollar backer and a vision. When the backer reconsiders, the vision evaporates, and the athletes are left holding contracts worth little more than the paper they were signed on. Until sports law catches up to the reality of sovereign wealth funded leagues, the players who took the biggest risks may find that the legal system offers them far less protection than the contracts they signed ever suggested.

At one point, according to a 32-page federal complaint, an NFL executive told a referee to join Frozen  on Broadway and learn to sing “Let It Go.” Not as a joke. As feedback. That allegation appears in a lawsuit filed in the Southern District of New York by former NFL official Robin DeLorenzo, who worked in the league from April 2022 through February 2025. It is one of several details included in a complaint that spans twelve claims under federal and state law, all centered on alleged gender discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. The lawsuit names the NFL, along with two of DeLorenzo’s former supervisors, Walt Anderson, the former Senior Vice President of Officiating, and Byron Boston, a former NFL official, both of whom are alleged to have been directly involved in her training and evaluations. Before getting to what she says went wrong, it’s worth noting how she got there. DeLorenzo didn’t come out of nowhere. She spent nearly two decades working her way through the officiating pipeline, from high school to college football, eventually reaching the Big Ten and working major games. By the time she joined the NFL in 2022, she was, as the complaint states, “one of only three women in history to achieve this career pinnacle.” And then, according to the complaint, things began to shift. During her first season, DeLorenzo alleges she received repeated comments about her appearance, and was required to wear her hair down so that her ponytail would be visible during games. She alleges she was provided only ill-fitting men’s uniforms, forcing her to purchase her own women’s gear, which she customized it adding NFL patches. (If only the NFL had any experience with providing customized athletic wear for individuals with very specific body types, but alas). Her on-field experience, she claims, presented additional challenge (for example, a head referee was seen on television ignoring the flag she had thrown, and she was frequently told to “shut your f***ing mouth”); and her alleged off-field experiences were no better: she claims that at Steelers’ training camp she was made to participate in a rookie-style hazing activity that involved singing in front of players, coaches, and staff. According to the complaint, a senior NFL executive also recorded the episode against her will. DeLorenzo alleges she filed a successful union grievance after she was directed to attend a college officiating clinic as a “training opportunity,” despite already being an NFL official. She says she pushed back, raising concerns that the clinic operated at a lower level, with different rules, mechanics, and philosophies, and questioning how it would help her at that stage of her career. She also alleges that no male NFL official had been required to attend a similar clinic. Many of the most shocking allegations are reserved for Walt Anderson. According to the complaint, she was advised that she would be better off breaking her leg than volunteering at events when Anderson might be present; that he would terminate her if she refused the aforementioned college training; and after the 2023 season, DeLorenzo was replaced on her preferred crew by Anderson’s son. Anderson also made the comment about her appearing on Broadway, informing her that this was because her “issues were mental”.  (Less pertinent to the case, this allegation raises other questions about Anderson to which I personally would like answers: why Frozen the Broadway musical, rather than the movie with which the song is much more popularly associated? Does all his employee feedback include Broadway puns (if so, same)? What informs his apparent belief that singing live for three hours in front of two thousand people eight times a week is not mentally taxing? Does he (as it appears) think the only qualification needed to play the lead in a Broadway show is learning the main song? And, most of all, has Anderson ever actually seen Frozen ? Because, if so, he seems to have fundamentally misunderstood what is, at heart, a children’s cartoon. As every 9 year old since 2013 could tell you, despite its title, the moral of Let It Go is that pretending to be unaffected by people’s cruelty and ignorance can lead to the accidental creation of a permanent winter hellscape, which, presumably, the NFL would have found to be a sub-optimal result of their officiating reviews – although, granted, if permanent winter meant 52 NFL Sundays, you could see it getting some traction at the annual owners meeting). Anyway, the NFL has indicated that its decision to terminate DeLorenzo was based on her performance, which DeLorenzo disputes, pointing out that the grading system used to evaluate officials during her final season was subject to influence by the very supervisors about whom she had complained The case has been assigned to Judge Analisa Torres in the Southern District of New York. Among the issues that may emerge are how performance evaluations are actually structured and applied, and whether those involved in the process can be considered sufficiently independent in light of the allegations. Cases like this often turn not just on what happened, but how consistently policies were applied. As with any complaint, these allegations have not been proven. The NFL and the individual defendants will be required to respond, either by filing an Answer or by moving to dismiss some or all of the claims, although no deadline has been set. Still, the filing offers a detailed account of one official’s experience in a role that very few people, and even fewer women, have ever held. At this stage, the complaint raises broader questions about how officials are trained, evaluated, and supported at the highest level of the game. Brianna Pryce is an attorney at Kaufman Dolowich LLP. Her practice focuses on labor and employment law and she regularly handles workplace disputes in state and federal court. She has a background in criminal law and complex civil litigation. Charles Bergin is an attorney at Kaufman Dolowich LLP. His practice focuses on labor and employment law, business litigation, and immigration law. He has a background in entertainment law, sports law, and insurance litigation. He was named a New York Metro “Rising Star” in the field of “Business Litigation” each year from 2020-2025, as a “Top Attorney In Westchester” by Westchester Magazine, and was recognized by Super Lawyers Magazine as one of the “Top Attorneys In America."

The United States is celebrating the 250 th  anniversary of American independence with a year-long “America 250” slate of events. This past January, President Donal Trump issued an executive order directing federal agencies to work with IndyCar, America’s premier open-wheel auto racing series, to stage a street race in Washington D.C. Dubbed the “Freedom 250,” the event would feature sponsor-laden Indy cars racing past the Capitol and the National Mall as a marquee centerpiece of the America 250 celebration. The race weekend is scheduled to take place from August 21 st  to 23 rd  and was a last-minute addition to the 2026 schedule. The official track layout was recently revealed, and its unveiling has already triggered backlash from some fans who see the compact, roughly 1.7-mile street circuit as “boring,” but it may be better understood as a legal compromise. The tension is not about the announced course itself, which runs along public streets around the National Mall rather than through the statutorily defined Capitol Grounds. The tension is more prospective, as federal law has long prohibited commercial advertising on U.S. Capitol Grounds, and the sheer proximity of the race route raises genuine questions about how much of IndyCar’s commercial identity can travel with it. This is an obvious issue and logistics challenge for a series whose economic model is built on turning cars, pit boxes, and temporary infrastructure into rolling billboards. Section 5104 of Title 40 of the U.S. Code  governs unlawful activities on the U.S. Capitol and its grounds. Among other things, the statute explicitly restricts commercial activity on Capitol Grounds. Under subsection 5104(c), individuals are prohibited from offering any item for sale, displaying “sign, placard, or other form of advertising,” or soliciting fares, aims, subscriptions, or contributions on Capitol Grounds, with the U.S. Capitol Police identitifed as the primary enforcement authority. Capitol Police guidance  clarifies that not all signs and placards are banned, only those that constitute advertising. Advocacy or informational signage related to demonstrations may be allowed, while commercial branding and sponsorship signage are categorically off-limits absent a specific legal exception. For legal purposes, “Capitol Grounds” is defined quite specifically in federal law. One provision explains that the United States Capitol Grounds comprises all squares, reservations, streets, roadways, walks, and other areas as defined on a map  entitled "Map showing areas comprising United States Capitol Grounds," dated June 25, 1946 , approved by the Architect of the Capitol, and recorded in the Office of the Surveyor of the District of Columbia in book 127, page 8, including all additions added by law after June 25, 1946. Other statutory text and historical notes elaborate that particular streets and parcels around the Capitol, Supreme Court, Library of Congress, Botanic Garden, House and Senate office buildings, and related facilities are expressly declared to be part of the Capitol Grounds, sometimes “to the face of the curbs contiguous to such squares.” The Freedom 250 circuit runs along Pennsylvania Avenue, Independence Avenue, and 7 th Street. All of these are public roads that do not fall within that mapped footprint. Like most top-level motorsports, IndyCar is commercially saturated. Cars, driver suits, pit equipment, barriers, and gantries are covered in sponsor logos, and sponsorship revenue accounts for an estimated 60-70% of team budgets, with teams generating between $6 million and $14 million per season from commercial partners. Temporary trackside signage is sold as a revenue stream for both the series and its teams. A “clean” race without visible corporate branding is, in practical terms, a nonstarter for a championship whose economics depend on sponsor exposure. Staging the race in the shadow of the Capitol forces a choice. IndyCar can either strip away much of the commercial signage that keeps the series afloat, or potentially test the limits of a statutory framework designed to keep Capitol Grounds free from this sort of advertising. The framework raises a threshold question: what does it actually mean, in practice, for something to occur “on” Capitol Grounds? Because the statutory definition is fairly broad, it is not enough to simply confirm that the racing surface itself lies outside the mapped boundary. If any branded temporary infrastructure were placed on a street or plaza that falls within that footprint, an argument that sponsor-laden signage was being “displayed” on Capitol Grounds would write itself. Even if organizers thread the needle so that the racing surface technically remains outside the boundary while the Capitol looms in the background, one may argue that the spirit of the advertising ban could still be invoked. This is where track design and legal risk management intersect. A conservative approach would keep the entire racing operation (cars, pits, grandstands, branded barriers) off any parcel clearly designated as part of the Grounds, even if it dulls the visual drama. A more aggressive strategy might rely on narrow readings of “displaying” advertising, or on distinctions between static signage placed on the Grounds and moving cars passing through shared rights of way, to argue that the race does not trigger the core prohibition. Either way, the statutory language and the mapped boundaries of the Grounds are not abstractions; rather, they are constraints that shape where IndyCar can physically go and how much of its commercial identity it can bring with it. President Trump’s executive order does not make the underlying tension disappear. It directs federal agencies to work with IndyCar to deliver a Washington street race for America 250, but it cannot unilaterally amend or override Congress’s advertising ban. At most, it can instruct agencies to look for workarounds. This would be a route that skirts the legal perimeter of the Grounds, “clean zones” where logos are covered or removed, or proposed legislation creating a narrow, time-limited exception for America 250 programming. Each option trades off something, whether that is sponsor value, on-screen spectacle, or statutory clarity. In addition, each invites its own set of legal questions about whether the Capitol is being treated as civic space or commercial canvas. With all of this in mind, the Freedom 250 presents an interesting case study. It is hard not to be swept up by the idea of Indy cars thundering past historic landmarks in the nation’s capital, like a living American-themed postcard. It would be a special kind of spectacle that channels genuine patriotism into a shared national moment of celebration. However, the league and its public partners will have to show that they can celebrate American innovation and exceptionalism without turning the symbol of representative government – meant to belong to the citizens – into a billboard-laden backdrop. Whatever the final layout looks like, and whatever mix of branding ultimately appears on race weekend, the underlying conflict between IndyCar’s branding and the Capitol Grounds advertising ban will remain a useful example of how sports can turn questions of venue and visibility into questions of law. Calvin Holle is a 3L at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law.  He can be found on LinkedIn and X .

Introduction  The sports industry is no stranger to legal analysis, particularly in recent years. Professional and amateur sports teams have undergone significant changes that raise complex legal questions involving athlete compensation, league administration, and intellectual property.   One of the more complex legal issues, however, lies outside sports organizations themselves, at the intersection of legislation and corporate activity. Sports betting and its many variations, including sports prediction markets, have exposed flaws in current United States gambling regulations and have opened the door to disparities in consumer protection.  This article examines the legal distinction between sports betting and sports prediction markets, focusing on the implications of differing age regulations between the two and how those differences expose a loophole in existing regulatory frameworks. This disparity undermines responsible gaming policies and challenges legislatures to reconsider how consumer protection should apply to emerging, financialized wagering products.  Differing Classification of Sports Gambling and Sports Prediction Markets  Age regulation discrepancies between sports betting and sports prediction markets stem from the differing legal classifications of these activities. Under federal law, sports betting is a form of gambling that relies on the traditional method of placing a bet “against the house".   Sports betting involves placing a wager with a sportsbook on the outcome of a sporting event, with the bettor standing to gain or lose money based solely on that outcome. States typically require sports books to obtain licenses, submit to ongoing audits, implement responsible gaming programs, and comply with strict advertising rules. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n , 584 U.S. 453 (2018), states gained authority to regulate sports betting individually, including consumer protection measures and age restrictions.   Most states set the minimum age for sports gambling at twenty-one, with a minority permitting participation at eighteen.   As a result, major sportsbooks such as FanDuel and DraftKings require users to be twenty-one to comply with state gambling laws which they are subject to. By contrast, sports prediction markets have emerged as a new method for consumers to exchange money based on the outcomes of sporting events through peer-to-peer contract trading. These platforms allow users to buy and sell event-based contracts whose value fluctuates based on market predictions rather than wagers placed against a bookmaker.   Because these contracts resemble derivatives or futures, they are classified as financial instruments rather than traditional gambling.   Courts have recognized that financial instruments are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”)   under federal jurisdiction and are generally preempted from state gambling laws.   As a result, sports prediction markets that operate through contract trading are regulated by the CFTC under the Commodity Exchange Act and not by state law.  Age Regulation Disparities and Federal Oversight  Since sports prediction markets are classified as financial instruments rather than gambling, they are not subject to state gambling age requirements. The CFTC does not impose explicit age restrictions specific to sports prediction markets and instead relies on general federal principles governing contractual capacity. Under U.S. law, individuals eighteen years of age and over have the legal capacity to enter into binding contracts. Accordingly, prediction market platforms commonly permit participation by users eighteen and older. Companies such as Kalshi and Polymarket rely on their classification as federally regulated contract markets to justify this age threshold. The company's regulatory structure mirrors that used for securities and commodities trading, where eighteen is the standard minimum age for independent participation.  The divergence between state gambling age limits and federally regulated prediction markets has created direct conflict in states where gambling participation is restricted to those twenty-one and  older. States argue that this discrepancy undermines the policy goals of gambling regulation, particularly consumer protection and youth harm prevention.  Legislative and State Response  State legislatures justify twenty-one and older gambling age limits not as mere formalities but as core consumer protection measures grounded in public health research on addiction and adolescent risk behavior.   States increasingly argue that sports prediction markets resemble sports betting more than traditional financial instruments.   Unlike stock or commodity trading, sports-based contracts are primarily motivated by entertainment and fandom rather than financial hedging or investment utility.   Courts have acknowledged that regulatory classification may consider economic reality over formal labels. Tennessee has taken a leading role in challenging prediction market platforms. The Tennessee Sports Wagering Council issued cease-and-desist letters to companies including Kalshi and Polymarket, alleging that their sports event contracts constitute unlicensed sports wagering in violation of Tennessee law.   Tennessee regulators argue that these contracts are “functionally equivalent” to sports wagers and therefore subject to state gambling law that prohibits gambling under twenty-one years old. In response, Kalshi filed suit seeking injunctive relief, arguing that its contracts fall under exclusive federal jurisdiction through the CFTC and are preempted from state regulation.   The federal court’s temporary injunction blocking from shutting down sports prediction market operations marks a momentary win for Kalshi and highlights the unresolved tension between state gambling authority and federal commodities regulation. The results of these state and corporate entity battles in court will create valuable precedent for how sports prediction markets operate going forward and who they are beholden to. A win for state governments would allow them to hold sports prediction markets to the gambling regulations of their state. It would also force companies to reevaluate their company models and advertising efforts on a state by state basis to comply with age regulations and consumer protections.  Consumer Protection Implications  Age restrictions in gambling law are designed to protect consumers through safeguards such as identity verification, marketing restrictions, and addiction prevention programs.   From a societal standpoint, these consumer protections are put in place to reduce potential gambling addiction and poor financial investment.   A central concern is that consumers, particularly younger users, may be misled into believing that sports prediction markets are legal substitutes for sports betting in jurisdictions where traditional gambling is restricted, potentially leading to a rise in gambling in the younger age demographic. This leaves them exposed to the negative pitfalls of gambling without consumer protection regulations in place through this age limit loophole.  Courts have recognized that misleading representations regarding legality and regulatory status can constitute consumer deception.   Several states, including Connecticut, have alleged that prediction market platforms advertise themselves as lawful alternatives to sports betting while effectively offering unlicensed gambling services to underage users.   Sports prediction market companies have to be careful on how they market themselves to consumers, as posing as legal sports betting strengthens states' arguments for regulations to apply to these companies as they share more similarities with gambling than financial contracts. Additionally, sports prediction market advertising practices undermine the purpose of state gambling regulations and raise significant consumer protection concerns, particularly when platforms emphasize lower age requirements as a marketing advantage.  Looking Toward the Future  Pending litigation will significantly shape the regulatory landscape for sports prediction markets. If states prevail, prediction market platforms may be required to comply with state gambling laws, including higher age limits, advertising restrictions, and responsible gaming obligations. Conversely, a ruling favoring prediction market operators could solidify a nationwide regulatory gap, allowing sports-based wagering products to operate outside traditional gambling frameworks. At its core, this is a restructuring of consumer protection regulations and how state and federal policy concerns can reinvent themselves to match the modern framework of sports betting.  These regulatory outcomes will also affect professional and amateur sports organizations and their relationships with fans. As teams increasingly partner with wagering-related companies, heightened regulation may limit sponsorships and marketing strategies directed at younger audiences.   Courts and legislatures will be forced to balance fan engagement, commercial interests, and the protection of vulnerable consumers. Additionally, in a post Name, Image, Likeness (NIL) era amateur and collegiate sports will have to navigate a world in which fans profit based on performance of non-professional athletes. In states where the age requirement is twenty-one for sports gambling, sports prediction markets offer a way for eighteen and older consumers to bet on their favorite players. In some cases this means college students betting on their peers and fellow students in collegiate sports for younger consumers. This highlights another pitfall of the age disparities presented between sports gambling and sports prediction markets, one that legislators will need to consider when deciding what is best to protect both consumers and athletes.  Conclusion  Sports prediction markets expose a significant gap in existing legal frameworks due to their classification as financial instruments rather than gambling. This distinction has resulted in disparate age requirements that challenge the consumer protection goals underlying state gambling laws. Ongoing litigation between states and prediction market companies will play a critical role in determining whether these platforms are subject to traditional gambling regulation or continue operating under federal commodities law. The result of this litigation will impact state government, corporate entities, fans and athletes and how they interact with sports betting. As sports-related wagering continues to expand, legislatures and courts must address whether current regulatory schemes adequately protect consumers in an evolving marketplace. Claire Kane is the 2026 Conduct Detrimental Writing Competition third place winner. This article placed her third.

I. Introduction In January 2025, a New York-based derivatives exchange called KalshiEX LLC began listing binary contracts tied to the outcomes of NFL, NBA, NHL, and NCAA games. The contracts worked exactly like sports bets: a user paid a price between one cent and ninety-nine cents for a “yes” or “no” position on whether a team would win, and received a dollar if correct.  But Kalshi did not hold a gaming license in any state. It did not operate under any state’s responsible-gambling framework. It was not subject to the integrity agreements that licensed sportsbooks maintain with professional and collegiate leagues. Instead, Kalshi structured its products as “event contracts,” a type of derivative, and listed them on its exchange under the regulatory authority of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). Interest was immediate.  During the 2025 March Madness tournament alone, the American public poured over $500 million into Kalshi’s college basketball markets. Kalshi’s entry into sports has ignited a jurisdictional crisis that exposes a fundamental flaw in how the United States regulates wagering on athletic competition. On one side stand state gaming commissions, which have spent the seven years since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association  building consumer-protection regimes to govern a $10.9-billion industry. Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have legalized sports betting since Murphy  struck down the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”) as an unconstitutional violation of the anticommandeering doctrine, and those states enacted responsible-gambling frameworks precisely because they recognized that sports wagering carries unique risks of addiction and financial harm. On the other side stands a single federal agency, the CFTC, whose regulatory tools were designed for commodity futures, not consumer-facing sports wagers. This Paper argues that applying the Commodity Exchange Act’s (“CEA”) exclusive-jurisdiction framework to sports event contracts creates a dangerous gap in consumer protection, undermines sports integrity, and represents regulatory arbitrage that Congress never intended. II. The Prediction Market Playbook: Structuring a Sports Bet as a Swap The Commodity Exchange Act grants the CFTC “exclusive jurisdiction” over transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery and swaps traded on designated contract markets (“DCMs”). The CFTC retains authority under Regulation 40.11 to review and prohibit certain event contracts that are contrary to the public interest, including those involving “gaming.” In September 2024, however, a federal court in Washington, D.C. held that political event contracts offered by Kalshi did not constitute “gaming” under the CEA, rejecting the CFTC’s attempt to prohibit them. The CFTC initially appealed but withdrew its challenge in May 2025 after the change in presidential administration. The withdrawal was a green light. Kalshi self-certified sports event contracts within weeks and began offering markets on professional and collegiate games before any regulatory body had affirmatively determined that such contracts served the public interest. The strategy was elegant in its simplicity: by labeling a sports bet as a “swap” and trading it on a CFTC-registered exchange, Kalshi could bypass state licensing requirements, avoid responsible-gambling mandates, and claim the protection of federal preemption if any state objected. Several states did object, and they did so loudly. III. Six States Objected, and the Courts Could Not Agree Gaming commissions in at least six states (Nevada, New Jersey, Maryland, Ohio, Montana, and Illinois) issued cease-and-desist orders, asserting that Kalshi’s sports event contracts constituted unlicensed gambling in violation of state law. Kalshi sued in federal court, arguing that the CEA’s exclusive-jurisdiction provision preempted state gaming regulation. The resulting litigation has produced irreconcilable outcomes that demonstrate why the current framework cannot hold. In April 2025, the District of Nevada granted Kalshi a preliminary injunction, concluding that the CEA’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC constituted both express and field preemption of state gaming laws as applied to contracts traded on a DCM. The District of New Jersey reached the same conclusion weeks later. But the District of Maryland rejected Kalshi’s preemption theory entirely, reasoning that Congress did not intend for the CEA to displace decades of state sovereignty over gaming regulation. The split then deepened within a single state. In October 2025, the same Nevada judge who had initially sided with Kalshi reversed course, dissolving the earlier injunction after concluding that certain Kalshi products, particularly prebuilt parlays and player-prop-style contracts, were not swaps under the CEA and therefore fell squarely within the state’s gaming jurisdiction. Meanwhile, a California district court dismissed a suit brought by Native American tribes on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the question belongs to the CFTC itself. The result is a patchwork of conflicting rulings now headed to at least two circuit courts, with the prospect of Supreme Court review. Thirty-four state attorneys general have weighed in, filing an amicus brief urging the Third Circuit to reverse the New Jersey ruling. Their central argument deserves serious consideration: Kalshi’s products are functionally indistinguishable from sports bets, and the CEA’s regulatory framework was never designed to replace the consumer protections that states have built to govern gambling. IV. The Consumer Protection Gap Is Real and Growing The most urgent policy concern is not doctrinal; it is practical. State gaming frameworks enacted after Murphy share common features born of hard experience with gambling’s social costs: age verification, responsible-gambling programs, self-exclusion lists, advertising restrictions, dispute resolution procedures, and mandatory reporting. Federal law supplements these with prohibitions on interstate gambling transactions. These protections exist because legislatures recognized that sports wagering carries distinctive risks of addiction and financial harm. The CFTC’s regulatory apparatus offers none of this. It was designed to protect institutional participants in commodity and derivatives markets, not individual consumers placing binary bets on basketball games. The CEA’s core requirements (margin rules, clearing mandates, position limits) address systemic financial risk. The CFTC does not require self-exclusion programs. It does not mandate responsible-gambling disclosures. It does not restrict predatory advertising targeting young bettors. And it does not coordinate with state problem-gambling agencies. The practical consequence is stark: a consumer who places a $50 bet on an NFL game through DraftKings in New Jersey receives the full benefit of that state’s responsible-gambling infrastructure, while a consumer who places a functionally identical $50 bet on the same game through Kalshi receives none of it. The CFTC itself appears uncomfortable with this state of affairs. In September 2025, the Commission issued an advisory cautioning that it “has not taken any official action” approving the listing of sports-related event contracts. This is a remarkable posture as the agency that claims exclusive jurisdiction over these markets has disclaimed having approved them, while simultaneously asserting that no other regulator may step in. V. Sports Integrity Falls Through the Cracks Beyond consumer protection, prediction markets create sports-integrity risks that the CFTC is institutionally unequipped to manage. State gaming commissions maintain cooperative relationships with professional and collegiate leagues to monitor suspicious wagering, investigate match-fixing, and enforce prohibitions on insider betting by athletes, coaches, and officials. These relationships are formalized through integrity agreements, data-sharing protocols, and real-time monitoring systems. Prediction markets operating under the CFTC framework exist outside these networks entirely. Kalshi’s self-certified contracts explicitly disclaim endorsement by the NFL, NBA, NHL, or NCAA. No integrity agreement governs the exchange’s relationship with the leagues whose contests determine contract payouts. The CFTC’s surveillance infrastructure, built to police manipulation in oil futures and interest-rate swaps, lacks the sport-specific expertise that state gaming investigators have developed over years of cooperation with leagues. Position-limit rules designed for commodity markets may be poorly calibrated to detect the kind of correlated, low-dollar wagering patterns that signal match-fixing in sports. This gap is particularly acute for amateur athletics. The NCAA’s governance structure is fragile, and collegiate athletes remain uniquely vulnerable to corruption given their historically limited compensation, even as NIL opportunities have begun to change the economic landscape. State gaming laws frequently impose heightened restrictions on college-sports wagering, and several states prohibit it entirely. Those restrictions reflect a deliberate legislative judgment that the integrity risks surrounding amateur competition warrant special protection. None of them apply to event contracts traded on a CFTC-registered exchange. VI. Congress Should Close the Gap Before the Courts Make It Permanent The courts will eventually resolve the preemption question, likely at the Supreme Court level.  But waiting for that resolution is risky. If the Third or Fourth Circuit adopts the broad preemption theory endorsed by the New Jersey and initial Nevada decisions, the result will be a permanent carve-out from state gaming law for any company that structures its sports bets as CFTC-regulated event contracts. Companies like Sleeper Markets LLC are already lining up to enter the market. DraftKings and FanDuel have announced prediction-market business lines. The longer Congress waits, the more entrenched this regulatory arbitrage becomes. A targeted legislative fix need not dismantle the prediction-market industry. Congress should amend the CEA to clarify that the CFTC’s exclusive-jurisdiction provision does not preempt state gaming laws as applied to event contracts whose underlying events are the outcomes of professional or amateur sporting events. This approach would preserve the CFTC’s authority over event contracts generally (weather futures, political outcomes, economic indicators) while recognizing that sports wagering involves a distinct set of consumer-protection and integrity concerns that states are better positioned to address. Alternatively, Congress could adopt a cooperative-federalism model, analogous to frameworks it has employed in environmental and securities regulation, requiring any exchange listing sports event contracts to comply with baseline consumer-protection standards equivalent to state gaming requirements: age verification, self-exclusion programs, responsible-gambling disclosures, advertising restrictions, and mandatory integrity agreements with the relevant leagues. Such a model would also require the CFTC to coordinate with state gaming commissions on suspicious-activity monitoring, closing the information-sharing gap that currently exists. The Dodd-Frank Act’s expansion of CFTC jurisdiction over swaps was designed to close gaps in derivatives regulation following the 2008 financial crisis, not to create a federal safe harbor for sports gambling. The post- Loper Bright judicial environment, which demands closer statutory interpretation rather than deference to agency constructions, further supports reading the CEA’s preemptive reach narrowly. VII. Conclusion   The Murphy  Court observed that “Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it elects not to do so, each State is free to act on its own.” That principle is now under threat. Sports-related prediction markets have found a way to offer the functional equivalent of a sports bet while claiming the jurisdictional protections of federal commodities law, sidestepping the consumer safeguards and integrity infrastructure that states spent years building. The current framework, in which identical products are subject to entirely different regulatory regimes depending on what they are called, is untenable. It fails to protect consumers, it compromises sports integrity, and it represents a form of regulatory arbitrage that neither Congress nor the CFTC ever intended. If Congress does not act, the courts will be left to resolve a conflict the law was never designed to address, and consumers will bear the cost. Zahan Shokrekhuda is the 2026 Conduct Detrimental Writing Competition runner-up. This article placed him second.

1.     Introduction The regulation of sports betting and how sports-related prediction markets fit in is important because gambling harms consumers by placing them in a position of a mathematically guaranteed disadvantage. Common law tests for gambling fail to capture gambling’s distinct harmful nature by only considering the relative aspects of skill and chance within an activity, but state gambling statutes in the places where gambling is most prevalent better account for the danger of gambling by classifying percentage games as gambling. It is currently unclear whether sports-related prediction markets are governed by federal law or state law, but either one can handle their regulation, provided that they keep gambling’s percentage game nature at the center of the analysis. 2.     The True Danger of Gambling and Why it Should be Regulated Central to the intersection of sports betting and sports-related prediction markets are the considerations of what gambling actually is and why it is important to analyze whether existing legal frameworks are sufficient to handle these markets. In short, why does this topic matter? When people think of gambling, some might think of it as a risky endeavor—risky in the sense that, maybe they win, maybe they lose. In reality, gambling is far from risky. For a casino or sportsbook, gambling is about as much of a sure thing as there is. To oversimplify, “[t]he house always wins.” If the house always wins, who is losing? Casinos and sportsbooks are in a position of inevitable profitability because they offer what the law calls “percentage game[s].”  In a percentage game, “ the house collects money calculated as a portion of the wager made or sums won in play.”  A percentage game places the house in the position of obtaining profit without incurring any risk of loss. Roulette is an example of a percentage game, commonly listed in proximity to the percentage game phrasing within state statutes. A quick breakdown of roulette reveals how percentage games work. Roulette features a wheel with thirty-eight tiles, numbered 00,0, and 1–36.  To play the game, the roulette wheel is spun, the ball is dropped in the wheel, and the ball eventually settles in one of the tile spots. One possible bet is a bet on any single number.  With this bet, there is 1/38 chance that it will win. However, a winning single number bet only pays 35x the money.  Thus, if a player bets $1 and loses, they will lose $1. But if the player wins, instead of receiving $38, they only receive $35. The casino keeps the remaining $3, or 7.89%, of the winnings for themselves. This 7.89% is the money calculated as a portion of the sums won in play that the house collects, making roulette a classic percentage game. Thanks to mathematical formulas like this, which are also present in all other casino games, it becomes impossible for there to be any such thing as a profitable player in the long run. Sportsbooks also have a percentage game nature to them, known as Vigorish (“Vig”). Vig is the “built-in-commission” in a sportsbook that “is not displayed as a separate fee but is instead embedded in the odds offered” and allows the sportsbook to “earn a profit regardless of the result of a sporting event.” Vig is similar to house edge in a casino. It guarantees a margin of profit for sportsbooks by slightly tilting the odds in their favor. Sports bettors therefore face a “mathematical disadvantage” and even “well-reasoned bets . . . fight[] an uphill battle.” As a result, 97% or more sports bettors lose money in the long run. Gambling’s percentage game nature is why its regulation is crucial. Gambling is worse than risky for a player, because the player is mathematically guaranteed to lose money over time. This mathematical guarantee is what makes gambling dangerous for consumers. Any legal framework that considers sports-related prediction markets and their gambling status must consider the percentage game nature of gambling. 3.     State Law on Gambling State common law classifies an activity as gambling when a participant pays consideration for the opportunity to win a prize in a game of chance. Skill is the counterpart to chance. Whether a game is one of chance is determinative, and there are three tests for whether a game is a one of chance: the predominant factor test, the material element test, and the any chance test. If a game is one of chance then it is gambling, but if it is one of skill then it is not gambling.  All three tests consider the relative aspects of skill and chance in an activity to determine its gambling status. Unfortunately, these tests miss the mark, because they fail to address the percentage game nature of gambling, which is the part most dangerous to consumers. One justice’s dissent in a recent New York case highlights this failure. In White v. Cuomo , New York’s highest court considered the gambling status of Daily Fantasy Sports contests. The court applied the predominant factor test and found “resounding support” for the legislature’s determination that these contests were games of skill and not chance. Judge Wilson dissented, critiquing a gambling classification that analyzed a game’s relative measure of skill or chance. He contemplated that under the majority’s analysis, “blackjack . . . and commonly understood forms of gambling [would] not [be] gambling, because of the level of skill they entail.” Judge Wilson is correct. He mentioned blackjack, which undoubtedly involves significant skill and strategy. There are over 1,300 books covering blackjack listed on Amazon alone. These books are authored by “serious blackjack players” who have “spent hours studying various blackjack strategies.” Yet, despite the overriding presence of skill in blackjack, it is unquestionably gambling. Moreover, even with perfect strategy, the player only has a 42% chance of winning, a 49% chance of losing, and an 8.5% chance of tying. The player is guaranteed to lose in the long run, in spite of the predominant level of skill involved, because blackjack is a percentage game. It would be naïve to not classify blackjack as gambling due to the skill involved. In this way, common law gambling tests fall short of protecting consumers by failing to capture a definitive aspect of gambling. Contrastingly, state gambling statutes do address gambling’s defining characteristic. To name a few, Nevada, New Jersey, and California all classify “any . . . percentage game” as gambling. Nevada’s classification of percentage games as gambling is particularly significant, given that Nevada is “the state which has the greatest acquaintanceship with commercial gambling.” Second to Nevada in that department is New Jersey. Indeed, Nevada is home to Las Vegas and New Jersey is home to Atlantic City, the two cities who have historically monopolized casino gambling. Each year from 2001–2014, Nevada accounted for the highest percentage of U.S. gambling revenue amongst states, and New Jersey accounted for the second highest. The states who are most closely acquainted with gambling choosing to classify percentage games as gambling should play a crucial role in analyzing a particular activity’s gambling status. 4.     How Should Sports-Related Prediction Markets Fit In With respect to sports-related prediction markets, their gambling status remains undetermined. It is currently unclear if these prediction markets are financial assets, in which case they would be exclusively overseen by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), or if they are instead gambling, in which case they are reachable by state gambling law. The Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) provided the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction over accounts, agreements, and transactions involving swaps or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery. Thus, the CEA may have preempted state gambling laws, and courts have come to different conclusions on this issue. In Kalshiex, LLC v. Hendrick , the court found that a sports-related prediction market, Kalshi, was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC and that state law was preempted. However, in Kalshiex LLC v. Martin , currently on appeal, the court instead concluded that the CEA does not preempt state gambling laws with respect to sports-related event contracts. Under either legal framework, there is the potential for properly addressing these markets, so long as each framework follows the proper approach. If state gambling law is preempted by the CEA’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC on future financial assets with respect to these markets, then the CFTC can take action to ensure consumers are protected. The CEA empowers the CFTC with a “special rule for review and approval of event contracts,” which allows the CFTC to determine that event contracts “are contrary to the public interest” if they “involve” certain activity, including “gaming.” Hence, the CFTC is explicitly empowered to outlaw these markets if they are gaming. The CFTC should certainly consider whether they are gaming. In doing so, they should examine whether the markets are offering a percentage game, because that is the aspect of gambling that is dangerous to consumers, as analyzed above. On the other hand, if state gambling law is not preempted, then states should consider for themselves whether these markets are gambling or not. In so doing, they should avoid the common law tests for gambling, because they fail to address gambling’s harm to consumers. Instead, they should look to statutory schemes that define gambling as percentage games, because this approach will ensure consumers are best protected. In sum, whether the CFTC or state gambling law is the proper source for classification of these markets, either one is capable of addressing the markets, provided that they consider the percentage game nature of gambling. With respect to how such an analysis applies to these markets, it could go either way. Given that there is no house and that the contracts are peer-to-peer, it does not seem that there is a house collecting a portion of the wagers made or sums won in play, as the definition of a percentage game requires. On the other hand, the “main source of revenue for exchanges and brokerages is the fees they charge on each trade,” which seems like these platforms are collecting a portion of the trades made. Such a setup may make it next to impossible to be a winning trader in the long run, in the same way that it is next to impossible to be a profitable sports bettor in the long term due to the percentage game nature of sports betting. Nevertheless, the fees charged on each trade may not be as significant as the percentage of Vig in a sportsbook bet or percentage of winnings kept by the casino in a roulette game. Moreover, if the fees charged on each trade are not unique to the sports-related prediction markets, or even are not unique to the prediction markets in general, then such fees may not actually make these sports markets a percentage game. 5.     Conclusion In sum, the regulation of sports betting matters because of sports betting’s potential to harm consumers. What makes gambling harmful to consumers is its percentage game nature, which places consumers at a mathematical disadvantage, guaranteed to lose money in the long run. State common law does not address the percentage game nature of gambling, but crucial state statutes do. No matter whether the CFTC or state common law will be charged with the task of regulating sports-related prediction markets, the percentage game nature of gambling should guide the analysis. Louis Christifano is the 2026 Conduct Detrimental Writing Competition Winner. This article placed him first.

This past NFL offseason was as electric and unprecedented as we've seen in recent history — from center Tyler Linderbaum resetting the market with his new $81 million contract with the Las Vegas Raiders, to outside linebacker Trey Hendrickson and his $112 million contract with the Baltimore Ravens. Better yet, the deal that was heard around the league but was too good to be true: the Raiders sending Maxx Crosby to the Ravens in exchange for two first-round draft picks. "Done deal" was written all over this blockbuster trade: Crosby flew out to Baltimore and even posted on his social media as a tease that he was going to be a Raven. Then, the unexpected happened: the Raiders announced via X that the Ravens had "backed out" of the deal – rattling the league and its affiliates. Every behavioral signal pointed toward a done deal once the 2026 league year opened. Yet, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) provided zero enforcement to make the agreement binding, leaving the Raiders with a disgruntled player. The Maxx Crosby situation sheds light on a structural deficiency in how the NFL governs agreements made during the moratorium window, and implied-in-fact contract theory illustrates why the current framework is inadequate. To understand why the deal sent shockwaves through the league, the timeline matters. The Raiders and Ravens had agreed to send Maxx Crosby to Baltimore in exchange for two first-round draft picks. This would have signaled a full organizational reset in Las Vegas. Crosby traveled to Baltimore, medical records were exchanged in advance, and completing the physical was understood by all parties to be a formality. Then, the night before the 2026 league year officially opened — the moment agreements become enforceable — the Raiders posted on X: "The Baltimore Ravens have backed out of our trade agreement for Maxx Crosby." The trade did not fall through because of a failed physical or an injury concern. The Raiders simply backed out. The distinction matters legally, and Las Vegas made sure everyone knew it. The reaction across the league was immediate and pointed. One team executive told CBS Sports it “doesn’t smell right.” An agent questioned whether any team could trust Baltimore going forward, and an NFL source said they didn’t think “many teams will feel comfortable trading with the Ravens.” No formal league mechanism was triggered – but the reputational damage was real and widely acknowledged. Adding fuel to the fire, reports surfaced that Trey Hendrickson — the very player Baltimore turned around and signed to a $112 million deal — had significantly lowered his asking price right around the time the Crosby physical was conducted. The suggestion was hard to ignore: the Ravens may have found the deal they actually wanted and needed a way out of the one they had already made. To appreciate why the Raiders have a grievance worth examining, implied-in-fact contract theory is essential. Unlike an express contract — where obligations are memorialized with signatures and clear terms — an implied-in-fact contract arises entirely from the conduct of the parties. As defined in 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 4 at pp. 557-560: A 'contract implied in fact'… arises where the intention of the parties is not expressed, but an agreement in fact, creating an obligation, is implied or presumed from their acts, or, as it has been otherwise stated, where there are circumstances which, according to the ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men, show a mutual intent to contract. Apply that standard to what happened here. Crosby was flown to Baltimore. Medical records were formally exchanged. Both organizations communicated publicly and internally as though the deal was done. Under any ordinary commercial framework, the mutual intent to contract was present and demonstrable. Where it breaks down is the CBA. Because the agreement was reached during the moratorium window — before the 2026 league year officially opened — it carried no binding force under the league's governing framework. NFL trades are contingent on passing a physical, and the CBA expressly states that certain conditions must be satisfied before a trade is legitimized. The Ravens are hiding behind that language. But there is a critical distinction: the argument is not that Baltimore breached a contract. It is that the conduct of both organizations created reasonable reliance. However, the CBA protects none of it. The Raiders restructured their offseason, moved capital toward other assets, and operated as an organization that had just acquired two first-round picks. When the deal collapsed, they were left absorbing consequences the league's governing document never anticipated and still does not address. The Maxx Crosby situation is not the first time a failed physical has raised eyebrows around the league, and the Ravens themselves are no strangers to this pattern. In 2018, Baltimore voided a four-year, $29 million agreement with wide receiver Ryan Grant following a physical, and in 2020 a deal with Michael Brockers collapsed under similar circumstances. Each time, the league shrugged. Each time, there was no formal accountability mechanism to speak of. What separates Crosby is the scale of the reliance. At stake were two first-round picks and a player who relocated and made his intentions public. The free agency market moved around a deal everyone believed was done. The Raiders absorbed $30 million in lost cap space according to Spotrac, the result of a $281.5 million spending spree executed under the assumption that Crosby – and his $35.79 million cap hit – was gone. Those damages are concrete and calculable. But the Ravens did not escape consequence either. Having burned their leverage in the market by pulling out of the Crosby deal hours before the league year opened, Baltimore turned around and signed Trey Hendrickson – a player who, per CBS Sports, had been seeking approximately $35 million per year before the Ravens’ pivot created urgency. He settled for $28 million per year. Whether Baltimore overpaid relative to where that negotiation was heading absent the Crosby collapse is a fair question – and one that Ravens front office would rather not answer publicly. Implied-in-fact contract theory does not get the Raiders their picks back. What it does is expose exactly why the next CBA negotiation cannot treat this window as an afterthought. Standardized physical evaluation criteria and a good faith obligation once medical records are formally exchanged are not radical proposals — they are the minimum the framework owed to teams and players who operate in good faith. The conduct was there. The contract, unfortunately, was not.

Professional sports teams have a long history of deficiencies in their trademark filings and registrations. This was on full display when the Utah NHL franchise’s early flirtation with the name “Utah Yetis,” which created immediate conflicts with the well-established YETI outdoor goods company. While Cleveland rebranded from the Indians to Guardians, they ran into a trademark dispute. A men’s roller derby team in Cleveland had been using the name “Cleveland Guardians” and selling branded merchandise for years. When Major League Baseball’s franchise announced the same new name, the roller derby team sued, alleging trademark infringement and consumer confusion. No one realized there was a team with the same name during their trademark search. This research mistake led to the baseball team having to pay the roller derby team an “amicable” amount in their resolution. These disputes show how even billion-dollar organizations can face operational and financial complications when they fail to conduct proper trademark due diligence. Now, as the Oakland Athletics prepare to relocate to Las Vegas in 2028, they recently filed two trademark applications for the names LAS VEGAS ATHLETICS and VEGAS ATHLETICS but were denied by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for the second time. The refusal is non-final, meaning the Athletics will have the opportunity to respond for the third time. The USPTO viewed the proposed names as primarily geographically descriptive and lacking distinctiveness. Geographic descriptiveness refers to a name that primarily tells consumers where goods or services come from, rather than identifying who provides them. A “geographic indicator” refers to a word or phrase that primarily tells consumers where goods or services originate, rather than identifying the specific source providing them. Business names such as “New York Pizza,” “Miami Fitness,” or “Texas BBQ” immediately communicate location. They inform the public about geographic origin, but they do not, on their own, clearly distinguish one business from another. Allowing one business to own that word would unfairly block others from describing where they are or what they do. That is why a brand name has the strongest chance of obtaining federal trademark protection when it is distinctive and unique, because it sets itself apart from other brands. The USPTO stated in the Office Action that the most important part of “Las Vegas Athletics” is “Las Vegas,” which is a famous location that people immediately recognize. The word “Athletics” is commonly used in sports and does not really make the name unique. The USPTO concluded the name simply describes a baseball team from Las Vegas, rather than pointing to one specific brand. The USPTO also noted that ATHLETICS refers to “activities such as sports, exercises, and games that require physical skill and stamina.” The term is commonly used in the sports world and, as a result, does little to make the overall mark unique or distinctive. This common usage weakens its ability to distinguish the team’s brand from other sports-related organizations. A defense to an Office Action for lack of distinctiveness is that the mark has acquired distinctiveness. Acquired distinctiveness is when a name that started as ordinary or descriptive becomes a protectable trademark because people have come to recognize it over time. The Athletics tried a version of this by pointing to their long history dating back to the Philadelphia Athletics in 1901 and through subsequent stops in Kansas City and Oakland. The USPTO did not agree and stated, “applicant’s claim of ownership of such registration is insufficient evidence of acquired distinctiveness because the mark is highly descriptive of the goods and/or services.” The team's history did not help. Even having the OAKLAND ATHLETICS as a registered trademark does not matter because these are two totally different marks. The team has not played as a Las Vegas franchise yet, so there is not sufficient marketplace evidence that “Las Vegas Athletics” acquired distinctiveness. The Athletics are not alone in their struggle for distinctiveness. The Las Vegas Raiders, who relocated from Oakland in 2020 and now play their home games at Allegiant Stadium, took nearly ten years to secure a trademark registration for “Las Vegas Raiders.” Trademark records show that at one point their application was suspended because third-party filers beat them to the mark, delaying the process and driving up legal costs. This shows that the Athletics are not the only team in Las Vegas facing trademark challenges tied to their move. Did the Athletics “mess up,” or do they simply need more time for their Las Vegas identity to marinate? The most accurate view is that this is a problem of timing, not negligence. Typically, the Athletics could have shown real-world evidence, such as strong sales, widespread advertising, media exposure, and public recognition, that is usually needed to overcome a descriptiveness refusal. Now, one of the few ways to show this would be to create a consumer survey that would show how the public strongly connects the name “Las Vegas Athletics” with the Athletics organization and its Major League Baseball team. This would take time and money, which they do have, especially if they extend their deadline to answer the Office Action. Unfortunately, without a federal trademark registration, it becomes much harder for the team to stop unauthorized merchandise sellers and other third parties from using the name. Without it, the Athletics are left to rely more heavily on limited common-law rights, which are narrower, harder to prove, and often restricted to the specific areas where the team can show actual use. That makes enforcement slower, more expensive, and less predictable, especially in a market like Las Vegas, where tourism, pop-up vendors, and online merchandise create constant opportunities for brand misuse. Receiving a trademark registration sooner rather than later would be more beneficial, but the exact timing is the big question. Ultimately, until the team fully establishes itself in Las Vegas and consumers come to associate the name with one specific source, the legal foundation for federal protection will remain difficult to prove. Once that public association is established, the Athletics will be positioned to secure federal trademark registration making this a question of timing, not viability.

Nike is defending its revived Total 90 soccer line against trademark infringement claims brought by a smaller company that obtained federal registration for the mark after Nike’s earlier registration lapsed. Central to the   dispute  is whether Nike’s longstanding but allegedly limited recent use of the mark preserves its common-law rights despite the lapse of its federal registration. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and, following a preliminary injunction hearing in January 2026, ordered both parties to submit supplemental briefing on critical issues of trademark use and abandonment. Although the case remains unresolved, it highlights the risks associated with letting legacy marks lapse, as well as the evidentiary challenges involved in proving continuous use. Case Background Nike launched its iconic Total 90 soccer cleat line in 2000 but allowed its federal registration for “TOTAL 90” to lapse in 2019 as primary use declined. In 2022, Hugh Bartlett, a New Orleans–based engineer and youth soccer coach, obtained a federal registration for the nearly identical mark “TOTAL 90” through Total90 LLC. The registration was based on use beginning in 2019 for a fantasy soccer app and later expanded into apparel and footwear. Seeking to capitalize on nostalgia ahead of the 2026 World Cup, Nike began relaunching retro Total 90 products in 2025. In December 2024, Bartlett allegedly contacted Nike to propose a collaboration. Negotiations continued for nearly a year but soured when, according to Nike, Bartlett demanded $2.5 million to assign the registration or face litigation. Total90 LLC then filed suit in November 2025, asserting claims for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and reverse confusion under the Lanham Act. Total90 argued that Nike abandoned the mark after its registration lapsed and that Nike’s high-profile relaunch was overwhelming Total90’s smaller brand presence. Nike responded that it remained the senior user and that, despite letting the registration lapse, it had never abandoned the mark, as evidenced by product sales, promotional activity, and licensing arrangements involving the Total 90 name. On November 26, 2025, Chief Judge Wendy B. Vitter   denied  Total90’s motion for a temporary restraining order, finding insufficient evidence of likelihood of success or irreparable harm. After a subsequent preliminary injunction hearing, the court ordered supplemental briefing focused on whether Nike’s activities between 2019 and 2024 constitute bona fide trademark use sufficient to avoid abandonment. Shortly after submitting supplemental briefing, Nike filed its answer, which included counterclaims seeking cancellation of Total90’s federal registrations. Among other allegations, Nike asserts that Total90 committed fraud on the USPTO by declaring that it was unaware of any prior users with superior rights despite Nike’s historical use of the mark. If Nike prevails on this counterclaim, Total90’s registrations could be canceled and Total90 would be barred from relying on the presumptions of validity and exclusivity that normally accompany federal registration. Key Takeaways for Trademark Practitioners and Brand Owners Although the court has yet to rule on the motion for preliminary injunction, this case already offers several key insights for trademark practitioners and brand owners. Abandonment Is Not Automatic Upon Lapsed Registration One issue in the case is whether Nike abandoned its rights to the “TOTAL 90” mark by failing to renew. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1127, a mark is abandoned when “its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume,” or when the owner “causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark.” Nonuse for three consecutive years creates a rebuttable presumption of abandonment, but the burden is on the challenger to prove both discontinuance and intent. Mere failure to renew a registration does not constitute abandonment. Courts routinely   recognize  that the lapse of a federal registration does not extinguish common-law rights where bona fide use continues. As Judge Vitter noted in denying the TRO, trademark rights flow from use, not registration. However, the supplemental briefing demonstrates that the type and extent of use matters greatly. Brand owners must maintain more than token or sporadic use and should document ongoing commercial activities to defend against abandonment claims. The takeaway for brand owners is that even minimal ongoing use of dormant marks should be carefully documented and must constitute genuine commercial activity rather than mere warehousing. But only sporadic can increase vulnerability, especially if a third party later adopts and registers the mark in good faith. Senior Common-Law Rights Can Trump Junior Registration—But Must Be Proven Even when a junior party holds a later federal registration, a senior common-law user’s prior rights can prevail based on first use in commerce. The registration’s presumptions of exclusivity under   §§ 1057(b)  and   1115(a)  are rebuttable by evidence of earlier use. However, as this case illustrates, asserting senior common-law rights requires substantial proof. The senior user must demonstrate not only prior use but also continuous use without abandonment. Generic assertions of “ongoing use” unsupported by sales data, inventory records, or testimony from knowledgeable witnesses may be insufficient, particularly when the senior user allowed its registration to lapse. Nike’s counterclaims seeking cancellation of Total90’s registrations reflect the offensive potential of priority disputes. Rather than simply defending against infringement claims, senior users can affirmatively attack junior registrations through cancellation proceedings based on lack of priority or fraud. Documentation Is Key to Proving Continuous Use The evidentiary difficulties Nike faced at the preliminary injunction hearing (specifically, the inability to provide concrete sales figures or testimony from personnel with direct knowledge of the relevant time period) illustrate the importance of maintaining detailed records of trademark use. Brand owners should: Maintain comprehensive sales records, invoicing, and shipping documentation for all products bearing dormant or legacy marks Document promotional activities, such as online marketing, social media posts, and advertising campaigns Preserve licensing agreements and monitor licensee use Conduct periodic audits to verify ongoing use and identify marks at risk of abandonment Create contemporaneous business records reflecting intent to continue using marks, even during periods of reduced activity Trademark Office Declarations Carry Serious Consequences Nike’s fraud counterclaims highlight the risks associated with trademark application declarations. Applicants must exercise good faith and reasonable diligence in investigating potential prior users before declaring to the USPTO that they are unaware of any other party with superior rights. Although applicants are not required to conduct exhaustive searches, actual knowledge of a well-known prior user creates a duty to disclose. The potential consequences of fraudulent declarations are significant and include cancellation of the registration, loss of all presumptions of validity and exclusivity, monetary penalties, and attorneys’ fees. Thus, brand owners should err on the side of disclosure when aware of potential conflicts. Portfolio Management and Revival Risks Nike’s experience offers a practical lesson for brands reviving legacy marks. Even well-known names benefit from consistent portfolio maintenance, including timely § 8 and § 9 filings. Docketing systems and periodic audits of dormant marks help reduce the risk that nostalgic brands are picked up by opportunistic registrants. For smaller companies, acquiring a lapsed registration can create leverage, but enforcing it against a senior user with substantial historical goodwill carries real risk, including challenges based on prior use or allegations of bad-faith adoption. Conclusion As the case proceeds, the court’s analysis will likely focus on whether Nike’s activities between 2019 and 2024 constitute bona fide trademark use sufficient to overcome the presumption of abandonment. The outcome may provide guidance on how courts distinguish between legitimate minimal use and impermissible token use when legacy brands fall dormant. Regardless of the ultimate result, the dispute reinforces a fundamental principle of trademark law: rights depend on use, and even brands as recognizable as Nike must demonstrate continuous, documented commercial activity to preserve their claims to a mark. Alec McNiff is an Associate at a global law firm and licensed to practice law in California. He earned his J.D. from University of Michigan Law School and holds a business degree from University of Southern California. (Twitter: @Alec_McNiff). This content is for general information only, not legal advice.

Over the past few weeks, the league fined the Utah Jazz $500,000 and the Indiana Pacers $100,000 for conduct it deemed detrimental to the league. In Indiana’s case, the issue centered on player participation in a February 3 loss to Utah. Indiana held out three starters (Pascal Siakam, Andrew Nembhard, and Aaron Nesmith) on the second night of a back-to-back. Following an investigation that included review by an independent physician, the NBA concluded that the players could have participated under the policy’s medical standard, including potentially playing reduced minutes. The league also stated that the team could have structured the absences differently across other games to remain compliant with the policy.   In Utah’s case, it was fourth-quarter substitution patterns involving Lauri Markkanen and Jaren Jackson Jr. in games against the Orlando Magic and Miami Heat. According to the NBA, the Jazz removed Lauri Markkanen and Jaren Jackson Jr. from those games despite both players being able to continue playing and with the outcomes still in doubt. The league concluded the decision prioritized developmental and roster-management considerations over competitive integrity, which it classified as “conduct detrimental to the league.”   With the 2026 draft class widely viewed as elite, the incentives for teams to engage in this form of tanking are obvious. However, the legal questions are far more complicated.   Commissioner Adam Silver has reportedly been “forceful” with general managers about addressing tanking, and the league is considering structural reforms for next season: freezing lottery odds at the trade deadline, prohibiting consecutive top-four picks, allocating odds based on two-year records, and limiting pick protections to certain bands. These are not cosmetic tweaks. They are fundamental changes to how competitive incentives are engineered.   From a sports law perspective, this is about governance power, collectively bargained rights, and evidentiary processes.   Start with the player participation policy, adopted in 2023 and primarily aimed at “star players.” The policy empowers an independent physician to review medical documentation and determine whether a player could participate without substantial risk. But it also contains a broader clause giving the commissioner authority to penalize teams for non-participation deemed “prejudicial or detrimental” to the NBA. That language is sweeping. It mirrors the traditional “conduct detrimental” standard seen across major leagues and has historically survived challenges because of the commissioner’s broad, collectively bargained discretion.   Yet the Pacers’ situation introduces a procedural wrinkle. Coach Rick Carlisle publicly questioned the investigative process, alleging that the league relied on a medical review that did not include direct examination by team physicians. According to Carlisle, the league determined that Siakam (who qualifies as a “star player” under the policy) and two other starters were healthy enough to play in some capacity under the policy’s medical standard by using a review of medical records instead of examining the supposedly injured players directly. In response, the NBA maintained that an independent physician led the review and that Pacers team executives were also interviewed. If this dispute escalates, it raises due process-adjacent questions within the CBA framework: What constitutes a sufficient medical review? How much deference is owed to team doctors? And how transparent must the league be when applying competitive integrity standards?   Then there’s the draft lottery itself. Tanking is not a rules violation in the abstract. Teams are allowed to rebuild. They are allowed to prioritize development. They are allowed to manage minutes. The line the NBA is trying to police is “overt behavior” that prioritizes draft position over winning. But that line is inherently subjective.   The more discretion the league asserts, the more it risks tension with the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA), particularly if players feel pressured to play through injuries to satisfy competitive optics. Any structural reform to lottery odds or pick eligibility will almost certainly implicate collectively bargained provisions. Even if the league has authority to modify certain competitive mechanics, meaningful changes that affect player movement value and draft economics could invite NBPA scrutiny.   There’s also the trade overlay. Indiana’s top-four protected 2026 first-round pick (sent to the Los Angeles Clippers in the Ivica Zubac deal) creates a rational incentive to finish in the bottom tier. When protection structures are legal, disclosed, and strategically rational, is maximizing lottery odds truly “conduct detrimental”? Or is it front-office optimization within the rules as written?   This is the central paradox. The NBA designed flattened lottery odds to discourage tanking. It created a player participation policy to protect national broadcasts and competitive optics. Now it is contemplating further reforms because teams continue to respond rationally to draft incentives.   You can fine behavior. You can adjust odds. You can restrict consecutive top picks. But unless the incentive structure changes in a way that aligns long-term team value with short-term competitiveness, tanking will remain a feature, not a bug.   The legal battle isn’t just about whether a player could have played 18 minutes on the second night of a back-to-back. It’s about how far a commissioner’s “integrity of the game” power extends in an era of sophisticated roster management and asset engineering.   Competitive integrity is a foundational principle. So is collectively bargained discretion. The NBA is now stress-testing both at the same time.   Oliver Canning is a 3L at the University of Miami School of Law. He can be followed on Twitter (X) @OCanning and found on LinkedIn .

As reported last night by Atlanta Falcons Reporter Marc Raimondi , Falcons Defensive End James Pearce Jr., was arrested Saturday on multiple felony charges. Those felonies include: two counts of Aggravated Battery with a Deadly Weapon, one count of Aggravated Stalking, one count of Fleeing to Elude, one count of Aggravated Battery on Law Enforcement and one count of Resisting an Officer without Violence. The Defendant is currently in jail awaiting his first appearance where a Judge will decide a bond for Aggravated Battery DW (Deadly Weapon and Law Enforcement) as well as the stalking charge. The most serious charges are the Aggravated Battery with a Deadly Weapon charge as well as the Aggravated Battery on Law Enforcement. The latter is a 1 st degree felony punishable by up to 30 years in prison with a 5-year day for day minimum mandatory. That means the Defendant walks into prison on January 1, 2027, they cannot walk out until January 1, 2032. There is no gain time on charges. So, what actually led to this? Per Andy Slater , the entire situation started after Pearce Jr., allegedly stalked his ex-girlfriend from his car and tried to get into her car at an intersection. However, this is where the serious allegations begin. Slater also stated that Pearce, “intentionally crashed his Lamborghini into his ex-girlfriend car multiple times, trying to stop her from getting to a police station.” That is where the Aggravated Battery with a Deadly Weapon charge come in to play as the vehicle itself is the deadly weapon. The alleged intentional act of ramming your vehicle into another’s vehicle is where the charge stems them. However, I ultimately believe the two counts will be reduced to one count if Pearce allegedly tried to ram the alleged victim twice in the same transaction or occurrence within a short amount of time. It would create a potential double jeopardy issue. However, Aggravated Battery on Law Enforcement is by far the most serious charge because of the minimum mandatory. “Aggravated Battery on Law Enforcement requires the Defendant, in committing the battery to use a deadly weapon (a car is a deadly weapon).” As Slater reported, “Pearce intentionally drove into a police officer, hitting the cop’s knee in an effort to get away.” It is unclear from the police narrative whether the defendant was intending to drive into the officer’s knee or was just driving off. As stated in the Florida jury instructions, the Defendant must, “actually and intentionally have struck the alleged victim against his or her will.” Mr. Pearce may have been driving off, but it is unclear if he intentionally tried to strike the officer. The problem for Pearce Jr., is that Aggravated Battery on Law Enforcement is almost always charged by the State Attorney’s Office because they do not need to worry about victim cooperation – law enforcement, as the alleged victim, is always cooperative. The case depends on whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction. If there wasn’t intent or the officer wasn’t really injured, the charge will likely be reduced by a judge or jury potentially to Battery on Law Enforcement, which is still a felony, but much less serious one. What happens from here? The Defendant has his first appearance in court today or tomorrow at the latest. The judge will set his bond and any pretrial conditions they deem necessary. From there, the battle begins.   Matthew F. Tympanick, is a criminal defense attorney, personal injury attorney, and sports law attorney from Sarasota, Florida who has tried 45 criminal and civil jury and non-jury trials. You can see him regularly on Court TV, Live Now from Fox, Law & Crime Network and has appeared on television, radio, and podcasts throughout the country discussing sports criminal law issues. Matthew is also a NFLPA certified contract advisor. You can follow him on all forms of social @TympanickLaw.